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MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

IMPORTANCE OF TIMELY RECONNAISSANCE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Col V. Koval', deputy chief of staff of Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "The Commander and Modern Combat: B - What is the 'Enemy' Like?"]

[Text] At precisely the designated time the reinforced motorized rifle company commanded by Sr Lt N. Kazakov attacked the "enemy" in the strongpoint. Attacking subunits already had wedged into the defense and had begun to penetrate into the depth, but suddenly a hail of fire came down on the combat formations of the company and reinforcing subunits from the front and flank. The attackers had fallen into a fire pocket. Taking advantage of the moment, the "enemy" moved into a counterattack from two directions. The outcome of battle was predetermined.

Just why had the attack failed? The commander's decision for combat had been based on data on the "enemy" which he had received from the senior commander and during ground reconnaissance.

It turned out that the reconnaissance data had been obtained the previous evening. But that night the "enemy" had made a maneuver and had taken his main body to another line, setting up defenses there with the calculation of drawing the attackers into a fire pocket. He succeeded in doing this because the motorized rifle company commander, the commander of the attached artillery battery Sr Lt V. Kulesh and other officers had scorned reconnaissance.

This incident happened not long ago. Unfortunately even now, in the concluding phase of the training year, such examples are not isolated. They indicate once again how dangerous it is to ignore reconnaissance in modern combat, which is characterized by a frequent and abrupt change in the situation. Practice convinces us that without accurate data on the enemy's location, the layout of his forces and weapons, nature of the terrain and so on, it is impossible to count on success either in the attack or in any other kind of combat actions. It also should be emphasized in this regard that the conduct of reconnaissance is not just a matter for reconnaissance subunits. Commanders at all levels must conduct reconnaissance continuously.

Frontline experience provides us much that is instructive in this regard. Here is but one example.

In the summer of 1944 the 771st Rifle Regiment was preparing for an attack. It was faced with a mission of destroying the enemy on an intermediate line.

Continuous reconnaissance was being conducted in all the regiment's subunits. Animation was noticed on the Hitlerites' forward edge of defense in the latter half of the day. Small groups of soldiers were moving from the second trench into the first. Lone tanks appeared in several places on the forward edge of defense. On receiving this information the regimental staff concluded that the enemy was preparing for a counterattack.

But some time later new intelligence came in: Vehicles with personnel and other equipment were moving to the rear. This provided the basis to assume that the enemy subunits were closing up and withdrawing. And that is how it was in actuality. Additional reconnaissance established that the Hitlerites were withdrawing to a new line in the defensive depth. The increase in their activity on the forward edge was merely a demonstration to disorient the attackers. Guessing the enemy's plan in time, the regimental commander issued an order for the attack.

Yes, the importance of reconnaissance as one of the most important kinds of support to troop combat actions is difficult to overestimate. And as indicated by exercises now being held in district units and subunits, a majority of commanders realize this well. They are teaching subordinates to perform reconnaissance in different kinds of combat. Meanwhile, facts similar to that mentioned above attest to our incomplete work in this matter and that all kinds of indulgences and oversimplifications still are allowed in places in preparing personnel, including officers, for actions in modern combat.

Take that same Sr Lt Kazakov. When he was asked after the battle to report what kind of "enemy" was opposing the company and how his forces and weapons were disposed on the terrain, the officer merely repeated what he had learned on receiving the mission from the senior commander. But to the question of why he himself had not conducted reconnaissance, Sr Lt Kazakov responded, in justifying his inactivity, that there were no personnel or means in the company for this.

And that unfortunately is what the subunit commander sometimes believes: The senior commander allegedly has reconnaissance subunits and he must perform reconnaissance. Yes he must, but the platoon, company and battalion commander also is obligated to collect intelligence with his own personnel and means. And not only support himself with the necessary information, but the superior commander as well. It must be noted that the data obtained by personnel of subunits conducting combat and in immediate contact with the enemy have special value. As a rule, they are most reliable and this is very important for the commander to make the proper decision in the dynamics of combat. Here is an episode from an exercise in Motorized Rifle Regiment "X." An acute and contradictory situation took shape in one of its phases. Regimental first echelon subunits, which had deployed into combat formation for an attack, were counterattacked in the flank by tanks. A tactical airborne force landed in the regiment's rear. Moreover, the "enemy" employed smoke on the forward edge in an attempt to conceal the maneuver of personnel and weapons. The regimental staff already had begun to think about a temporary shift to the defense.

But the commander was in no hurry to place the initiative in the "enemy's" hands. He waited for a report from battalion commander Maj G. Bogatchik, attacking on the main axis. And soon the latter reported that the 2d Company commanded by Sr Lt V. Panteleyev was successfully repulsing a counterattack by tanks and infantry, while 3d Company was moving to the flank of the "enemy's" main body defending in the

strongpoint. The strongpoint was being attacked from the front by 1st Company. The combat reconnaissance patrol commander reported that the "enemy" was withdrawing part of his forces to a new line under cover of smoke.

On receiving these data, the commander decided to continue the attack. The regiment won the fight.

Thus success was predetermined largely by the fact that reconnaissance was carried out in all subunits continuously and purposefully. For example, Maj Bogatchik took account of the difficult situation and assigned the most experienced privates, NCO's and officers to reconnaissance. They were provided with necessary means of observation and communications and had specific tasks by time and lines. Data on the "enemy" obtained in the battalion's subunits were reported promptly to the regimental staff.

It stands to reason that the ability to organize and continuously conduct reconnaissance does not come to an officer of itself. Skills needed for this are perfected in classes in the command training system and during independent officer studies, the organization of which, by the way, is given careful attention in the unit. Officers learn methods of performing reconnaissance and perfect practical skills in organizing it under the direction of the regimental intelligence officer.

Field problems and exercises are the best school of proficiency. As a rule, they take place in a difficult situation approaching that of combat to the maximum. Each subunit commander has to be able to assign missions to scouts, generalize and analyze data on the "enemy" and see his true intentions behind the demonstrations. The fact that the regimental commander and chief of staff give subunit commanders an opportunity to act on their own in exercises and do not impose ready-made solutions on them also contributes to the officers' rapid acquisition of the skills needed for this.

But it unfortunately also happens otherwise. I had occasion to observe the following picture in one exercise. When the talk turned to reconnaissance after missions had been assigned to subunits, acting battalion commander Capt V. Naumov threw out in passing: "Reconnaissance departed." To where and for what purpose it had departed remained a secret. It subsequently was learned that the entire battalion reconnaissance consisted of one reconnaissance patrol, which also had no precise mission. Just how did Capt Naumov plan to conduct combat? Against what kind of "enemy"?

"The exercise director will say," responded one of the regimental staff officers.

And as a matter of fact, hardly had a group of targets appeared from a thicket of small trees when the exercise director gave the acting battalion commander a narrative: "You are being counterattacked in the flank by a company of 'enemy' tanks and two infantry platoons."

By giving such narratives the exercise director clearly was in fact freeing subordinate officers of the need to perform reconnaissance, estimate the "enemy," and determine the nature of his actions. While operating under such oversimplified conditions it is no accident that trainees arrive at the conclusion that reconnaissance is a matter for senior commanders and special subunits.

Many tactical exercises are being held now in the concluding phase of the training year. They will be a review of the maturity and combat proficiency of officers and all personnel. It is important to conduct them so that they enrich commanders and all personnel with skills in organizing combat support, including reconnaissance.

6904

CSO: 1801/044

ARMED FORCES

PROGRAM FOR INNOVATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Engineer Yu. Voinov: "Give an Account of Yourself by Introducing Innovations. The Next Review and Competition of Inventors and Efficiency Experts in the Army and Navy."]

[Text] The personnel of units and ships is doing everything possible to master modern technology completely, make skillful use of its combat capabilities, and is exhibiting creativity, wit and inventiveness while doing this. Year in and year out among the troops, in military educational institutions, in military enterprises and organizations, the movement of inventors and efficiency experts is growing and innovations are taking root which have a positive influence on strengthening combat readiness.

Recently, the second and concluding stage of the All-Army Review, which took place with the motto "Strive for Efficiency and Quality", was summed up. The review was announced by the Inventions Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the editorial staff of the journal TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, in conjunction with the Central Council of the All-Union Society of Inventors and Efficiency Experts and the board of directors of the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy [VDNKh] of the USSR. Its goal was to assist the broad introduction into units, ships, military educational institutions and maintenance enterprises of technical innovations exhibited at the VDNKh as well as inventions and efficiency proposals from innovators in the army and navy.

During this second stage, which lasted from January 1979 through 31 December 1980 hundreds of various mechanisms, instruments, units, non-standard equipment items, technological processes and materials were introduced into the armed forces. These innovations were adopted from the VDNKh and also from the inter-industry and thematic exhibitions: "Management-79", "Televised Movie Chronicle-80", "NTI-80 [Scientific-Technical Information-80]", "Protective Industrial Coverings of Metals", "Microelectronics for the National Economy", "Central Exhibition NTTM-80" [Scientific and Technical Creativity of Youth-80] and others. The use of these innovations helped the troops more successfully solve their assigned tasks.

The review promoted the establishment of business-like contacts among related units, military educational institutions, and maintenance enterprises. It also promoted the dissemination of advanced experience and the establishment of useful

contacts with enterprises and scientific research institutions of the national economy.

The introduction of technical innovations had an enormous effect. It amounted to many hundreds of thousands of rubles saved just at the self-supporting enterprises. Here are just a few examples. The device for connecting a pneumatic tool to an air line increased labor productivity significantly and reduced by four- to five-fold the time spent in preparing test stands for operation. Using the engine testing unit "Mul'titest" enables one to diagnose the conditions of carburetor engines, without disassembling them, for a whole series of parameters - temperature conditions and the operations of the ignition system, power sources, cylinders, etc.

Among the innovations which were disseminated due to the review and competition, we can mention the technology of high-temperature brazing and cutting of metals by propane-butane mixture, the electromechanical apparatus for cleaning internal surfaces in preparation for painting and polishing, the device for restoring polyethylene insulation on a cable, the digital instrument for determining the nature and location of damage to communications cables and the standard lubricant MZ.

Specialists showed a great deal of interest in the multilayer printed circuit which increased equipment reliability, the procedure for determining fatigue damage to materials, the mobile system for checking the correct functioning of aircraft equipment in stationary or field conditions, the computer switchboard installation which increased the effectiveness of using the EVM [electronic computer] and many other items developed by the armed forces innovators.

Among the winners mentioned by the judges were the innovators from the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Force, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts and the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

The success achieved during the second stage of the review was the result of a lot of organizational work by commanders, staffs, political organs, several thousand military specialists, inventors and innovators. These groups displayed a high degree of creativity during all stages of the review.

A great deal of knowledge and most of all, a perfect understanding of the models of equipment and armaments with which you are dealing, are needed to create, invent and manifest a sense of the new.

All of this exists among today's defenders of the motherland. Very literate reinforcements are entering the army and navy. Many of the young soldiers have secondary educations and have graduated from technical colleges and PTUs [Vocational Technical Schools]. A considerable number of these young soldiers managed to work in industry after receiving their theoretical knowledge, become specialists, went through the good school of labor and learned the joy of creative and constructive work. It is not surprising that when these people encounter complex military equipment in units and on ships, they not only make every effort to completely master the equipment, but they also take constant initiatives to improve individual models and increase the effectiveness of their tactical use. They are creating equipment and methods to assure the complete study, high quality operation, maintenance, care and repair of the materiel.

Conducting the next All-Army Review and Competition, whose motto is "Strive for Mass Participation and High Efficiency in Scientific and Creative Work", will aid the further development of inventiveness and efficiency in the army and navy. The review is directed at resolving such tasks as improving the models of weapons, equipment and military stores, increasing their effective use and reducing the time needed to put them into tactical use. Other tasks include improving the supply of training equipment, increasing the effectiveness and quality of repair work, periodic technical servicing and maintenance, improving the storage of weapons, equipment and military stores, mechanizing manual labor and assuring the careful expenditure of finances, manpower, stocks of materials and equipment service life. The detailed conditions of the review and competition will be published in the June issue of the journal TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE.

To give an account of oneself by introducing innovations is the main criterion and basis of evaluating the results of the new review and competition.

9887
CSO: 1801/040

ARMED FORCES

NEW METHODS FOR TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 81 p 2

[Article: "The New in Military Training"]

[Text] As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, military skill is one of the components of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat potential. How to increase this skill is a question which faces commanders at all levels, staff officers and political workers practically every day. Which is the most acceptable way to do this? One way is to assimilate the experiences of the leading officers and experts in training and education. Of course, military journals are called upon to play an important role in this matter.

Here is an instructive example. A group of officers developed and proposed a new method for studying the telegraph keyboard. The method was tested in one of the signal regiments and was effective. When information about this appeared in a newspaper, even some specialists, despite the facts, began to assert: "That's impossible, the results are too good." Then the journal VOYENNYY VESTNIK disclosed the new method completely and substantiated it in the article "Telegraphers Can Be Trained More Quickly". This supported the researchers and was a direct aid to the officers serving as instructors. The new method for training telegraphers was put into use.

Here is another example. The journal published an article by Lieutenant Colonel L. Ilyushkin "Introduce It or Wait?" The editorial staff posed some specific questions for the readers in the article's concluding remarks: "Why have progressive methods for training soldiers had so much difficulty gaining acceptance? What must be done so that they will receive general dissemination?" And replies began to arrive at the editorial office. The journal introduced a new section: "For Advanced Methods".

Substantive articles appeared in this section from company commanders K. Kozyrev and Ye. Bystrov and platoon commanders A. Vasil'chuk, N. Tarasov, A. Krant and A. Poroshin. In practical terms, these were lessons in advanced experience and new training methods.

By disclosing the substance of new methods, VOYENNYY VESTNIK is doing a great deal for their general introduction into practice. For example, the selection of materials in "They Introduced It and They Did Not Miscalculate", published in one

of the journal's 1961 issues, is characteristic of this plan. Senior Lieutenant A. Vasil'chuk writes: The question 'introduce it or wait?' does not cause disagreements among us. The ways and methods for learning to handle equipment, developed on the basis of the theory of systematic training, are enjoying even greater popularity among officers. Yet it was not so long ago that the situation was different. There were a considerable number of skeptics who asserted that traditional methods were just as good as new ones."

If the "introduce it or wait?" problem for many instructors has already been resolved to a considerable extent, in favor of introducing new methods, then VOYENNY VESTNIK has rendered a definite service in this regard. It is true, however that unit commanders, chiefs of higher military schools, as well as officers and generals from the combat training directorates of the military districts and arms of the service have not yet expressed themselves in the pages of the journal, regarding the substance of the questions posed in it.

In the articles published in VOYENNY VESTNIK relating to problems of advanced experience, the topic in most cases has involved the signal troops. But the problems being considered are also important for the motorized rifle troops, tank troops and artillery troops. Therefore, the appropriate publications are simply begging to be included in the pages of the journals with the goal of disseminating the advanced experience which has already been amassed. This kind of experience also exists in the other services and arms of the service.

Take the radar troops, for instance. Their command was deeply interested in improving the training of its specialists. It developed new methods and included them in its leading documents. The first steps in testing these methods in the Moscow Air Defense District showed that they produce sufficiently good results. First and foremost, this was because considerable attention was paid in the district to improving the systematic training of the instructors. During this period, the officers and researchers (psychologists and teachers), who were supporting the scientific leaders by developing new methods and examining the ability of the methods to produce results, had a considerable work load. All of this was reflected in the pages of the journal VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY. It is enough to recall such publications as "On the Basis of the Method for Phased Formation", "The Accelerated Formation of Skills and Knowledge" and "Let's Have Advanced Methods for Training Radar Operators".

But that was in the past. What do we see in the present? New methods have been developed and their effectiveness has been verified experimentally. But the matter is being hampered because many officers either are not prepared to accept the new methods as being the most effective or are not able to put them into practice for one reason or another. Of course, if a lively discussion of shortcomings and their reasons were to be organized in the pages of VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY, this would undoubtedly play a positive role. But judging by its contents, the journal has not done this.

The journal MORSKOY SBORNIK is also feebly generalizing and disseminating advanced experience. Yet, methods based on the theory of systematic training and other achievements of Soviet science have received a rather broad dissemination in the training units and schools of the navy. In a number of places, good results have been attained. But when you read MORSKOY SBORNIK, you sense how distant the journal is from new methods for training and educating personnel.

Of course, military journals do not exist merely to deal with the problems of introducing advanced training methods into the educational system. Readers seek and find in the journals' pages answers to many problems of military life. But new developments in training methods and education of troops are forcing their way into practice and are knocking at the doors of the editorial staffs. As was noted at the 26th party congress, it is also necessary to eliminate everything that is turning the process of introducing new developments into a difficult, slow and painful ordeal. Undoubtedly, our periodical press has an important role to play in solving this task.

One of the pressing tasks for military journalists is to be able to see, in a timely manner, all that is new and advanced, support the creators of advanced experience opportunely and make this experience the property of everyone. When doing this, it is important that such materials appear not just occasionally, but regularly, from one issue to the next. In this sense, the example of VOYENNYY VESTNIK is very instructive. And even that journal should pay more attention to the further development of such problems as generalizing the experience of working with young officers, training the troops for combat at night and in the mountains and several other problems.

Of course, it is only by actively investigating the life of the troops and by noticing, in a timely manner, all that is new and advanced in the practice of training and educating the servicemen of the army and navy that the military journals will be able to solve the important tasks assigned by the 26th CPSU Congress to the mass media and propaganda media to thoroughly analyze and seriously generalize progressive and vitally important phenomena and processes.

9887
CSO: 1801/040

ARMED FORCES

PRECISION IN INSTRUMENT MAINTENANCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Military Metrology and Combat Readiness"]

[Text] While checking the readiness of a ship's equipment prior to a long and crucial cruise, the base metrologists discovered that the instrument for adjusting one of the radars did not have the necessary accuracy. As a result, the actual distance of target detection had significantly decreased. Prompt measures were taken and the error was eliminated. Thus the metrologists had eliminated a condition which might have disrupted the normal working of the radar set during the cruise. Such instances are not rare. They graphically confirm that in contemporary conditions the successful solution of combat training tasks, the correct operation of armaments and military equipment and their maintenance in constant combat readiness are inconceivable without strict and systematic metrological inspection.

Among the troops, the measurements of various parameters are important means for obtaining objective information about the tactical and technical characteristics of armaments and military equipment, the conditions for their operation, the quality and expenditure of material and technical resources, and the health of personnel under combat conditions. The reliability and accuracy of this information and in the final analysis, the effective use of armaments and military equipment in exercises, tactical training, live-firing exercises, flights, naval cruises and other combat training missions are dependent largely on the competence, demanding nature and persistence of military metrologists.

Today the pool of military measuring technology includes equipment of varying degrees of complexity, from the simplest instruments to automated systems and complexes. There has been a considerable increase in the required precision for measurements of mechanical, radio, electrical, magnetic, optical, thermal and other parameters and values. The organization and procedure for conducting, instrument checks among the troops have changed qualitatively. Whereas previously they were carried out mostly in permanent laboratories, now they are carried out, as a rule, on board ships and in the areas where units are deployed.

All of this makes great demands on the organization of metrological inspection and the level of training among metrological officers. They must have an irreproachable knowledge of armaments and the peculiarities of their metrological maintenance. They must be able to put into practice the fundamentals of military metrology, be

perfectly fluent in measurement technology, be good organizers and thoughtful leaders of their subordinates. A merely punctilious observance of the instructions in technical standards documentation is not sufficient. Constant searching for means of more effective metrological service and persistent introduction into military practice of new methods and equipment for measuring are needed. Today, military metrologists have been assigned the task not only of maintaining the measuring equipment in the proper condition, which is very important in and of itself, but also of providing for the timely and complete metrological maintenance of armaments and military equipment, the necessary training of personnel for carrying out this work and the rigorous observance of the rules and regulations of metrological inspection.

That is how the work is organized, for example, where Lieutenant Colonel Engineer V. Semenov is serving as a military metrologist. All the measuring equipment there is inspected in a timely manner, is maintained in good working order and the rules for operating the equipment are studied in a thorough manner. Metrological maintenance measures are incorporated into the plans for maintaining armaments in constant combat readiness. The measuring equipment laboratory, headed by Major Engineer G. Mikhed'ko, invariably carries out the test with high quality and within the specified time period. The command, the staff, the political organs and the party organization constantly keep in mind the problems of metrological maintenance of armaments and military equipment and of increasing the level of training among metrological specialists.

Unfortunately, this important aspect of combat support is not properly organized everywhere. There still are units, sub-units and ships where the level of organization for metrological maintenance is low and the measurement monitoring gear is not used in a skillful manner. Thus, in some units and sub-units of the signal troops, instances of using unchecked instruments have not been eliminated and the proper control over the maintenance and qualified utilization of measuring equipment is essentially lacking. This situation is unacceptable.

In formations, units, and on ships, constant effective control over the organization and conduct of metrological servicing of equipment and armaments must be implemented. Competent and complete utilization of measurement resources in regulatory and preventive maintenance work, strict observance of metrological requirements and great personal responsibility of metrological specialists for carrying out their functions must be attained. This is a very important duty for the chiefs of services and directorates. Particularly important in this regard is the role of the deputy commanders for armaments, who have been assigned by regulation the responsibility for the organization and coordinated solution of the entire complex of tasks involving the servicing and operation of equipment, including problems of metrological support.

The effectiveness of the military metrologists' efforts in working with equipment and armaments and the quality of their labor are dependent, to a considerable extent, on how attentively the commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations relate to metrological support and how thoroughly they understand its role. They must constantly concern themselves with improving the level of the organization and implementation of metrological maintenance work for armaments and military equipment, must not allow instances of using unchecked instruments and

gear to pass without reprimand and must render assistance in every way possible to the military metrologists in meeting their requirements for a strict observance of the metrological inspection regulations. Improving the quality of work by the metrologists of the army and navy is an important reserve for increasing combat readiness and efficiency in utilizing armaments and military equipment. Not a single instance of underestimating the role and significance of metrological support should be disregarded by the commander of the party organization.

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The summer combat training season is in full swing. In exercises, flights, and naval cruises, the servicemen are persistently struggling for a high quality execution of combat and political training plans and of their duties in the socialist competition. They are striving to obtain from equipment and armaments the maximum performance for which they were designed. The precise and conscientious work of the military metrologist is an important condition for attaining new success in combat training. This is their weighty contribution to a further increase in the combat readiness of the troops.

9887
CSO: 1801/040

ARMED FORCES

NEED FOR FIRE TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Tactical-Fire Training"]

[Text] On the fields of tactical exercises, in aerial expanses, on the seas and oceans, intensive summer combat training is in full swing. Each day of the training is marked by ardent striving of the Soviet soldiers to honorably justify the high evaluation given to the armed forces at the 26th CPSU Congress and to gladden the motherland with new martial achievements.

To a great extent, the level of tactical fire training, which constitutes the basis of field, aerial and naval training for personnel, determines the combat readiness of formations, units and ships. This is caused by the growing combat effectiveness of fire weapons, which are part of the standard equipment of the army and navy, and by the increased role of fire and maneuver in contemporary combat. The further improvement of tactical fire training for the personnel in units and on ships is one of the important tasks for commanders, political organs and staffs. As has been shown in practice, success in this matter is attained where there is a real concern that every exercise, combat flight, sea or ocean cruise distinguishes itself with high effectiveness. Naturally, this presupposes the creation in each combat exercise of a situation which induces the opposing sides to take dynamic and mobile actions in the struggle for fire superiority. Those commanders and staffs are acting correctly who, during the organization of personnel training, base their plans on the fact that contemporary combat is first and foremost an active struggle between the opposing sides and thereby organize fire training in close contact with tactics.

The Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment commanded by Guards Col L. Kovalev (Order of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District), who has retained the title of outstanding officer for several years in succession, can serve as an example of this kind of training. In this unit, paramount attention is given to training the personnel to destroy the enemy, particularly his armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons, in a reliable manner with a minimal expenditure of ammunition. Each soldier in the regiment considers it a matter of honor to learn how to hit targets with the first shot, the first burst, the first launch at maximum range, during the day or night and in any kind of weather. To a great extent, this is promoted by well organized competition in the subunits regarding tasks and norms. The fact that the guards demonstrate the ability to skillfully exploit the results of

defeating the "enemy" with firing and to combine fire and maneuver in all live-firing exercises is due to the constant attention of the commander and unit staff to questions of tactical fire training.

There are a good many such examples. At the same time there are facts which show that, in some places, tactical fire training takes place without even the requisite regard for the nature of contemporary combat, the growing significance of the struggle for fire superiority or the necessity to skillfully use fire weapons. Quite often in exercises, in pursuit of a large quantity of destroyed targets, the momentum of attack slows down and artillery and mortar fire from covered fire positions is conducted without regarding the actual status of the subunits or the tactical situation. Also, there are instances when a linear layout of targets is allowed. This does not induce maneuvering by men and equipment, but leads to movement along a straight line in the subunits' tactics. Such an approach to the matter is intolerable.

With the increase in firepower of subunits, the significance of their independence in carrying out combat tasks and of their ability to successfully operate when cut off from the main forces is increasing. In connection with this, the role of commanders of small elements in tactical fire training is increasing. Their skill will increase more rapidly where active forms and methods of instruction are in wide use in the officer training system. The majority of exercises with commanders must be conducted in the field with communications equipment and must involve the practical treatment of the basic questions of preparing for combat and directing the subunits and their firing, particularly at night, in the mountains, in the desert, in the tundra and in other difficult geographic and climatic conditions. To this end, front-line experience, as well as the experience arising from daily combat drills, must be utilized more actively and a complex situation, including an atmosphere of high demands, must be created in exercises and training. Conducting tactical exercises using opposing forces and various types of instruments for objective control must be practiced more widely. At the center of an officer's attention should be the methods of organizing and conducting tactical training, fire training and live-firing exercises.

The further increase in the quality of tactical fire training is connected directly to improving the training equipment and materials. The intensification of the training process, directed towards reducing the time required to master contemporary weaponry while expending the minimum amount of material resources, presupposes the widespread use of simulators, operating mock-ups, assemblies and units as well as the precise functioning of all training positions and objectives. Commanders at all levels, staffs, engineering and technical personnel, inventors and productivity experts are called upon to be constantly concerned that every training objective corresponds to the requirements of courses, manuals and guides.

The struggle for skillful use of contemporary weapons is the main thrust of the socialist competition whose motto is "Strive for High Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!". When using this accumulated experience, commanders, political workers and staff officers must be given more concrete instruction in the methods for organizing competition in tasks and norms of tactical fire training during field exercises and drills. It is their duty to strive for a situation wherein competitions in the ability to hit a target at great distance with the first shot,

the launch, the first approach and to utilize with maximum effectiveness the great combat qualities of modern equipment and weaponry, become an integral part of the entire training process and that every soldier participates in these competitions.

The quality and effectiveness of tactical fire training for personnel depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of party and political work. Commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations must carefully think out the political support for each training measure and strive for the personal exemplary conduct of communists and Komsomol members during combat training. It is important to foster personal responsibility of military personnel for timely and high quality fulfillment of assigned tasks and obligations, more actively develop their initiative and adherence to party principles, support them in creative ventures, provide them with advanced experience and be stricter about calling those to account who do not exhibit enthusiasm in the struggle for high combat readiness and firm military order.

Summer is the busy season for combat training and is filled with exercises, flights and long cruises by ships. Using them to the maximum extent for improving the tactical fire training of personnel will lead to even further increases in the combat readiness of the army and navy.

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ARMED FORCES

LEGAL KNOWLEDGE FOR OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 81 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen Justice Artem Grigor'evich Gornyy, chief military procurator, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich: "The Legal Culture of an Officer. An Interview About a Current Issue."]

[Text] The tasks presented by the 26th CPSU Congress to the Soviet Armed Forces, including the task of strengthening their educational role, require that commanders and all chiefs do their utmost to enhance conscious military discipline and observance of regulations, to maintain in units and on ships conditions of high demandingness, self-critical relation to achievements and intolerance of defects. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich discusses with Col Gen Justice Artem Grigor'evich, chief military procurator, the significance of the legal knowledge and legal culture of a military manager in forming the best qualities of the Soviet soldier and citizen among his subordinates and the ability of an educator to take into account the norms of Soviet law in his work.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General, could you briefly state the concept of the legal culture of a Soviet officer? What is its role in practical work, including the education of subordinates?

[Answer] Legal culture is a part and a very essential part at that, of the general culture of an individual. For this is a question of the citizen's ability to participate actively in the life of society and to fulfill the responsibilities imposed upon him by society. Therefore, the legal culture of the Soviet officer consists of his conviction of the social justice, moral justification and practical expediency of the legal norms of the socialist state of all the people and based on this conviction, his conduct in the active and vitally important position of an officer. The level of his legal culture has a telling and very direct effect on the educational activity of an officer.

First of all, this effects the officer's conception of the ultimate goal of his work with people. This goal is to foster a conscious defender of the motherland, a soldier-citizen. The educator has no right to forget this goal while solving any tasks, no matter how important they are, in and of themselves.

Take the work of tightening up military discipline, for example. Let us say that some military units have achieved a reduction in the number of disciplinary infractions in their sub-units. Yet, such changes can be evaluated in a positive manner only under the condition that they reflect the actual state of affairs, which is exactly what we observe in the leading units. But what if the fine indices conceal the chiefs' superficial knowledge of their subordinates and loose control over their conduct and services?

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin noted that an achievement can only be considered as that which "has entered into culture, life, and habits." So then, an officer with a high legal culture will strive to establish really strict and genuinely conscious military discipline. Only in that instance can one be confident that one's current subordinates, even after being discharged into the reserves, will never, under any circumstances, violate the rules established by laws and by other normative documents. And on the other hand, a lack of legal knowledge and a low level of legal culture on the part of an educator cause him to put absolute faith in numerical indicators of the level of discipline among his subordinates.

From this come both indulgence towards so-called "minor" infractions of discipline and the infamous desire not to ruin "an overall good picture" in sub-units and units.

[Question] But that itself is a violation of the regulation which requires a commander or chief not to allow a single violation by a subordinate to pass without a reprimand, while skillfully combining measures of persuasion and coercion.

[Answer] That goes without saying. The issue is that the legal culture of the officer and educator begins precisely with a thorough assimilation and unconditional execution of the requirements of our regulations which embody many years worth of experience and scholarly research by outstanding commanders, teachers, psychologists and jurists.

[Question] But what is entailed by the requirement to combine, in a skillful manner, measures of persuasion and coercion? An educator often encounters so-called "borderline" cases where punishment could be administered a little more mildly or a little more harshly.

[Answer] Once again, one must take a look at the regulation. It prescribes that any disciplinary measures, as a means of education, must correspond to the seriousness of the offense and the degree of guilt. The regulation also says that the severity of the punishment should increase if the guilty party has repeatedly committed infractions, participated in a group violation of discipline, or if the infraction occurred during the performance of official duties, in a drunken state, etc. Yet some comrades "forget" the appropriate clauses of the regulation when rendering their decisions! The staff of the military procurator's office was interested in finding out how and by which considerations were individual chiefs guided in such a crucial point for the education of their subordinates. They were guided by many considerations, but not those mentioned above. Of course, this also indicates the level of the educator's legal culture.

[Question] In your view, what determines this level?

[Answer] First and foremost, as we have already seen, the necessary amount of legal knowledge determines this level. This amount of legal knowledge is rather large for an officer. For a commander is a military leader, an administrator, an economic planner, as well as an employer, land-user and a manager of materiel and finances. Each of these aspects of his activity is regulated by a special branch of law. The basis of this special knowledge must be the theses of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state and law and the concepts of the essence of socialist legality. An officer is required to fully understand and correctly put into practice the decisions of the party and organs of the Soviet government in building up the state and the military and in protecting the social order.

[Question] Artem Grigor'evich, it is difficult to imagine that even a professional jurist could pass an exam with flying colors, as they say, on all these issues.

[Answer] Well, first of all, the human memory has a rather large capacity. And in the second place, it is not so much the sum of knowledge that is important as the level of thought conditioned by the knowledge. That is what we call a high socialist sense of justice. Even if an officer is not able to cite from memory the requisite clause of the law, it is important that he not fail to think before making a decision: "Am I acting correctly?". Glancing at a document after that will only take a minute. By the way, the specific standard of a statute or regulation can be read in a different light on the basis of general concepts about law.

[Question] Consequently, the disciplinary practice of a chief must be determined not only by the letter but also by the spirit of statutory provisions in their totality.

[Answer] Of course. For example, a high sense of justice induces an educator to strive not only for a certain fear among his subordinates by announcing two or three days' arrest for any offense, but for the halting of infractions during the earliest possible stages of a serviceman's deviation from the norms of conduct. Moreover, this should be done with measures precisely corresponding to the seriousness of the infractions. The reaction from the procurator and the court, which a person with a high legal culture will not equate with inciting fear, should begin at the earliest possible stage and impose severe punishment without fail. According to Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's thinking, such a response is necessary, first and foremost, so that people will learn "lessons of social morality and practical politics from the court." For the preventive significance of punishment is not in its severity, but in its inevitability.

[Question] Many factors influence the formation of the legal culture in an officer's personality: political maturity, legal knowledge, the condition of legality and observance of regulations in a unit and prior experience. How do you evaluate the influence of these factors today?

[Answer] It can be said, with all certainty, that these factors are active in the requisite direction. What is not operating completely, in my opinion? In some places, legal propaganda has lost touch with the tasks resolved by the unit or ship, with the plans for combat and political training. For instance, the system for imposing disciplinary measures, about which we have already talked, is being studied. At an opportune moment, people hear from the propagandist about what guilt is,

according to our law, what forms guilt takes and how our evaluation of an occurrence depends on these forms. But a jurist arrives in the unit and gives a lecture on the reasons for highway accidents.

Another weakness is the legal training of future officers. And today it is not so much a question of the hours allotted to it as it is a question of the quality of the instruction. Unfortunately, the quality is not always high. In some military schools, the course on the basics of Soviet law is given by instructors from every department except Marxism-Leninism. But law is a social science and a part of ideology. Sometimes this course does not include study of the combined-arms regulations, which are very important legal documents. Also, in some places, the sequence of legal studies is set up just the opposite of what it should be. The course, whose significance for his practical activity a future officer will realize, as a rule, only on the eve of his graduation from the school, is taught to him in his first year of study.

[Question] And yet, legal propaganda is merely a part of the educational process.

[Answer] Yes. The critical issue here is supporting a strict observance of the regulations with the aid of organized measures. For it is not enough to tell a serviceman: "You must be disciplined and efficient." He must be placed in conditions of strict military order and the entire life of the unit or ship must be organized according to regulations.

[Question] What is being done to improve the cooperation of commanders and political workers with the organs of military justice to strengthen law and order? In your opinion, which reserves have not yet been utilized?

[Answer] Considerable experience with this kind of work has been accumulated. Its organizing principle consists of jointly developed plans for various measures. For example, as in the past, the plan of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, of the Main Military Procurator and the Military Tribunal Directorate is active now and envisages an entire series of organizational, scientific research and propaganda measures. A useful sociological investigation of the causes of offenses connected with drunkenness was conducted by the Volga Military District jointly with military jurists. Performance of guard duty was studied in the Odessa Military District. The causes of motor vehicle accidents were studied in the Moscow and Transcaucasus Military Districts.

We would like the military jurists to exercise greater influence on the educational process, prior to the time when they must get involved with it in connection with a specific offense.

[Question] In practical terms, what do you have in mind?

[Answer] For example, the participation by military jurists and the consideration of their opinion when determining the level of military discipline and observance of regulations in a unit or on a ship.

[Question] Artem Grigor'evich, what would you wish for officers, particularly young officers or those who have just been appointed to positions as commanders of

units, ships or independent elements, in the interest of a constant growth in their legal culture?

[Answer] That they would feel themselves to be people of the state. That is, that they would evaluate any fact, however it might effect the estimation of the situation in a company, battalion or regiment, in light of the tasks facing the armed forces, including their educational role. To do this, they should take a greater interest in questions of Soviet law, drawing the requisite information from books newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, during exercises and meeting with jurists. They should check each of their decisions against the norms of law. Then they will see more distinctly not only the goals of their noble labor--first and foremost, this is high combat readiness of elements, units and ships--but also the ways to attain these goals, ways in which combat training, political, moral and legal education merge organically.

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INVENTORS, INVENTIONS DISCUSSED

MOSCOW KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Major General Engineer A. Safronov, Chief of the Inventions Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "To Invent Is To Seek the New. Scientific and Technical Creativity in the Army and Navy."]

[Text] How does one become an inventor? This question is asked by many people: cadets in military schools, young officers and workers in repair enterprises and construction organizations. To invent is to find a new technical solution to a task. The new solution differs essentially from the present solution and yields a positive result in one or another area of the national economy, social and cultural construction or national defense. Compared to the present solution which is in universal use, the new solution must be more efficient, rational and progressive.

To invent in army and naval conditions involves improving weapons, military equipment and the techniques for using them and finding efficient ways to reduce the time spent in getting them into combat ready status. It also involves creating the newest technical devices for training which meet contemporary requirements, finding highly efficient means for the operation, repair and care of equipment and creating devices to mechanize labor-intensive work. In a word, it involves solving the tasks dictated by the life and activity of the troops and naval forces.

It must be stated that the inventors from the Soviet Armed Forces make an important contribution to the replenishment of the State Register of Inventions. The quality of inventor's certificates, received each year by them, or decisions about issuing them number in the thousands. Just during the last five years it increased by 80 percent and the quantity of inventions used in the army and navy more than doubled.

It is gratifying to note the mass participation in invention work by young officers of units and ships, students and cadets in military educational institutions. It is a significant fact that inventions made up one third of the 1,200 items displayed at the Central Exhibition NTTM-80 [Scientific and Technical Creativity of Youth-80], which took place at the VDNKh [Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy] of the USSR. On the other hand, the opinion is still expressed that inventiveness is a level of scientific and technical creativity accessible only to specialists at scientific research institutes, design bureaus and institutions of higher education. And the troops, they say, can only work at increasing efficiency. This opinion is erroneous. It is refuted by practical work itself.

Quite often, you hear another opinion: "Only the outstanding developments which cause a revolution in an appropriate area of human activity are recognized as inventions.". This is not at all correct.

The overwhelming majority of inventions solve individual problems. But these solutions are real, they have a tangible result and they are absolutely new. There are a great many examples of this. Here are just a few of them.

Colonel V. Blazhchuk developed a device to simulate the vibrations of a stabilized tank gun. It was used in the tank gunners' simulator which was supplied to the troops. Reserve Captain 2nd Rank Engineer Ye. Varitskiy proposed a sweeping buoy which increases the accuracy of ranging. This invention is being used in a number of units. Captain Engineer Ye. Khomyakov co-invented with some other comrades a device for underwater cleaning of ships' hulls. It assures the simultaneous cleaning of both sides of the underwater portion of a ship's hull, increases the quality of the work and reduces the time spent in doing the work. All of these developments were recognized as inventions.

Our military educational institutions are preparing competent specialists for the troops, but years of practice and experience are helping the innovators in the army and navy gain the ability to present and solve complex technical tasks on a high level.

Where do topics for creativity come from? First of all, the innovator must have a thorough knowledge of the field of technology in which he is working. He must have a profound understanding of the principles upon which it is based, be able to bring to light the problem areas and determine methods for eliminating them. Practical work itself is a "bottomless pocket" filled with topics and tasks for inventiveness.

But that is not all. A profound scientific approach to problem solving, the use of the scientific method in formulating the problem and the analysis of research results allow one to explain the interrelationship between phenomena and processes, to trace their conformity to the laws of science.

In the final analysis, inventiveness in the army and navy pursues specific practical goals. The usefulness and efficiency of a proposal must be based on calculations or experiments--preferably both. For example, inventor's certificates were not issued to a number of applications from army and navy inventors in 1980, due to lack of usefulness of the announced technical solutions.

Inventiveness is not a goal in itself. Sometimes an officer-inventor receives some favorable decisions about his application, but not many of them have a practical use. The reason for this is that he did not fully consider practical demands. An inventor should never think that he alone is working on a given problem. In this age of the rapidly developing scientific-technical revolution, when practically every five minutes there is a new invention in our country, solving one or another problem without knowing what has already been done in that field by others is the same as "inventing the bicycle". A thorough study of the scientific, technical and patent literature will insure success in making inventions. When this requirement is not observed, the applications are usually declined due to a lack of newness.

For example, in February 1981 a proposed invention entitled "Method for Stabilizing the Rotational Speed of a Gyroscope's Rotor", was turned down with a reference to a textbook published several years ago, in which this idea had already been set forth. For an analogous reason, an application from another army group was declined.

A careless attitude towards researching the newness of a proposed invention invariably leads to an annoying waste of time. A thorough study of scientific and technical literature or of popular scientific publications is necessary for the initial verification of a proposed invention's newness. At the same time, conducting patent research not only avoids a fruitless expenditure of creativity on the invention of something which is already known. It also enriches one with new knowledge, provides certainty and gives one a true idea about the most promising courses of development in a given technical area. Herein lies the basis of fruitful and effective technical creativity.

And just what are the sources which allow an inventor to stay abreast of the innovations which interest him? There are many of these sources. An extensive system of scientific, technical and patent information has been created in our country. This system begins with the All-Union Patent and Technical Library--a large storeroom of inventions created throughout the world during the past 150 years in various spheres of human activity--and ends with industrial sector and territorial patent collections. The industrial sector collections are concentrated in the leading NII's [Scientific Research Institutes] and a number of institutions of higher learning, while the territorial collections are in many oblast, kray, republic and city libraries.

It goes without saying that to become an inventor one must have a good understanding of the legal and juridical issues related to the field of inventions and must be able to draw up an application for an invention competently. Nor should one neglect to carefully draw up other documents: the statement of inventions, the certificate of the specific creative contribution made by each of the co-inventors in cases of group solution of a set task, the certificate of appraisal, etc.

The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized once again that speeding up scientific and technical progress is the decisive condition for increasing production efficiency and improving product quality. In our army conditions, this means improving the quality of every training procedure and increasing the qualifications of specialists. I would like to wish the innovators of the army and navy successful creative work in solving the complex tasks facing them and a high level of solutions, which can reinforce our country's stock of inventions and help strengthen the motherland's defensive power.

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PHYSICAL TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 81 p 1

[Article by Vice Admiral N.A. Shashkov, chairman of the sports committee of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "By All Forms and Methods."]

[Text] Modern combat demands a sound physical and psychological toughness on the part of each soldier. Recently, a great deal was done among the troops to improve this toughness. The search for new forms and methods of sporting activity, to assist in increasing physical toughness, is being conducted in many military districts, groups of forces and fleets. For example, in the Baltic Military District a great deal of attention is being paid to the development of endurance among the personnel. In connection with this, each soldier has been assigned this specific task: during the summer training period, run at least 500km during morning exercises, pursuit training, section drills and competitions. A socialist competition to fulfill the planned tasks for sports has been widely disseminated in the Siberian Military District. Thanks to this competition, two-thirds of the servicemen received "good" and "excellent" evaluations at a physical training examination.

Some interesting experience has accumulated in the Belorussian Military District, where a precise system has been set up for instructing the personnel in the methods of individual combat and hand-to-hand fighting. Competitions in hand-to-hand combat among battalions are being organized on a wide scale in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. They are taking place in several phases--first in units, then in formations. The subunits commanded by Majors V. Distanov, V. Stolyarov and Captain V. Narezhnyy have distinguished themselves in the most recent of these competitions.

A great deal of work is being conducted in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts to put mountain training into practice. The search for new ways to improve general and special physical training in the units led to the creation, from on-hand resources, of special mountain sports camps. The structures of these camps are distinguished by their simplicity and the ease by which they can be made. In the unit where Guards Major S. Sharipov is the deputy chairman of the sports committee, exercises on an Alpine obstacle course have been set up. These exercises include movement along an irregularly shaped horizontal beam, rapid climbing and descending on a ladder and rope, as well as elements which train the soldiers for actions at a height. All of this is part of a system with exercises organized directly in the mountains (Let's say, mastering the technique of scaling cliffs),

with cross-country races in rugged terrain and other forms of physical toughening. This creates a solid basis for developing among the soldiers many useful qualities and skills and fostering will, courage and determination among them. The experiences of the Transcaucasus and Turkestan personnel merits approval and must be put into practice more widely.

The inspections conducted recently by specialists from the Sports Committee of the USSR Ministry of Defense demonstrated that in many units, the personnel distinguished themselves with sound physical toughness. For example, that is how matters stand with the units and ships where officers A. Shugaley, S. Ognev and others are serving. Considerable success has been attained by the soldiers of the unit where Major L. Balakin is a member of the sports committee.

However, the situation is not like that everywhere. At the 50th Anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol of the Ukraine Military Air Technical School at Vasil'kov (Captain A. Levchenko is the chief of physical training and sports), swimming exercises have not been held for several years. Pursuit training, military medley and technical types of sports are being utilized in a feeble manner to improve the physical toughness of personnel in those units where Major A. Chashchin and Senior Lieutenant A. Zhovtonog are members of the sports committees. The quality of training exercises is low in these units and few complex tasks are conducted.

The all-army competitions "Officers' Starts" help to increase the physical preparedness of the personnel. These competitions are always conducted in a festive manner in the unit where Major V. Konovalov is a member of the sports committee. In that unit, all of the officers have received the VSK [Military Sports Complex] badge of the first and second degree and are athletes with official standing. It is no accident that the unit's personnel distinguish themselves with good physical preparedness.

Now, during the summer combat training season, active preparations are underway for the final stage of the 23rd Review of Mass Sports Activity in the Soviet Army and Navy. Regular training in cross-country running, with gymnastic equipment, at firing ranges, aquatic sports areas and massive competitions in compliance with VSK norms will help the soldiers demonstrate their sports skills during the final inspections.

Undoubtedly, the slogan "From a VSK Badge to an Olympic Medal!", which was coined during the preparations for the 1980 Olympics, helped increase mass sports among the troops. Even now, this slogan has not lost its significance. Mass sports competitions, in which servicemen and their family members participate together, are taking place under this motto. Such a traditional festival recently took place, for example, at garrison "X" of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Its program was filled with fascinating competitions, games, relay races and had something of interest for everyone. Such an initiative deserves every kind of support, since sports activities involving civilian workers and office workers of the army and navy and servicemen's family members are not yet set up everywhere.

Today, while celebrating All-Union Physical Training Day, we are particularly glad to recognize the rapid pace at which sports are developing in our country. The mass nature of the physical training movement assures that there will be notable victories in major international competitions by Soviet athletes, including army athletes. All forms and methods of physical training and mass competitions in units and on ships must be used in the future to increase the physical toughness of the personnel. To a considerable extent, the combat readiness of the troops depends on this.

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

FRENCH SOURCE ON SOVIET STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

Symposium on Flaws in Soviet Power

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 27-32

[Article by Admiral M. Duval, managing editor of DEFENSE NATIONALE]

[Text] As is now our custom--one apparently appreciated by our readers--we are devoting most of this issue to a reconstruction of the discussions at our latest symposium held on 11 June under the joint sponsorship of the Committee on National Defense Studies, the publisher of this review, and the Foundation for National Defense Studies.

Our proposed theme for discussion by our guests was "Is the USSR's power flawless?" We were well aware that this was an ambitious and delicate subject. But to have it discussed with necessary objectivity and circumspection, we knew we could count on the participation of highly qualified experts, both among the speakers who had kindly agreed to lead our deliberations and among the guests who came in exceptionally large numbers and took a very active part in the discussions.

Having decided, in principle, to have but a marginal discussion of Soviet military power, because that power is undeniable, and also its resultant substantial diplomatic power which is obvious, we hoped to analyze primarily the "flaws" that may exist in other constituent elements of Soviet power, such as physical and human geography, societal structures, organization of the economy, and the exercise of political power. As regards diplomatic power, we had agreed to deal solely with issues relating to the European satellites. As for military power, we proposed to consider only its capabilities of intervening in the Third World, so as to assess to what extent the Soviet Union really has the means of supporting a master plan based on a concept of indirect strategy with reference to the West, a strategy often attributed to the USSR.

In this connection, definition of the Soviet master plan itself was not within our frame of reference. I think it was Churchill who said, that the Soviet Union is "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." If such is indeed the situation, the exact objective of its plan can be determined only by a subjective assessment that is dependent, in the final analysis, upon each person's own personal political judgement.

Consequently we proposed to begin by making a list of detectable "flaws" in those different elements of Soviet power we have enumerated above. Our purpose was to determine their objective reality with the help of the eminent experts participating in our deliberations. We likewise proposed to determine, also with the help of those experts, whether these flaws ultimately constitute "weaknesses" in Soviet power as a whole. By carrying our analysis still further, we then hoped to examine whether these possible weaknesses are or are not "factors of instability" in international relations. And lastly, if we had the time, we hoped to broach the ticklish question of whether these factors can be exploited by the West to contain the USSR, and thus constitute Soviet "vulnerabilities." Hence flaws, weaknesses, factors and vulnerabilities were not synonyms in our way of thinking, because the ultimate objective of our symposium was to differentiate them.

Our deliberations obviously did not exhaust our proposed agenda. As our readers will notice in the pages that follow, we particularly did not have enough time to examine the status of the Soviet economy as much as that subject really required. And this from the standpoint of its "weaknesses" which are evident, as well as its "strengths" that are too often overlooked. Indeed, the USSR's natural resources are considerable and give it formidable means of exerting pressure on the West or even blackmailing it. This is evident at the present time in the negotiations on supplying natural gas to Europe. We could, however, be much more sorely tried in the future over gold and strategic minerals if South Africa were to disappear or change "camp." Such pressure could even be exerted on seaborne trade because the USSR has the capability of causing international freight rates to collapse by using its excellent merchant marine for this purpose.

As regards the Soviet economy, it would also have been highly interesting to obtain the views of our guests on the advisability of having the West actively trade with the USSR and its satellites, continue to grant them very generous credit terms and transfer advanced technology or ready-to-operate industrial plants to them. A more exhaustive discussion of these subjects would have made it possible to broach the following questions of major current interest: By helping the USSR, can we hope to appease it or gradually convert it to a certain liberalism? Must the West, on the contrary, try to exacerbate the USSR's domestic difficulties so as to force it into a dialogue, even if this means temporarily subsidizing its power? Can convergence of the technological preoccupations of advanced industrialized countries eventually produce a certain closer similarity in economic patterns and, as a result, in societal patterns? Or, on the contrary, is a social explosion the inevitable outcome of an impossible integration within CEMA? Will the heavy debts to the West incurred by CEMA countries bring about a certain interdependence or, on the contrary, do such debts possibly constitute an inducement to break with the West by reason of insolvency? Can the Soviet Union's inability to continue the arms race for too long a period ultimately exert a moderating influence on that country? Or, on the contrary, does it open that "window of opportunity," i.e. tempt it to begin a war before long, as has been frequently mentioned of late?

All these questions alone could serve as the theme of a special symposium. Being unable to organize such a discussion quickly, we have asked our friend Christian Schmidt, assistant director of the French Institute of Polemology, to write an article on these questions, an article we intend to publish shortly in this review.

We also consider it fitting to comment here on the "flaws" in Soviet power that may result from existing tensions within the satellites. It must be emphasized, in fact, that our symposium was held on 11 June and that this issue will come out on 1 November. In June, there were extreme misgivings about the fate of Poland. Polish leaders had just received Brezhnev's famous warning letter and the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) was about to hold its congress. These circumstances led many observers to fear a Soviet invasion was imminent. It is not surprising, therefore, that the emphasis in our discussions was on Poland, possibly at the expense of our review of the situation in other countries of the communist buffer in Europe, and particularly in the Baltic States, for the latter situation probably should be analyzed in view of the potential dangers it appears to pose. Furthermore, when this issue appears, the situation in Poland, which remains extremely fluid and dangerous, may have evolved in such a way that the reassuring comments that are to follow may possibly appear to have been considerably overtaken by events.

With further reference to the Soviet buffer, we must also underscore the fact that China was not within the scope of this symposium as we defined it above. Moreover, we had debated that subject in our May 1979 symposium on "Destabilization in Asia" whose proceedings were reported in our November 1979 issue. It is quite certain, however, that among the "weaknesses" or "vulnerabilities" of the Soviet Union, we must not omit the presence on its eastern borders of that immense empire with its population of countless millions and its potential power which the USSR must view as formidable. On the subject of China, our readers may refer to a very old book by Admiral Castex, "From Genghis Khan to Stalin," a work that is now too forgotten even though it is still thoroughly current and probably prophetic. In it, the author brilliantly explains the determinism, not to say the fatalism, that stems from the geostrategic location of these two adjacent empires.

The prescribed scope of our symposium did not provide for discussion of Soviet machinations in the Near East and Middle East, and more generally in Africa and the Third World, although the results of these machinations are often interpreted as power factors for the USSR, despite the fact that some of its successes are perhaps temporary, as the setbacks which have already occurred might well indicate. Our friend Paul-Marie de La Gorce was kind enough to compile for our readers the record of these successes and setbacks in his article entitled "Soviet Policy and the Third World."

But we must now give the floor, or rather the pen, to the experts who graciously agreed to ably lead our 11 June discussions by introductory presentations that are reproduced in the articles which follow. They are presented in the same chronological order in which they were given during the symposium, namely first those relative to the Soviet Union's "flaws" in the successive areas of its own political system, institutions, and society. Their respective authors are:

- a. Alain Besancon, dean of studies at the School of Advanced Social Science Studies and author of many first-rate books on the USSR, including the indispensable "Short Treatise of Sovietology for the use of Civil, Military, and Religious Authorities," and the very recent "Anatomy of a Specter: Political Economy of True Socialism"
- b. Michel Tatu of LE MONDE, and its former Moscow, East European, and Washington correspondent who is the author notably of an equally indispensable book for Sovietologists, "Power in the USSR," and the highly insightful "The Washington-Moscow-Peking Triangle."

c. Helene Carrere d'Encausse, professor at the Institute of Political Studies, who is, as everyone knows, the justly famous author of "The Shattered Empire" and the very recent "The Confiscated Power."

The above articles are followed by presentations on the "flaws" in the USSR's European satellites and those flaws having to do with the Soviet Union's military capabilities solely in the field of "external intervention" as we define it in France, in other words, intervention in the Third World. The authors of these articles are respectively:

a. Francois Fejto, journalist and seminar director at the Institute of Political Studies, who is also the author of numerous highly reputable books, including "Lenin's Legacy," "Budapest 1956," "Coup of Prague," and "History of the People's Democracies."

b. Henri Paris, a highly qualified expert in military Sovietology, who recently published, under the patronage of the Foundation for National Defense Studies, the book "Soviet and American Strategies," a work that is already an authority on the subject.

c. Jean Labayle-Couhat, who knows the Soviet Navy better than anyone in France because he is the author of the periodical FLOTTE DE COMBAT which has an international reputation and authority in that it has been adopted by the U.S. Navy.

The oral presentations reproduced herein as articles are followed by a synthesis of the questions and comments they prompted from the audience. This synthesis was prepared by our editorial staff on the basis of the five subject areas that stimulated the most lively discussions: nationality and dissidents, satellites, economic problems, military problems, and the evolution of political power. As is our custom, these questions and comments, plus the answers given to them, are presented anonymously. It should be understood, however, that the ideas expressed during these discussions do not necessarily reflect the views of this review.

A most eminent and highly qualified person kindly consented to chair this symposium and summarize its conclusions: Roger Seydoux, who was our country's ambassador to the USSR from 1968 to 1972, after having served, *inter alia*, as French representative to the United Nations and NATO. His experience makes him a peerless authority on the subject matter of our symposium.

Ambassador Seydoux has authorized us to reproduce his closing remarks as the final article in our coverage of the symposium, for which we are most grateful to him.

It would be inappropriate for us to add anything to this conclusion. Yet before ending our introductory remarks, we do believe we must, nevertheless, draw our readers' attention to two ideas we feel dominated the subject of our symposium, namely that the USSR is a state unlike all others and that its power is considerable.

Soviet Union's Flaws

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 33-44

[Article by Alain Besancon]

[Text] The difficult question of the USSR's strength or weakness is altogether different according to whether we consider the USSR to be or not to be a nation like any other. By nature, Western nations can establish only state-to-state relations. They are led to think that this state-to-state relation is the ultimate and that other relations are unimportant or subordinate to it. Such is not the case with the USSR, and the result is two analyses that are quite different depending on whether they are made from the angle of relationships between nations or, on the contrary, from the angle of relations between some nations, ours, and the international communist movement headed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which has the Soviet state as its principal instrument.

Most analyses of the Soviet Union are made from the angle of symmetry. They implicitly assume that the Soviet regime answers to the same criteria as ours. These analyses ultimately produce a table of strengths and weaknesses listing those elements which in our country would constitute strong points and weak points. Someone analyzing the Soviet economy on the basis of Soviet statistics, duly adjusted or not, will note, for example, the rapid progress being made in industrial and agricultural production. He will calculate the GNP, the standard of living, the military budget, and come up with such statements as "the arms burden weighs heavily on individual consumption; the oil crisis has compelled the USSR to look outside its territory for the supplies it needs; modern economic necessities have forced it to relax its rigid planning structures; East-West trade will sow the seeds of a market economy or else durably bind Soviet economic affairs to ours." In the political and military spheres, the symmetrical view likewise consists in assessing the USSR's strengths and weaknesses on the basis of classical factors. The presence of irreducible nationalities, the Moslem Turkic groups of Soviet Central Asia, for example, will be viewed in the light of the experience of colonial empires, notably the French empire. The extent of the population growth and of increased tolerance and religious cohesiveness will be viewed as an indication of the cohesiveness of the USSR likened, without further qualification, to a classical empire. Won't the low turnover in key leadership positions, the hierarchical stratification, the growing aloofness of the elitist ruling classes, the patent ossification of the Politburo's gerontocracy, and the increasing militarization of the economy and social and cultural life eventually bring about formation of a military-industrial complex, indeed even a military coup that will make a clean sweep of the old tired and worn communist regime and attempt, with a fresh start, to achieve Russia's permanent goals, namely protection of its European buffer area and acquisition of raw materials and sources of energy?

I have just stated a type of problem, many examples of which are familiar to all of you. It is not an easy one to dismiss because, in a way, it does adequately cover a limited sector of our field of analysis. The mistake is to take this sector for the entire field. The sector in question embraces the state's functions, or rather some of them. In our country, the state arbitrates between social groups. It is the guardian of the security and interests of its citizens. It establishes relations with the society to which it belongs and which it represents, and also with other states. The Soviet state does not care about any of these functions because it does

not belong to the Soviet society and is not responsible to it. Quite the contrary, its function is to represent the interests of what it calls "socialism." Hence it employs against society the forceful means which that society had formerly entrusted to it for its own, society's, preservation. Externally, the Soviet state's role is not to ensure the Russian nation's security and greatness. It is the instrument of socialism which must expand and assume dominion over the whole world. Outside the USSR, it represents the forceful means with which a state is traditionally endowed, and particularly the Russian state, but its ends are altogether different and do not concern Russia per se. The mistake many make is to believe that because it employs the traditional means of a state and which remain those of a state--diplomacy, armed forces, trade, gaining territorial advantages, spheres of influence, etc.--the USSR has the ends of a state in view. This is the mistake made by such remarkable men as Roosevelt and Churchill, Kissinger and De Gaulle, who all wanted and tried to have the USSR enter into a concert of nations by trying to highlight the interests common to all states, but without realizing that socialism, to which the Soviet state is committed, actually excludes the idea of a community of interests.

Any effort to draw up a list of Soviet strengths and weaknesses must be based on the specific nature and ultimate goals of the Soviet economic and political system. The Soviet master plan does not call for expanding the economy, or making justice reign, or raising the standard of living. It is designed to make socialism happen. As Boukhovski explains in his latest book, the fact that nobody any longer discerns the precise meaning of socialism, that nobody any longer believes in that idea, beginning with the leadership and extending down to the ordinary soldier, changes absolutely nothing. "As a matter of fact," Boukhovski adds, "there is no way of changing the goal, which is to extend the system over the entire globe. What can the Soviet leaders do, leaders who have forced their people to make tremendous sacrifices, who have sacrificed part of their population, and who systematically demand new sacrifices to attain an imaginary objective? It is impossible to get off a tiger once you have mounted him. The slightest hesitation, the slightest weakening of the government would be the beginning of the end in this insidious civil war. There is no choice left but to conquer, to continue to expand."

Accordingly, the USSR is not, to begin with, a state. As Boukhovski says, it is a base for universal subversion, a center for gradually crystallizing the planet and patterning it after the initial crystal nucleus. Such is the Soviet plan. Soviets strengths and weaknesses pertain solely to the means of accomplishing this plan. We shall first distinguish the material means from the moral means.

From a material standpoint, the goal is to build a system capable of generating:

- a. A sector of technical and economic power capable of supporting a military machine rivaling the chief adversary's machine, plus a political and cultural system capable of effectively monitoring and controlling the people;
- b. A sector capable of acting the part of socialism, of giving the impression of a living socialism with all of its planning, review and controls, "new man," etc.;
- c. A "non-socialist" sector--free market, black market--capable of constituting an economic reserve from which the other two sectors would draw.

The problem is to maintain the system's dynamic equilibrium, given the fact that the first sector has priority, that the second sector cannot be abandoned, and that the third must not do more than its assigned task of serving as a safety valve and balance wheel.

From a moral standpoint, the goal is to build and maintain a political and cultural system capable of generating:

- a. A legitimatizing ideology, in other words, a comprehensive interpretation, vouched for by "science," of the world and human history;
- b. An organization of men united by possession of the ideology, and forming the world communist movement;
- c. The monitorship, motivation, and, if need be, direction of the world communist movement by the senior communist party, the CPSU, which in the USSR also assumes the functions of the state.

The problem here is to maintain this system's general equilibrium, given the fact that the party's coherence is dependent upon the ideology's coherence, and that authority over the USSR as well as over communist movements depends on the party's coherence.

By keeping in mind this basic dissymmetry between the communist world and ours, we can now try to make a rough appraisal of the situation. Here is a non-exhaustive list of the positive elements of that situation:

- a. The immensity of Soviet resources. There is no need to dwell on this point, but very serious demographic, sociological, alimentary, and even military imbalances can be contained or offset for a long time before they endanger this enormous system's overall stability.
- b. The absence of opposition from Soviet society. In Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland, the party has to come to terms with society's permanent and multiform opposition. In the USSR, society--i.e. all groups capable of spontaneous self-organization, such as churches, social classes, trade groups, most of the nationalities, public opinion, the intelligentsia, etc.--have been sufficiently fragmentized, not to the point of vanishing altogether, but to the point of no longer being able to challenge the party's political and cultural monopoly.
- c. Party unity. This is what gives the CPSU its historical superiority over the Chinese Communist Party. The latter party succeeded in integrating and controlling society perhaps more completely, but it was never able to acquire that monolithic unity which the Soviet party proudly, and with good reason, considers its most valuable asset.
- d. Leadership of the international communist movement. That movement's tradition, ideological coherence, and political logic demand that it have a single ideological center and that this center be the CPSU. The latter, for its part, maintains secret correspondence with members of brother parties, and even the "apparatuses" in some of those parties, thereby consolidating its leadership which is genuinely acknowledged. In this way, the CPSU can arbitrate between the international communist movement's

general interest and each local communist party's special interest, knowing that the general interest must coincide with the interest of the dominant party, the CPSU. Since Stalin's death and the Chinese dissidence, the CPSU has established a flexible structure which has operated fairly efficiently to date.

e. Surrogate-occupation of the area of domination. There is actually no Soviet empire comparable to the old Russian empire. There is, however, Soviet domination, but this domination is maintained on-site by local communist parties. Their presence in local governments is protected by the international communist movement and Soviet power. Consequently the Soviet Army does not have to perform those actual direct occupation duties which in the past exhausted the classical empires, and again of late the Nazi empire.

f. Persistence of a communist alternative to any political crisis. Communist rule offers itself as a plausible way out of all those crises which the communist party has not instigated nor, more often than not, even foreseen, and which temporarily engender a revolutionary situation, regardless of whether this crisis occurs in an "ancien regime" (of the Czarist Russia or Imperial Iran type), or in a nation in the process of formation or decolonization (Vietnam, Angola), a dictatorship, particularly a military one (Cuba, Nicaragua), an authoritarian regime (Portugal), or a democracy (Chile). The party never creates revolution, but it is organized to manipulate a revolutionary crisis, and it can make its way into power by means of the crisis. Communist power offers itself as the universal solution to every revolutionary crisis whatever or wherever the crisis may be.

At the same time, however, the Soviet plan is also experiencing serious and unresolvable difficulties, even though they are not where we think they are. Here is a non-exhaustive list of those difficulties:

a. The most striking economic development is certainly the deterioration of the "socialist" and civil sector of the economy.

Everything connected with kolkhozes, sovkhozes, planning, and ordinary factories appears to be foundering in inextricable disorder, impotence, and waste.

Correlatively, there is a noticeable boom in the "non-socialist" sector [underground economy] which is thriving on markets the socialist sector is unable to service, and likewise on goods that enter this sector through corruption and theft. When it is not traumatized or soddened with alcohol, the labor force is on a sort of permanent slow-down strike in the socialist sector and sells its labor on the labor black market.

b. In the Soviet view, this type of situation, with all of its troubles, is altogether tolerable as long as it does not have awkward political consequences. If shortages spread to the cities, particularly Moscow and Leningrad, they may breed certain dangers. What is worse is the fact that these shortages press heavily on the priority power-production sectors and are liable to cripple them. To remain competitive with the West, the Soviet military system entails such concentration of technological, human, and material resources that they are soon liable to be politically dangerous and, at the same time, technically inadequate. This military power's logistical base, whose narrowness was offset by the concentration of resources which political constraint

makes possible, is liable to become too narrow under the strain of an arms race the West is, knowingly, reportedly determined to pursue.

c. In the moral sphere, the ideological situation is not good. The ideology is the system's main pillar. It constitutes the sole legitimacy of the government and of the party's very existence. To be convinced of this, one need only read that letter--a masterpiece--which the CPSU Central Committee sent to the Polish communist party. But things are quite different depending on whether the communists are in power or not. Outside the socialist camp, the Marxist-Leninist ideology has lost little of its appeal. It is waning among the upper strata of the intelligentsia, but is continuing to flourish in the immense world of those who in pre-1917 Russia were called semi-intellectuals, namely instructors, secondary school teachers, etc. It is taking root in regions like England and the United States which up to now were almost free of it. In the Latin-American area, it has become involved with the Church crisis and is changing into a sort of ideological messianism that is identically or confusedly Marxist and Christian. The first Castroism, Che Guevara's, failed. The second is succeeding thanks to this supportive ecclesiastical involvement.

Within the communist world, however, the ideology has ceased to be a belief. It is now a language, the compulsory language of public affairs, and for party members, also the language of private affairs. It is the mark and means of governmental power and is identified with that power, but it no longer receives spontaneous and genuine approval, as it still did frequently in the 1950's. It is rather a sort of conditioning acquired in childhood, a code of behavior.

d. Because of this, the party is exposed to "corruption." That is my term for the loss of its Leninist essence. Two evils are undermining the party. The first is cynicism, which is an inclination to become alienated internally from the ideology and use it solely as a passport to power. This power is sought for the concrete benefits it can bring, and not to further the abstract interests of socialism. Accordingly, the party tends to turn into a privileged caste. The second evil is the inclination to enter into self-serving relations with society. The party member becomes a trafficker, an influence peddler. He modifies political decisions according to the interests of this or that social group with which he has dealings, and not according to the uncompromising line defined by the party leadership. As a result, the party tends to turn into a privileged class, whereas its nature is to be neither caste nor class, but rather a sort of sect or order that is present in society but strictly separated from it and with no organic link to it.

To shield the party from any contact with society, its members have exclusive access to a system of stores, schools, and hospitals, but with the passage of time, the shield is becoming porous. The material perquisites of government positions are continuously being increased so as to deter party members from seeking other benefits on their own.

e. Lastly, in one part of the socialist camp, namely in Poland, there is an imminent danger of loss of socialist power. The deadly aspect of this possibility is that once socialism is overturned in one part of the camp, people realize that it never existed. Or also, as soon as the "construction of socialism" is ended, people realize that it never began. Consequently socialist power must be restored at all costs, but in Poland this does not appear to be an easy thing to do.

The party leadership is aware of all these problems. It has several possible ways of trying to wrestle with them. The first course would be to return to the Stalinist type of government. I don't believe this course would be practicable. To begin with, the party would have to be purged, and the present leadership knows how costly and dangerous that operation would be. Then, and above all, this course would cause a sharp drop in the power of the Soviet state. For example, depriving the kolkhoz farmer of his plot of ground would lead to famine. Reducing the working class to a servile mass would paralyze the official production system. Suppressing the parallel or black market would stymie the entire economy.

The second way, which is much more the fashion of the day, would be a rightist liquidation of the regime and a changeover to "national bolshevism." This would require renunciation of the ideology. The benefits would be immense, in that the ideology is the great affliction plaguing men of the Soviet regime. The relief would be such that it would not matter whether misery and oppression subsisted.

Furthermore, the party could act on the true state of affairs with rational means and put an end to industrial and agricultural fraud and waste. The defense industry, supported at last by a vigorous and well-managed economy, could expand without being hampered by a chaotic infrastructure, as it is at the present time. The party itself could be consolidated into a caste or class, because currently its benefits and privileges are still precarious and illegitimate on account of the ideology.

Can the party renounce the ideology? Such renunciation would be a change in legitimacy that could not be made without a period of time during which the authority of the state would no longer be exerted. Yet tensions are such that during that period, everything could break down. In addition, once the ideological magic is destroyed, the new national bolshevik state would have to face other legitimacies, none of which would, of course, be more formidable than the national oppositions. Lastly, it is incorrect to believe that the USSR is merely the former Russian regime covered with a varnish of socialist phraseology. The ideology is not an old torn veil from behind which the Great Russian reality would emerge. There is only emptiness behind the ideology.

That is why Brezhnev has been following a third course for the past 15 years. In a sense, he has been "contact flying" between the impossible return to Stalin and the dangerous drift toward national bolshevism. Politically, he is in the center and is trying to utilize, for the party's power, the magic of the ideology, which the party has carefully monopolized, and the Great Russian realism of national bolshevism. His domestic policies are prudent and conservative. He forgoes the extreme measures employed by Stalin and Khrushchev because he knows the problem is not solvable but is controllable. It is always possible, by secret arrests, by harassment, to make weak and dispersed opposition elements toe the line. Thus the peasant lives in a rather torpid atmosphere reminiscent of an old prison or old asylum. Yet this widespread debasement ultimately produces some special pleasures and some debilities that make Soviet society easier to govern.

Foreign policy, on the other hand, is maximized because the Soviet leadership relies upon it for the regime's consolidation and survival. This external policy is pursued in two directions. The first consists in getting Westerners to subsidize the Soviet production system. We have already furnished the USSR more than 80 billion dollars,

an amount greater than the Marshall Plan. Unlike the latter, these funds are directly or indirectly diverted into the military establishment, thus enabling the USSR to exert additional pressure on the West, so that it will furnish more money. The technology transfer is of equal magnitude.

The second foreign policy direction consists in obtaining what I shall refer to in deliberately vague terms as "major successes" in extending world communism and keeping it under the CPSU's control. Every major success further strengthens the already 60-year old alliance between bolshevism and Great Russian nationalism, and also resolves, in conformity with the Brezhnev line, the latent contradiction between the neo-Stalinist line and the national bolshevik line. The regime becomes popular again. Success is sought everywhere, but "the" major success is the one that would mark the decisive strategic victory in the great metaphysical conflict between socialism and capitalism. It would seem that the stake in this conflict has to be Europe. Conquering without war is a communist method, and bringing about the fall of Europe without war is a difficult problem to solve. Yet, the more the regime deteriorates, the more the search for this major success becomes a pressing necessity. That is our situation at the moment: we are plunged into a state of uncertainty shared by both the Soviets and ourselves.

So what do we do? Currently we are content to act from the angle of symmetry. We are allocating the bulk of our resources to checkmating the USSR by behaving as states facing another state of the same nature and with the same goals as ourselves. There is no doubt that this effort is necessary. Indeed we must have a competitive army, an effective diplomacy, intelligence on the condition of forces and key protected areas, etc. This effort will remain ineffective, however, because it is ill-founded with regard to the main action being taken against us, action which we persist in not recognizing, or which, at least, we have difficulty recognizing.

Yet we do have a few ways and means of countering this action. Materially, we are furnishing the USSR capital, technology, and consequently power. Western private firms are not equipped for resisting a request for credit or the tender of contracts. Western nations support trade with the East either for Keynesian reasons, because they must keep their industry going at all costs, or because they hope to thus bind the Soviet regime and, in the long run, transform it, or lastly in order to purchase peace for a ransom-like price. I believe that these nations should realize that Keynes, who recommended digging holes so as to refill them, never advocated arming one's own enemies. By reinforcing Soviet power, we increase its autonomy and strengthen its structures. If we want to purchase peace, we will have to pay more and more dearly for it the more the adversary is capable, thanks to the West, of sustaining a widespread war.

Morally, we can accelerate the Ideology's decline, and hence the erosion of socialist legitimacy. The Soviet regime deems it most important to obtain from us continuous recognition of its legitimacy by compelling us to use the Soviet vocabulary in dealings and negotiations. Each time we admit to this regime that it is socialist or, that in the sense that we are, it is a partisan of peace, independence, noninterference, democracy, detente, human rights, social progress, racial equality, etc., even if we do not believe it, even if we think these words are unimportant, we are binding ourselves in the same way as the Soviet citizens who speak the "wooden language" of the Ideology without believing in it. We are gratuitously giving that regime a legitimacy and especially a reality it does not have and drastically needs.

Departing from this vocabulary, trying at the same time to "delegitimize" the Soviet regime, presupposes--and therein lies the problem--that we accept a very difficult political battle. The government can win this battle only if it has the support of the people. Yet this support will be obtained only if the people are informed about the nature and reality of the Soviet regime. The USSR presses heavily to obstruct or block any information about itself. This information is, therefore, the stake in a major political battle. We cannot know whether we shall win or lose that battle, but in my opinion the greatest illusion would be to believe that we will be able to dispense with the political struggle by preparing solely for the military battle, in other words, by locking ourselves beforehand into symmetrical state-to-state relations.

I venture to advance this proposition: the military battle will be lost, or rather will not even be fought, if the preliminary political battle is avoided, that is to say lost.

Internal Problems, Recourses

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[Article by Michel Tatu]

[Text] When we speak of Soviet institutions, it is almost always to underscore their continuity, the immobilism or even petrifaction of the top-level leadership, and the resultant stagnation of the whole country. This point of view is fully justified when we consider the experience of the past 15 years. Yet precisely for this same reason, it would be extremely foolhardy to expect such stability in the future.

In any case, we have enough data with which to attempt to formulate a theory on the reactions of communist institutions in general when faced with internal or external crises. I dare say the experience acquired in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and now in Poland, is not directly transposable. Each crisis which occurred in those countries was heavily influenced by the presence and pressure of the guaranteeing power, the Soviet Union, without which nothing durable could be done, and whose projected shadow distorted the play of the actors. We can, nevertheless, draw a few lessons from these crises. More than anything else, we may ask ourselves what would happen should a crisis occur without an external guaranteeing power, without the threat of foreign intervention, in other words, if the crisis were to break out in the USSR itself.

One general conclusion is already obvious: all institutions of the state and society in a communist regime depend on the party to such a point that if the party, for one reason or another, relaxes its control, the institutions collapse. Or rather, in the most frequent case, they change their compositions and, without any modification of their legal status, begin serving an absolutely different regime that could be a democratic one.

Everything depends on the context. When Lenin, in 1917, launched the slogan "all power to the Soviets," he actually meant "all power to the party" controlling those Soviets. Today, the party controls everything, and that demand which has been expressed by certain dissidents means, on the contrary, "return power to those Soviets which were confiscated by that same party and promptly lost their reason for being." In other words, let the party be suppressed and the government will be able to govern,

the legislature to legislate, managers to manage, writers to write, etc. Let the party be merely weakened, and forgotten wheels of government, undreamt-of channels of authority will regain their lost vitality: the chief of state will suddenly realize that he is supreme commander of the armed forces, the head of government will realize that he can appoint ministers, the legislature that it has the right not to be a rubber stamp, etc.

In short, the institutions are in place. They are dormant but ready to take over, to become democratic and even efficient once again, the moment the party relaxes its domination. That is an observation that no one has been allowed to make in the USSR for several dozen years, and only for brief periods in neighboring countries. But it may also be a temptation.

A second obvious fact is that pressures within a communist society are such that an extremely rapid and cumulative process is inevitable in the event of a crisis. As soon as the party loses its control and this development begins to be perceived by the population and cadres, then grievances, demands, protests, frustrations, or just simply the elementary need of revenge after past injustices, all will immediately surge into the breach and threaten to sweep away everything in their path. As was seen in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the initial "liberalism" quickly gets out of hand. In the absence of extraordinary efforts that have every chance of culminating in a regression imposed by a repressive crackdown, the "democratization" of "real socialism" very quickly leads to a state of anarchy: anarchy not necessarily on the social level--the Prague spring remained, on the contrary, exceptionally disciplined--but on the political level, with the successive and swift collapse of the main bastions of "democratic socialism": supervisory authority over the government, censorship, "prefabricated" elections, etc.

This observation prompts us to note, once again, the party's central and crucial role in the system of domination, but it may also be a source of temptation. Just as Khruschev utilized and even sharpened anti-Stalinist grievances in his power struggle against his rivals, so too the Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak revolutions all had moderately reformist or even openly conservative party members who let themselves be carried away by the wave of liberalism in hopes of thereby enhancing their power or settling old scores. The strong desire for change, even when repressed, is so powerful that it cannot help but create "traitors."

I wish to make it clear at this point that when we speak of the party, we do not mean the majority of its members. There are millions of them, a large number of whom are mere tools, and not among the most reliable. In Poland, one-third of the party's 3 million members joined the trade-union movement Solidarity. The party leadership did at times countenance that movement and systematically had party members join it for the purpose of trying to change its policies. But the large majority of rank-and-file party members who joined Solidarity did so on their own.

At the upper levels, likewise, party members who are officials in factories or government offices cannot be totally identified with the special interests of the party apparatus. The head of government himself is a member of the party's Politburo, the only part of the system in which something resembling democracy can be found. Nevertheless, his general interests have to do with the governmental machinery and his real responsibilities lie elsewhere than in the party.

Those persons really responsible for party order and discipline are, therefore, much fewer than party membership figures indicate: a few thousands of persons at most in the USSR, almost all of them being "secretaries" of districts, regions, and republics, or heads of "departments" responsible to the secretaries. At the very highest level, there is the enormous machinery of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its dozen or so secretaries. This body is the "hard core" of the system.

Like the other institutions, the party operates under unwritten rules. It too would be relatively democratic if its statutes were enforced. These statutes call for elections at all levels: election of delegates to the party congress, then to the Central Committee by secret ballot; election of the Politburo and the Secretariat by the Central Committee. The latter is really the party's legislative assembly. It should be noted, however, that within the Central Committee, voting is by a show of hands, particularly for election of the top leadership. Except for this latter fact, these elections may conceivably be quite real, as the latest special Polish party congress demonstrated.

Actually, the Politburo perpetuates itself by co-opting its members: the Secretariat selects "delegates" practically at all levels and dictates how they vote. All of this is done according to rules that have now become well-known through descriptions of the "nomenclatura."* It should be remembered, however, that these rules have no constitutional validity. It is also pursuant to unwritten rules that the party and its secretaries run everything in the country. Officially, the party gives no orders. It "advises" governmental departments and agencies. It does not interfere in their activities. It gives them "assistance."

It is natural, therefore, that any destabilization of society should quickly have an impact on the party and that the latter should become caught up in the contagion when it has not itself caused such contagion. In Poland, the initial impulse came from the working masses, but the shock wave did not reach the party until a few months later. In Hungary, it came from outside the country with Khrushchev's destalinization effort, but also partially from inside the country. In Czechoslovakia, it came exclusively from inside the party apparatus which had, of course, been shaken by intellectual dissent, but perhaps even more by power struggles, that old combined driving force and venom of political activity in a communist regime as elsewhere. In this case, the "temptation" is no doubt weaker: we have as yet never seen a top leader of a communist apparatus personally and openly challenge his party's unwritten rules. But when, in 1957, Khrushchev appealed to the Central Committee to overrule the majority of his colleagues in the Politburo, he, nevertheless, did set a dangerous precedent.

These observations have brought out the fragility of the system and its vulnerability when faced with crisis situations. But we must delve even further and note the institutional, ideological, operational, and ultimately biological weaknesses of the party itself, including and above all its "hard core" mentioned above. After a few dissidents, and in a way other than pictured by Orwell--who, in his "1984," had foreseen the same kind of collapse of the system upon itself as we are witnessing at the present time--it is appropriate to say "the king is naked."

* See book of the same name by Michel Volensky and published by Belfond.

The first observation is the extreme weakness of the legitimacy invoked by the party to justify its presence and retention at the head of the state. PRAVDA's daily incantations must not deceive us, quite the contrary. The communist party, which began as the "party of the working class," became the "party of all the people" in the early 1960's at a time when it appeared proper to tone down the division into classes of a society ruled for 40 years by a party which proposed precisely to abolish all classes. The rejection reaction which followed reflected especially the lack of imagination of ideologists accustomed to handling old concepts. But instead of choosing between "party of all the people" and "party of the working class," they have fallen back, for the past 15 years, on the concept of "party of science:" the party directs because it represents the "science of direction," because it possesses the "art" of governing and is the only one in this position. A self-serving argument as it were, in that all party activity consists precisely in preventing any other group from acceding to direction of the country and acquiring the said science. However, it is also a self-destructive argument insofar as the same party directs poorly and is not equal to solving the basic problems plaguing the country.

All has already been said on the USSR's new external dynamism, on its rising military and diplomatic power, and we must admit that these assets can serve the system as a *raison d'être*. But this cannot make us overlook the fact that the party does not have a monopoly on the future handling of these assets, and that its repeated failures on the internal level, failures for which it has almost openly assumed responsibility, are weakening its legitimacy more and more.

The new internal development for the past 15 years is actually not a more pernicious policy than in the past, but the party's resignation to impotence and immobilism, the virtual official abandonment of the dynamism with which the party had imbued society throughout endless mistakes and catastrophes, to be sure, yet nevertheless with real effectiveness until about the mid-1960's. Today, everyone admits, certainly from Brezhnev down to the last plant manager, that management reforms are necessary to restore dynamism to the Soviet economy. But these same persons also recognize that such reforms are impossible because of the very nature of the system. To deduce from this that it will take a different system to make necessary transformations, is but one short step that mere common sense will bring some to take.

Likewise, everyone must certainly admit that it is dangerous for any country to drain itself of its intellectual elite. The first authorizations granted dissidents applying to leave the country, followed a few years later by expulsions, were rightly interpreted as a more humane way of dealing with dissidence. But these also reflected the dual resignation of a weary government, resignation in the face of its intellectuals that it gave up trying to indoctrinate, resignation in the face of foreign opinion that was being flooded with negative testimony, from Solzhenitsyn to Boukhover. The Brezhnev government is no longer even trying to attract, and yet that was the *raison d'être* of a system based on ideology.

In other words, the party has abandoned in deeds, if not in words, its main objectives. Except for external expansion--an objective others could pursue just as effectively--its only goal is to perpetuate the reign of its ruling elite, which at worst is a "nongovernment" in that it blocks any reform and instead of governing, seeks more to prevent others from doing so. That elite has become a parasite in the strict sense of the word, inasmuch as it curbs the pursuit of progress and modernization.

A different regime, still authoritarian but rid of the party, would be more efficient on the economic level, most likely on the cultural level, and perhaps also on the military level, because it would ensure a better standard of technological performance. Isn't this where the great temptation lies?

Aging of the ruling apparatus was inevitable the moment Stalin's heirs, freed from the tyrant and the terror with which he repressed them, firmly assumed power and made sure to remove all those who, in one way or another, were liable to reinstate insecurity for the "apparatchiki" (Beria, Khruschev, Shelepin, etc.). In a system which refuses any genuine elections, the Stalinist purges at least met the need for renewal incumbent upon any society. Without purges or elections, the regime was doomed to mental sclerosis, even necrosis. This phenomenon has been carried to a caricatural point with the present Politburo whose average age now stands at 70. The average age of its six principal leaders, Brezhnev included, is 74.

This situation is what we have to consider when examining the obviously very current problem of succession. In fact, the problem of Brezhnev's succession is not the only one the Politburo faces, nor perhaps even the most important. The departure of half the Politburo within 4 to 5 years will create a gap difficult to fill, a veritable "indraft" that a certain number of members of the power elite will be tempted to take advantage of, members whose careers have been blocked by the wall of gerontocracy, and whose accession to the top leadership has been unduly delayed.

Who will arbitrate between these contenders? From 1960 to date, the system's key man in this respect has been Mikhail Suslov. He has served on the Politburo since 1955--longer than anyone else, including Brezhnev--and as secretary of the Central Committee since 1947. More than being the "ideologist" he is said to be, he is actually the recourse, theoretically the impartial arbitrator, the "kingmaker," the one who had Khrushchev ousted and then installed Brezhnev. Now nearly 80, he is one of those who will soon retire from the scene. It seems a foregone conclusion that he will not be replaced in this role for a long while.

A regime without Brezhnev, without such an unchallenged arbitrator as Suslov, but with the number of candidates increasing as vacancies in the top posts multiply, all this while the country faces mounting internal and external problems, thereby giving rise to the various temptations mentioned above....The least that can be said is that the coming crisis or rather crises of succession promise to be much more difficult than all those seen in the past, except the one surrounding Lenin's succession. The unusual stability we have witnessed since 1964 must not make us lose sight of this fact. Quite the contrary, this excessive stability is going to lead to instability.

I shall not speculate here about the various present candidates or possible intermediate phases. I shall merely advance a general hypothesis. I believe that the military will someday take over power. In saying this, I am treading on dangerous ground and expect criticism. But to me, it appears inevitable that this will be the course of events sooner or later.

We have seen that institutions tend to become democratic the moment the party is no longer there to infiltrate and control them. In the immediate future, and undoubtedly for a long time to come, democracy cannot be tolerated by a regime which has become

an inordinate and challenged empire. The army is the only institution which, even in crisis situations, most generally does not succumb to anarchy, thanks to the solidity of its hierarchical structures. It has strength, and can, therefore, be the recourse. The party being ossified, the army embodies what remains of the system's dynamism. Having been the system's fair-haired boy, it has become its only adult member, the only one to have attained modernity and efficiency. The jurisdiction of its officers now extends to external policy because of the more and more distant projection of Soviet military power.

The role of the armed forces is well understood by the party apparatchiki who have had to make concessions to them, and not solely relative to equipment authorizations. The process of the military's rise to the upper reaches of power is no doubt dialectic, subjected to variations indicative of the opposition encountered. The relative participation of the military has tended to decline in the central committees elected over the past 15 years, until it stands today at approximately 7 percent of the committee membership. The Politburo, nevertheless, had to make room for them. In 1973, Marshal Grechko, then defense minister and undisputed representative of the regular military officers, made his entry into the party's supreme organ, an entry which attracted considerable attention. He was accompanied by the top officials of the two other pillars of the "ideological" regime that had become an empire: the secret police or KGB (Andropov) and the diplomatic service (Gromyko). A logical breakthrough, but one which incurred the suspicion of the apparatchiki for precisely that reason. Upon Grechko's death, the apparatchiki partially retracted this concession by placing a civilian technocrat at the head of the armed forces (Ustinov) and making their secretary general (Brezhnev) a marshal. Yet while two bogus marshals had thus replaced a real one, the rule that the armed forces and police had their "de jure" seat in the Politburo remained none the less firmly established in probably irreversible fashion. The military and police are no longer entirely the "instruments" of the party. They now have a hand in its decision-making.

Nevertheless, this up-and-down struggle which takes place in "peacetime," if I may put it that way, inadequately explains the role of the military in time of crisis. Since 1957, when Zhukov and other leaders of the armed forces actively backed Khruschev against Molotov and his other opponents in the Politburo, no succession crisis or other difficult phase in the exercise of power has been resolved without the military having given their more or less official endorsement to the solution arrived at. We have even seen military officers occasionally replace faltering politicians. For instance, it was Marshal Grechko in person who, in April 1969, settled the Czechoslovak crisis by enjoining Prague to remove Dubcek from office, a result the Politburo, with its blunders, had been unable to obtain at the time of the August 1968 Invasion.

Likewise, and even though the context of the Polish crisis is much different, the appointment of Defense Minister Jaruzelski as premier at the height of the spring 1981 crisis illustrates the growing role of the military in communist countries. When things are going badly, governments think of the army; when things are going very badly, the army becomes the recourse.

The case of Zhukov--Khruschev's defense minister who was forced into retirement in October 1957 for his "Bonapartist tendencies"--is often invoked to dismiss the possibility of a military coup, arguing that with Zhukov's dismissal, the party had

"permanently eradicated" the putsch virus. Nothing in history is ever permanent, however, and many things have changed in the past 24 years. On the other hand, it is not at all likely, in my opinion, that at dawn some fine day, the military will proceed to capture the Kremlin, as if they were in some African or Latin American republic. Much more likely is the possibility of a direct or indirect invitation to leaders of the armed forces who will then intervene, from a "sense of duty" as it were, in a succession crisis more difficult than the average when, after the "indraft" mentioned above, the open defiance of candidates more ambitious than the current Kremlin septuagenarians threatens to mortally paralyze the Politburo. Afterward, and little by little, the military leaders might develop a taste for power and decide to consolidate their position.

We can only speculate about what a military government in the USSR would be like after a few years of evolution. It would no doubt be more "national" than "bolshevik," to use Alain Besancon's terms. Still authoritarian and even autocratic--dictatorship being the only means of safeguarding the empire--it would retain what appears to be indispensable in the present structures, but would eliminate whatever is superfluous, that is to say the party's claim to involve itself in all fields of activity, particularly to run the whole economy. Technocrats would finally have ample scope for maneuver that possible might eventually make them autonomous, whereas the apparatchki oppose such a development as an attack on their self-proclaimed legitimacy. The military would have no such bias because the legitimacy of their institution is natural. They might also allow artists some "bold freedom of expression" (abstract art, etc.) which is currently considered bold only by a certain clique of bureaucrats, not because it endangers the authoritarian system, but because it jeopardizes their interests.

Accordingly we may picture, some 8 to 15 years hence, a more modern Soviet Union, still authoritarian but not totalitarian, committed to a course of economic progress, and freed by the military--if not formally at least actually--from the party's finicky and meddlesome supervision. Will it be more bellicose than it is today? Probably not, and less if anything. Because past experience has always shown the Soviet military to be at least as prudent as the civilians, but also because party leaders have and will continue to have a tendency to seek in external successes the legitimacy which escapes them. The succession struggles could offer formidable temptations in this respect within the very next few years. However, the army, unlike the party, does not need to seek its legitimacy in adventurism. It is also highly conceivable that once society's dynamism has been restored, it will be channeled initially into the domestic scene where accumulated problems are enough to keep everyone busy for a long time.

These speculations and hypotheses quite obviously lend themselves to critical examination. The scenario outlined herein may be unduly optimistic. Other factors resulting from possible violent reaction by the party or from the role of forces already in place (notably the KGB), should also be considered. Let me emphasize, however, that the present regime of party domination appears doomed, and that its end is ineluctable. This evolution will logically cap the historical decline we have been witnessing for some 20 years, both with respect to international communism--from the time of the Chinese secession up to the recurrent

difficulties encountered in satellite countries--as well as inside the USSR, with the various economic impasses, the regime's waning prestige, the "parasitization" and then fossilization of the party and its apparatus.

Weaknesses Discussed

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[Article by Helene Carrere d'Encausse]

[Text] After the preceding two reports on the Soviet political system, the weaknesses of Soviet institutions and their future, it is now appropriate to examine the problems of Soviet society. Can that still submissive and passive society turn someday into an active element in the Soviet Union's gradual political development? Michel Tatu stressed the need to examine the reactions of communist regimes in crisis situations. That is altogether correct. We must also, however, ask ourselves another more specific question. Will the crises now developing in the USSR, and threatening that country, be those of the whole society, or will they be solely crises inside the system? When we look at current developments within the communist world, we are struck by society's irruption upon the political scene in certain countries. Such is the case in Poland where developments in the past year--but also during preceding years--have established the presence of society and the problems it poses inside the political system. We are struck also by the obvious contrast between this vitality of Polish society and the conspicuous political inexistence of Soviet society. For some 64 years, society in the USSR seems to have put up with a system which admittedly changes somewhat, but nevertheless systematically denies it any right to exist as a civil society.

It is true that this society, while politically passive, does display a tendency to work off its frustrations by sinking deeper into corruption, laziness, drunkenness, and many other negative manifestations which, to begin with, contribute to perpetuating its passivity and lack of social consciousness. Yet is this a general phenomenon? Can we say that there is a hermetic barrier between the outside world and the Soviet Union? Is what is happening in that outside world (in Poland, for example) completely foreign to the Soviet Union and does it fail to have any influence?

At this point, we must recall that Soviet leaders have always stressed the existence of two levels within the Soviet Union. First and foremost is the Soviet state as a whole with its various components. Then there is the overall socialist system constituted by the East European socialist community whose organization is a simple extension of the USSR's internal organization. The socialist community and the Soviet community are two identical and inseparable entities. The Soviet nation extends into the socialist community and expands therein. Moreover, what is true, essential, inside the USSR is true outside the Soviet world.

When we note the outwardly amorphous character of Soviet society, we also note that during the past few years there have been a few manifestations of that society's existence. These are limited manifestations, of course, but which are, nevertheless, discernible from the least organized level to the most organized level. First of all, for instance, we perceive a completely unorganized phenomenon, namely the insidious discontent within Soviet society. Each Soviet citizen now "gripes" in an

increasingly clamorous manner. Some 25 years ago, the man in the street kept his mouth shut. Now, any observer who has been able to visit the USSR several times during the past 10 years, and whose knowledge of Russian allows him to listen, compare, and conclude, knows that one can no longer go into a public place without hearing every Soviet citizen grumbling about the political system, its inefficiency, and the incompetency of the country's leaders.

Some observers may argue that such complaining is only a safety valve and has no significance whatsoever. But this argument is not easily admissible. Recriminations are always levelled at the system's legitimacy. No one openly says "Down with Brezhnev" or "Down with the Party," but dissatisfaction is directed explicitly at the party's inefficiency, its inability to be an organizer and master the science of organization. The party and its cadres are clearly blamed for the disorder and waste that prevails in the country. This disaffection's motivations are material. It is completely unorganized and, in its present stage, certainly does not unduly frighten the Soviet leadership. Yet this discontent does exist and it is spreading.

At another level, we encounter an organized political phenomenon, namely the formation of small groups of courageous individuals. This is what is called "the dissidence." The dissidents say various things aloud which they feel accurately express all social frustrations.

It should be noted, however, that while the government can overlook the rising widespread discontent among the general public, it can immediately face up to the problem of dissidence because its available means of repressing that movement are considerable. Accordingly, in the course of the last few years, there has been a systematic dismantlement of the dissident movement by a variety of means that range from internal repression with incarceration of the dissidents in camps or psychiatric institutions to the suppression of dissident groups by expulsions of their most notable members or by any other means designed to neutralize them. One of the reasons for the weakness of this dissident movement is that it consists of groups that are very limited, both numerically and geographically, and have no real organization and no backing at all in Soviet society. The latter will not really become a civil society until the isolated and unorganized cells become movements large enough to be able to express, with a certain authority, views that are not those of the government, coordinate with the masses in voicing their demands and making proposals. In the USSR, however, there is no possibility of organizing a movement outside the party and against it. A large movement that would not be under the system's control and whose purpose would be to pressure the system is unthinkable in the Soviet Union, at least in the system's present condition and with its considerable means of bringing its authority to bear. The dissidents are weak because they speak and act outside the system and against it, whereas the only means of organizing society lie inside the political system.

This situation, therefore, prompts the following questions: In what fields of activity is it possible to rally Soviet society in a lawful way? In some respects, the churches offer such a possible physical rallying point, a place for the dissemination of ideas that are not those of the ideology. The Orthodox Church is, without any doubt, under such a degree of control and supervision that any attempt at forming an independent movement is immediately infiltrated and suppressed.

Nevertheless, some churches--Catholic, Protestant, and notably the Baptist sects--do channel or even organize the protests of their members. Doesn't the current status of the Polish church give these Soviet churches a powerful incentive to expand that liaison role with the government, a role they are already striving to play? Above all, we find in this situation the framework of the nationalities. National feeling, national claims, and national organization are the only kinds of rallying force that impart a certain cohesion to society's protests against the system.

Poland's example demonstrates the strength of the national factor. But what gives the Polish situation this cohesion? What accounts for the fact that Poles--from Kania to the communist workers who joined Solidarity, and to the late Cardinal Wyszynski--all speak at times with one common voice? The answer is national cohesion, Poland and attachment to its reality and national interest, the feeling of being part of a Poland that unites individuals, groups, and structures for reasons that are, however, far from being identical. There is a bond of Polish national feeling between Solidarity, the communist party, and the working class which is religious because the Catholic Church is Poland, the symbol of the Polish nation's existence.

Poland is probably an extreme example of the crystallization of phenomena that we see elsewhere in very different degrees. In the Soviet Union, it is evident that the existence of an ethnically composite society does offer possible chances of organizing society in the face of the government, if not against the government, along the lines of a large national movement. Here we must clearly define national phenomena in the USSR such as we know them in 1981 and insofar as the 1979 census permits us to compare and measure the phenomena of demographic imbalances which were noted some 10 years ago and whose economic and political repercussions are real. Furthermore, today we can also measure the Soviet government's response to the demographic problems it had been able to analyze and grasp during the 1970's. In so doing, we can determine its ability to react and adapt.

We must take stock of this situation as of 1981 before seeing how and where present or future national tensions occur. We must also examine how these phenomena fit into the USSR's internal climate, how they can affect its international action capabilities, and how they can be magnified by events taking place at the Soviet Union's borders. The national question in the USSR is always viewed in an impassioned manner. In other words, it is considered either to be unimportant or else so fantastically important that the Soviet Union no longer exists, that it is now merely an "addition" of nationalities or peoples who detest the Russians. In actual fact, the situation is infinitely more complex. First, all of these peoples or nationalities do not have equal national importance, not only numerically but psychologically. In addition, differences among all the peoples of the USSR are not the same kind. Lastly, the Russian people, like other peoples of the Soviet Union, deeply resents the existence of a national problem and national frustration, if only because it feels that throughout Soviet history it has made the greatest sacrifices for the general development of the other peoples. It deeply resents the hatred being increasingly displayed toward it by the other peoples. It feels that this dislike is unwarranted in that it does not consider itself to be profiting more from the political system than other peoples of the Soviet Union. The system may be functioning partly in its name, but it is clear that the Russian people feel they are as greatly oppressed by the political system as the other peoples. That is why the national question concerns all of the USSR's peoples, including the Russian people, to an equal degree.

There is no denying that the national problem is basically demographic and economic, whether some peoples have a demographic dynamism enabling them to exert increasing influence within the system and, therefore, causing them to feel they can demand more from the community, or whether other peoples are decreasing to such an extent that they feel they are on the verge of disappearing, thereby causing them to display increased resentment and aggressiveness. Hence the first question concerns the demographic balances and imbalances noted in 1970, the gulf in the Soviet Union--as revealed by the census--between its Western peoples representing the USSR's industrial power, and its Eastern non-industrial, agrarian peoples attached to their rural civilization.

To what extent has this evolution continued? To what extent, on the contrary, can we foresee an attenuation of those sharp differences which political authorities seem incapable of controlling? The answer is very ambiguous. When we examine the 1979 census figures, we note that the differences are both growing deeper and lessening in the same direction at the same time. They are growing deeper quite simply because of the Soviet Union's demographic structure. The moment age groups capable of reproducing become numerous in a society, it is evident that they will have a great impact on that society's demographic development for a relatively long time. Among the Moslem peoples of the Soviet Union, the percentage of the population under 20 years of age is very large and thereby maintains a sustained rate of growth that is greatly out of balance with the rate among the USSR's European ethnic groups. For instance, in the period from 1960 to 1970, the birth rate among non-European peoples was three times higher than among European peoples. In the last 10 years, the non-European birth rate has risen to five times higher than the European rate. Consequently, outwardly there are seemingly increasing differences in demographic behavior. In reality, that is not altogether correct, because Soviet demography's general trend is one of declining birth rates among all ethnic groups, a situation that creates a problem for the future. This decline is particularly obvious among the European populations, but there is also a noticeably very sharp decrease in population among the Moslem peoples whose birth rate is beginning to drop. These are contradictory pictures from which it follows that the Soviet population's overall rate of growth will steadily decline without any possible expectations of a spectacular turnaround. It is a population that is growing too slowly, given the immense spaces the USSR ought to populate and develop, and given its rivalry with China, a country still more or less claiming the lost territories the USSR is incapable of populating.

The Soviet Union is thus faced with population problems it did not imagine a quarter century ago. It will not attain a population of 300 million by the year 2000, whereas 20 years ago it was counting on growing to approximately 350 million. Furthermore, imbalances in the birth rate will continue to mark that population until the end of the century. The parallelism in downward trends in the Western population and Eastern population indicate, however, that the government's reactions to the demographic phenomena it had noted have certainly had some effects, but without it being possible to call them a success, inasmuch as the Kremlin's aim is to promote the growth of its Western populations and check population growth among its Eastern peoples. For some 10 years, the Soviet government debated about the actions it should take to correct these demographic disparities. Yet the solutions it chose are not satisfactory and create problems for the future, as shown by its inability to respond effectively to the difficulties it is encountering.

for several years, Soviet leaders speculated about whether it was possible to have two types of birth rate policies in the USSR, one designed to increase the birth rate among Western peoples, the other to check that rate among the more prolific Eastern peoples. After this lengthy analysis, the Soviet government concluded there could be but one policy lying midway between the two requirements. Having done this, the government adopted family assistance measures which tend to allocate the maximum of this aid to the family with three children. Noteworthy is the fact that when trying to establish an effective demographic policy exactly commensurate with Soviet population disparities, the government authorized its experts to make extremely serious and shocking statements that were challenged by the non-Russian peoples, and that are indicative of the Soviet Union's awareness of the acuteness of the nationality problem and its tensions. These experts very bluntly asked the following question: Isn't it possible for us to formulate a policy that differentiates on the basis of qualitative evaluations of the different ethnic groups? In other words, is one Uzbek worth one Russian? One non-European worth one European? Thus, when faced with a distressing and pressing problem, the government went so far as to violate its professed ideological system, namely the equality of nationalities or peoples. Hence the constantly reiterated equalitarian ideology tends to weaken, even in its expression, when confronted with problems created for it by the varying behavior of large sectors of Soviet society. This contradictory expression gives the nationality problem a specific political dimension.

What forms may national frustrations and tensions in the USSR assume in the future? Can the nations--national state, national feeling--serve as a framework within which to rally Soviet society as they are currently doing for Polish society? When looking back on the past 20 years it does seem that the debate on national interests and the Soviet Union's collective interest transpired largely in three stages.

In the 1960's, when the national issue was being debated in the USSR, the question was whether the concept of nationality should continue in perpetuity or disappear. The problem at the time was an institutional one: Should the Soviet state remain a federally structured multi-ethnic state? A society that is becoming united--one Soviet people replacing a conglomeration of different peoples--must be reflected in the unity of the state at the institutional level. A unitary state or a federal state encompassing states having relative sovereignty but one expressed in a constitution and capable of playing that part, nothing being simple in a system of that type: such was the great debate of the 1960's. This debate on the nation and on federation had thus generated a very lively conflict between the center of the country and the outlying regions, a conflict which can be considered responsible for the difficulties experienced between 1961 and 1977 in writing a Soviet constitution. In practice, the conflict ended about the late 1960's, and in theory, in 1977 with the constitution the Soviet Union adopted at that time, a constitution which adheres to a type of federalism that is undoubtedly toned down but which recognizes the continuance of national structures furnishing a framework for the cultural life of the nations, for the maintenance of their differences, and also, however, for their capability of expressing their own aspirations which are not exactly those of the entire Soviet Union, and which may even be at variance with the common good.

The second phase of the debate lasted from the late 1960's to the mid-1970's. It had to do with the "substance" of the nations, that is to say with what is conducive to reconciliation or maintenance of their differences, with priority given to cultural

matters. This debate was most important, in that the nations fiercely defended their rights to remain within their own cultural framework with everything that attaches them to their roots, gives them cohesiveness, and prevents them from becoming absorbed by the general Soviet community, namely their own language and educational system. The Soviet system conducted an extremely strong attack against this argument. On the whole, the outcome can be said to have been rather positive for the system. As concern the issue of the personality of the nations through their own language and culture, a transformation is currently taking place in favor of a certain standardization, progress of the Russian language, and a certain acceptance by non-Russian nations of a common culture that is largely identifiable with the central, and hence Russian, culture. This is shown in the latest census by the rapid advances of total or partial bilingualism. Yet the validity of Soviet statistics is undoubtedly questionable. Two examples illustrate this point: the Estonians, who are among the Soviet Union's most educated peoples, and who seemed to have a most thorough knowledge of Russian in 1970, had slightly less knowledge of that language in 1979, according to the statistics. We may infer that statistics announcing a lightning advance or decline in the knowledge of a language among a people with a low birth rate simply suggest that the Estonians, in a fit of temper, simply decreed that today they know little Russian and thereby manifested a certain opposition.

The second example goes in the opposite direction. The Uzbeks stated that their knowledge of Russian had increased 364 percent in 9 years. This means that even infants have a perfect command of the Russian language the day they are born. We may, therefore, wonder what sense such patently fantastic figures can possibly have. Such statistical distortions must not, however, hide the main point, namely that the Soviet government has definitely won a battle. It has given the nationalities a difficult choice. If they become Russified by adhering to a common culture of which the Russian language is the vehicle, they are consequently likely to find within their midst those cadres who can hold leadership positions. On the other hand, if they reject this cultural unification, when the Soviets view Russian as the language of progress, the nations are discredited and will have to be supervised by cadres who know that language. When given this choice in the past, non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union had answered in the negative. In the 1970's, however, they considered it better to yield and accept a certain degree of cultural unification. In this respect, and if we make knowledge of Russian a criterion of increasing unification, then it is clear that there is a new situation in the Soviet Union, even if the statistics are unreliable.

That is perhaps why we now note a new shift in the focus of the debate. Tensions and frustrations have moved from the sector of the legal existence of the nation and its mode of cultural expression to a much more complex sector, namely the sector of the national community's economic interests. The Soviet Union's peripheral nations, those that are the most numerous, now vigorously declare themselves prepared to learn Russian, and state that they are completely satisfied with the Soviet system, provided they can remain within their own framework with due consideration being given to their national interests and requirements. There are multiple examples of this tension between the common good and special interests. The major source of tension is the distribution of manpower, and we know what a serious problem that is in the Soviet Union. Some will no doubt say this is a false problem because the Soviets do not work much and need four times more manpower than those economies that work in a normal fashion. This correct statement must be qualified, as follows, however: unless the USSR reverts to the Stalinist system, it is impossible to demand a normal

amount of work from a Soviet citizen. The labor mobilization measures the government is currently attempting to adopt are viewed unfavorably and may become a source of tension if implemented. The existing social consensus in the USSR is obtained by the government in exchange for widespread laxity that allows the citizen to ignore absolutely the requirements of the common good. Yet by the year 1990, a whole series of problems will become most urgent. For the next 20 years, given the structure of the population, the Soviet government will not only have to provide for the manpower needs of labor-deficient regions in Europe and Siberia, but also find work for the surplus manpower in demographically rich areas. In the latter, the stated political policy has always been: "Go where there is need for you and you will be paid more." The demographically dynamic peoples reject this type of statement. These past few years, they have been battling to obtain new solutions enabling them to organize a much more different economic life on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union. The most cogent example in this connection is the debate over diverting Siberian rivers, a project for which the peoples concerned have very vigorously campaigned. Diverting water from Siberian rivers into the three republics of Central Asia--Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan--is an extremely costly project that would provide irrigation systems making it possible to expand agricultural activity, employ surplus manpower, and also develop the area's industry which has considerable energy needs, and at the same time, give these regions greater economic autonomy. The ardor of those who are fighting and who represent all classes of society is quite understandable. All things considered, this phenomenon resembles the Polish situation. This aspiration is not being voiced by peasants or the average worker, but by communist party cadres who refer to the national interest of these republics. Thus communist cadres, who are closest to the Soviet government, are the spokesmen for national interests in this case. It is not a fluke that the two men who are in the forefront of this project are Kunayev, the Moslem member of the Politburo and secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party (which fully adheres to the Soviet system), and Rashidov, the first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, the man who manipulated the demographic statistics of the Uzbeks to show that they had all learned Russian, and who drew the following conclusion from this shady exploit: "We have done everything you wanted, now you must reward our integration efforts by making us full-fledged peoples who will not be obliged to expatriate themselves." This debate was vigorously conducted in the newspapers of Central Asia for 2 years, newspapers which Westerners generally ignore and which are most illuminating in showing that the USSR is not solely Moscow. Communist cadres took a forceful part in this debate, demanding that the views of their peoples be taken into consideration.

The same economic debate is being conducted in Georgia under different forms by Chevarnadze, the man who said the sun rises in the East, in other words in Moscow, the man who hosted the Soviet leaders who came to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the invasion of Georgia, but who at the same time continuously emphasizes, in all of his speeches, that Georgians do like Russians provided Moscow lets them develop their nation and takes into account their national interests. This issue is important precisely because it is expressed not by dissidents but by political cadres who belong to the Soviet system and make that system endure. This is exactly the view expressed by Stanislas Kania.

As always, the 26th CPSU Congress refused to settle the issue. Brezhnev stated, with a certain petulance, that people had to move in order to work. It was decided to continue studies on diverting Siberian rivers. Thus when faced with a ticklish problem, that of the integration or transfer of manpower, the Soviet government ensconced itself in a posture of immobilism, thereby avoiding having to make painful choices. But can such choices always be avoided?

Final point: this situation wherein tensions express themselves in economic terms that are difficult for the government to conceal or dodge, may be influenced by the international context. Much importance is attached to the Afghan invasion and its consequences, as well as to its links with the Moslem periphery of the Soviet Union. It has been said that the Soviet Union rushed into Afghanistan to curb the Islamic revival movement in Soviet territory. Although it is too soon--we lack the necessary documentation--to define and grade the causes of the invasion, one question does remain: Can this serious matter have an impact on Soviet Islam? It does seem that for the immediate future the answer is "no." The Soviet government initially incorporated its Moslems into the Afghan operation which it believed would be but a military "excursion." The Soviet Moslems were supposed to suggest the idea of "national liberation" exactly as the Cubans had done in Angola. It quickly became apparent that this was poor tactics, because Central Asian soldiers could not be compelled to fire upon people who are very closely related to them. As a result, these soldiers were withdrawn from the Afghan front. Since then, there has been no indication of agitation within the Soviet Union. For all of the Soviet people, Afghanistan is tending to become a remote venture which hardly concerns them. Consequently the government feels reassured. It showed this by organizing an Islamic forum in Tashkent at which the USSR's Moslem authorities joined with Moslems from other countries in endorsing the Afghan operation. In this case, the Soviet government is, therefore, almost sure of its political or religious elite, because their demands do not center on solidarity with neighboring peoples, but on their own special interests and ability to express themselves.

From a broader standpoint, the Islamic revival, as expressed in Iran or as sweepingly manifested throughout the Moslem world, has not spread into the Soviet Union for the moment. Apparently no religious leader has any intention of calling for secession and formation of Iranian style Islamic republic. It is certain, however, that peripheral events are spurring the Soviet Union's Moslem republics to assert their national interests more vigorously. At the present time, the most urgent problems are those posed by China and Poland. Even though changes and "de-Maoization" in China are still quite hesitant, that country does display a certain continuity in its intention to make the national factor an essential element in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. China's policy on national minorities has radically changed. The Chinese are fascinated by the fact that these minorities could serve as a useful instrument against the Soviet Union. They are endeavoring to contrast their liberalism and respect for national interests, even though recent, with Soviet policy which tends to prevent national interests from rising too sharply.

Furthermore, Poland will no longer be irrelevant to future developments in the Soviet Union's nationalities. If the Soviet government were to admit the possibility of having a Polish style of socialism--in other words, no more socialism at all--or the possibility of Poland triumphing over socialism, the peoples of the Soviet Union would grasp the lesson, namely that national mobilization is perhaps the only force capable of successfully striking a fatal blow to socialism. Accordingly we may infer that the USSR cannot allow Polish style socialism to carry through or allow the Poles to destroy socialism. The Polish situation is a serious threat to the entire system, especially since within the Soviet Union there are peoples for whom the national framework is probably the most effective rallying point. Poland has proved that the only means of effective action is to rally the whole nation round its will to live independently.

These are extremely serious problems, even though they still have not clearly emerged. These are the problems of the next 20 years. They are linked to the problem of Soviet power and to the government's ability to devise innovative solutions and responses to a society inclined to think that the best way of organizing itself is to integrate itself into the national framework. The Soviet government is responding with minor measures. For instance, it is in the process of changing all of the Moslem community's religious leaders and replacing them with young men who have received an education that is more Soviet than Islamic. In a more general way, the frequent changes in political personnel within the USSR's national republics contrasts with the stability observed within the federal political apparatus. Developments in Poland have also shown that it takes more than a change of leaders to contain a movement, because the new leaders become readily immersed in the national dynamism and are "corrupted" by it. This is not a secondary problem, even though it is currently the subject of a certain number of question marks.

Weaknesses of Satellites

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 71-78

[Article by Francois Fejto]

[Text] Each of the previous speakers has referred, in one way or another, to the case of Poland, a drama which has kept us in veritable suspense for the past several months: Will they intervene or not? When and how will they intervene? Who will emerge victorious, Poland or the socialist bloc? etc. It should be noted, however, that the Polish crisis was not a complete surprise to us. In my lecture at the IHEDN [Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies] on 1 March 1980--and also published in COMMENTAIRE--I listed the following destabilizing factors I expected to continue to undermine the Soviet presence in people's democracies:

- a. The yearning to regain national independence and sovereignty.
- b. The economic rationality that dooms the Soviet world's peculiar centralizing structures to inefficiency.
- c. The trend toward democratization and pluralism whose spokesmen are intellectuals, but also the Church.
- d. Resurgence of the workers movement, as previously illustrated by the Polish workers uprisings of 1970 and 1976, and by the demand for independent trade unions.

The cautious forecasts I made more than a year ago have been more than confirmed by the Polish crisis which began in July 1980. That crisis reveals, in digest form, the factors of vulnerability existing within the USSR's European empire, factors that had already drawn our attention, in different ways, during previous crises, namely in Hungary and Poland in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

By its dimensions and historical context, the Polish situation has confronted the USSR with the most serious of all the crises it has had to face within its buffer states since Stalin's death. It must be reiterated that the immediate cause of the Polish political crisis is economic: price increases combined with a shortage of

basic articles of food, both situations deemed intolerable by Polish wage earners. But the latter's protests also disputed the entire politico-economic management system and quickly culminated in the tumultuous formation of an independent trade union movement of such power that the ruling party's leadership, unable to confront, check, and channel it, was compelled to recognize it as an equal partner. Such recognition was granted in the famous Gdansk agreements of 31 August 1981, agreements unprecedented in the history of Soviet bloc countries and which put an end to totalitarianism in Poland.

As a result, in addition to the Catholic Church whose independent spiritual authority has enjoyed de facto recognition since 1956, Poland now has a second nationwide institution which, without frontally opposing the country's single party, is totally free of that party's control. The Soviets, so vigilant in protecting the political monopoly of satellite parties, were quick to realize that while the trade union Solidarity disclaimed engaging in any political activity, leaving that up to the party, it was actually engaging in such activity, for example, by demanding the release of political prisoners or the dismissal of high-level officials guilty of repression or malfeasance. In fact, the press in the Soviet Union and other people's democracies lost no time in accusing Solidarity of setting itself up as a second political party. Yet, despite pressures of every kind which began back in September 1980, the "renewal," as the gradual emancipation of Polish society was called, continued to expand. Solidarity obtained its own weekly newspaper, access to the press, and a substantial relaxation of censorship. With the support of the Catholic Church, farmers also formed their own Solidarity union which took on the appearance of a peasants party. The organization for the defense of arrested and dismissed workers known by the initials KOR, and led by Kuron and Michnik whom the Soviets tried in vain to make scapegoats for all of Solidarity's "sin," opened offices throughout the country to receive citizens complaints about violations of their rights.

University students, in turn, freed themselves from restrictive controls. Lastly, the most recent development--also the one most fraught with consequences for relations with the USSR--was the fact that Solidarity contaminated the party itself, compelled it to radically change the rules of democratic centralism, and to such a point that the party congress convened on 14 July had no choice but to confirm the defeat of conservative leaders who were unwavering supporters of the USSR which had counted on their action to "reverse the course of events."

The appointment of delegates to the party congress, the party's "supreme authority," traditionally falls within the province of the party apparatus. In Poland, the party control committee customarily designates approximately 75 percent of the delegates, the others having been elected, as a rule, by the party membership. In the spring of 1981, however, the statutes of the party were changed under irresistible pressure from the rank and file. It was agreed that members themselves would elect delegates to the congress by secret ballot, with the congress then electing, by secret ballot, the central committee and party first secretary. As a result, most of the discredited conservative apparatchiki were defeated in the delegate elections and replaced by new men, many of them members of Solidarity, thus transforming the July congress beforehand into a new type of congress. It was for this reason that many feared the Soviets might intervene before 14 July to prevent holding the party congress. There was a precedent for such action, namely that of Czechoslovakia in 1968, wherein the USSR had set 21 August as the date of its military intervention so as to prevent convening of the party congress scheduled for September, a congress which threatened to change the Czechoslovak party into a democratic party free of Soviet control.

As for the Polish party's sudden transformation in the same direction, it was noted that Lech Walesa and his socialist and Catholic advisers viewed this change as an unwelcome development. Being realists, they were hoping to build Poland's democratization upon a balance between the independent trade unions on one side and the party continuing to enjoy the Kremlin's confidence on the other. The party's sudden breakup and the conversion of the majority of its 3 million members to the patriots' cause, embarrassed the trade unions and their intellectual friends.

As the date of the congress approached, the Soviets intensified their pressure on the party leadership. In their 4 June letter to the Polish Central Committee, the sentence that appeared most threatening was the one in which the Kremlin rulers asked the following question: Under the present circumstances, is the ability of the congress to lead the working class still credible? The Kremlin thereby also impliedly expressed its distrust of party chief Stanislaw Kania. The Moscow press gave broad coverage to statements by groups of ultraconservative Polish party activists criticizing the leadership's policy as being too "soft" on Solidarity. This campaign was viewed as possible psychological preparation for Soviet intervention. It insinuated that, if necessary, the Kremlin would not hesitate to replace the congress and legally elected leaders by groups totally submissive to its authority.

We must underscore the extremely prudent way in which trade unionists responded to this campaign of continuous pressure, and likewise their vigilant attention to the international aspects of the Polish crisis. Walesa, KOR intellectuals, Catholic intellectuals, and clergymen displayed rather extraordinary diplomatic abilities in avoiding any polemics, in constantly reassuring the USSR that they intended not only to respect Poland's Warsaw Pact obligations but also to spare Soviet susceptibilities about such dogmas as the party's primacy. Although there were a few anti-Soviet incidents, these were minor and, in most cases, probably the work of provocateurs. Party leaders, accused of making too many concessions to the democratic movement, found themselves in a position quite similar to Dubcek's situation in 1968. Other than their current conciliatory policy toward Solidarity and toward society in general now rallied round the national flag, the only solution is the use of force. But party leaders are not at all sure that this force is usable against the people. As a matter of fact, there can be little doubt about the army's patriotic loyalty ever since the 10-11 June meeting of the Central Committee at which the 21 generals on that committee gave the party leader and the prime minister, having become symbols of the party's accommodation with Solidarity, a unanimous vote of confidence.

The Soviets, for their part, seem desirous of avoiding, as much as possible, any direct military intervention that would prove much more costly than their intervention in Czechoslovakia. Since the beginning of the crisis, they have endeavored to organize schemes enabling them to settle the Polish problem through the Polish party, but to date these attempts have all failed because of Polish patriotism. Measures of intimidation and provocation, attempts to fractionalize the country, have all remained ineffective.

The ups-and-downs of the Polish crisis, such as I have examined them, permit us to better understand the vulnerability of Soviet rule over the socialist republics of Eastern Europe. This vulnerability stems in large part from the nature of the basic

concept governing the USSR's relations with its satellites, a concept embodied in the Brezhnev Doctrine promulgated in 1968. As everyone knows, that doctrine was designed primarily to prevent or overcome the system's internal crises through the institutionalized right of intervention by the dominant power and its partners. Intervention was justified every time a satellite's people or government exceeded "acceptable limits." Yet the ideological inflexibility with which an ultraconservative Kremlin established these limits for the internal operation of the satellites is in itself a source of discontent and a destabilizing factor. By prohibiting reforms which the evolution of these countries makes indispensable, it produces instability and passivity within communist parties set up as the sole guarantees of sustained Soviet influence. The case of traditionally Russophile Czechoslovakia showed how prohibiting a satellite from deviating from the Soviet model engenders first a crisis, then a wave of anti-Sovietism, whereas a compromise on the bases proposed by Dubcek would have been reasonably possible.

Regardless of how Hungarians, Poles, etc. may feel about the USSR, their leaders are rational enough to realize that the present balance of forces in the world compels them to respect Soviet hegemony. Constantly recurring changes do not tend to disrupt the alliance, as the Russians regularly insinuate, but tends rather to establish socialist models determined by the particularities and historical traditions of those countries. Furthermore, it is a noteworthy fact that, despite the obstacles erected by the Soviets, there have been some instances of diversification within the empire. Even pre-1980 Poland with its noncollectivized farmers, the special status of the Catholic Church, its small groups of free intellectuals, and its periodic worker uprisings, Hungary with its reconciliation of internal independence and external submission, Romania with its insubordinate and ultra-Stalinist policies, plus chauvinistic and Russophile Bulgaria, all have their own particular profiles, characteristics different from the Soviet model. Thus Moscow does allow some differences, provided they do not compromise the essentials of what Soviet ideologists call the "universal methods of building socialism." At Katowice on 20 May 1981, Kania's opponents warned, in a Soviet-inspired statement, that Poland must not build an "inordinately Polish" type of socialism. Moscow constantly reiterates that the Polish comrades have exceeded acceptable limits and that party concessions to Solidarity mortally endanger "the Polish nation's revolutionary gains."

Thus the Kremlin's ultraconservatism confounds socialist reformism and counterrevolution, normal evolution to a Finnish-style model and a swing to the "imperialist camp." This intolerant ultraconservatism, combined with systematic interventionism, is making the USSR appear more and more as the main obstacle to the economic, social, and cultural development of countries within its sphere of influence, and this is a time when their economic and energy dependence on the USSR continues to increase.

This ultraconservative policy of the Kremlin toward the satellite countries is probably derived from Soviet internal policy. Granting Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia a privileged, liberal, and pluralistic political status would inevitably revive similar aspirations in certain outlying republics of the Soviet Union, notably in the Baltic countries, the Ukraine, and even the Moslem republics as explained earlier by Madame Carrere d'Encausse. It does seem that, from the Kremlin's point of view, the Kadar model represents the maximum degree of tolerance and admissible decentralization without jeopardizing the bloc's cohesion and homogeneity. An independent workers and farmers trade union, independent journalism, etc. are not compatible with this system. Stabilizing Polish pluralism at its current level would

introduce a permanent source of contagion inside the bloc, something the Kremlin could not long tolerate without reversing its policy.

What countries are most vulnerable to the Polish virus? I believe Romania and Yugoslavia are such in the immediate future because of their difficult economic situation and the noticeable agitation of late within their labor circles. In Yugoslavia, the resurgence of national feelings--as evidenced by the disturbances in Kosovo province--is exacerbating economic and social tensions, a development which, under different circumstances, might have delighted the Soviets.

At the present time, however, for reasons we have just mentioned, Yugoslavia's destabilization does not seem to be in line with the present aims of the Soviet Union now fully concentrated upon preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe. As for Romania, its working class does not have the same militant traditions as the Polish workers; the Church there is an agent of submission; and the intellectuals are compliant. Nevertheless, 400 Romanian intellectuals did take some risk in signing a statement of support for Poland. Some will say that it is only natural for Hungarian patriotism to use pro-Polish demonstrations at the present time as a means of expressing its opposition to the Soviet big brother's domination, just as in 1939 it had expressed its opposition to the Reich, at the time of the invasion of Poland, by demonstrating in favor of Polish refugees.

We will conclude this rapid survey by noting that Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe is vulnerable especially because it is perceived as hampering the development and prosperity of nations. This perception makes the anti-Sovietism of the peoples in those nations the most important political force. In fact, isn't one of the main objectives of all Soviet policy in Europe precisely to prevent the West from exploiting this large chink in its armor?

Intervention Capabilities

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 79-86

[Article by Henri Paris]

[Text] Some 210,000 Soviet soldiers are currently stationed outside the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries.* Western attention is focused on the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. This presence of 85,000 men* is certainly important, but it must be pointed out that it accounts for only slightly more than one-third of the total forces maintained in the Third World by the USSR. Admittedly, except for the troops in Afghanistan, these Soviet forces are quite dispersed. The heaviest concentration is in Cuba where there are 7,500 men. These are military advisers more than intervention forces. As for the USSR's allies, their presence is just as dispersed, except for the Cubans who constitute veritable army corps in Angola and Ethiopia. The total of all these forces is, nevertheless, impressive, and in addition the Soviets have a specific military intervention capability.

* "Military Balance 1980-1981," International Institute for Strategic Studies.

In Westerners' eyes, the Persian Gulf oilfields appear to be threatened. In this connection, one immediately thinks of the Soviet Navy, but without bearing in mind that the range of an Ilyushin-72 transport for airborne troops is some 5,300 kilometers. This means that this aircraft can fly nonstop from its departure base in the USSR to Lake Tanganyika. This transport's radius of action, i.e. its nonstop round-trip capability, enables it to cover half of Arabia.

Another fact dictated by geography is that the Soviet armed forces, unlike Western forces, do not need ocean-going transports to reach Aden!

Our purpose here is to determine the USSR's actual capability of intervening in the Third World by air and land, in other words with airborne and ground forces.

Our analysis will deal first with an evaluation of available Soviet forces and secondly with the system's flaws and weaknesses.

Soviet Intervention Force

Unlike, for example, the French Army, the Soviet Army has no troops specifically organized and equipped for overseas operations. Marked by a long continental tradition as well as by the abundance of their resources, the Soviets have organized completely versatile or multipurpose forces deployed in three theaters of operations on the basis of the potential enemy as well as assigned missions. These three distinctive theaters are the European, Eastern, and Far Eastern theaters. Forces that could operate in the Persian Gulf area belong to the Eastern theater.

The forces belonging to that theater consist of 24 divisions, including one tank division, two airborne divisions, and 21 motorized rifle divisions, with one or two air armies especially tailored to the theater's needs. The organization and armament of these troops is no different from those in other theaters, with but one exception: the latest and most modern weapons and equipment are generally assigned on a priority basis to the European theater, and then the Far Eastern theater.

Weapons are designed on the basis of the major assumption of a war against NATO countries; and each division has its own nuclear weapon launchers. For instance, the intervention forces in Afghanistan brought their launchers of this type with them. Here we must emphasize one point, namely that Western technological superiority in army-type armament is a myth. The T-62 tank was the first tank in the world to fire a fin-stabilized projectile, and the T-72 battle tank was the first in the world to have a gun equipped with an automatic loading system. Troop training is outstanding. On the other hand, Soviet aviation has a few relatively weak points. In this field, Soviet technology is on a par with European technology and, therefore, below the level of American technology. But this gap is steadily closing. Pilot training is below Western standards in number of flying hours, but this shortcoming is somewhat offset by the use of very large flight simulators. Any judgement on the efficiency and quality of Soviet pilots and air crews is difficult to make in the absence of a conflict.

This Eastern theater's forces are not completely combat-ready. Like all Soviet forces, this theater's divisions have 100 percent of their authorized equipment, but their personnel need to be brought to full strength by mobilization to an extent that varies

with the units. The time required to do this is approximately 48 hours. The large number of maneuvers and mobilization exercises make it difficult to determine whether an exercise foreshadows merely a maneuver or an actual intervention, as was the case in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

According to "Military Balance 1980-1981," five motorized rifle divisions and one airborne division were withdrawn from the Eastern theater in 1981 for service in Afghanistan. This still leaves 18 divisions available for another intervention. Moreover, the theater can be reinforced almost immediately by units drawn from the Soviet Army's eight airborne divisions. Such reinforcement would be significant because the Soviets consider the parachute as merely a means of dispatching troops, and their airborne forces are equipped with light armored vehicles and other material enabling them to conduct operations in any terrain against enemy armored units. The sole difference is that paratroop units have no nuclear weapons. These units, specially trained for intervention missions, bear the generic name of "desant" derived from the French word "descente," as it was understood during the wars of the Revolution and Empire, for example, in the expression "descent on England," in other words a landing in force.

Military transport is provided by the Transport Aviation force directly responsible to the general staff. This force has some 1,500 aircraft, including nearly 700 high capacity transports. This represents an overall instant airlift capability of approximately 20,000 tons which is adequate for the immediate airlift of more than a division. Such an airlift was carried out in 1979 for the seizure of Kabul.

From an equipment standpoint, the Soviets thus have a peerless air and ground intervention force possessing incomparable strategic mobility. When the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force attains its full operational readiness status by 1985, it will still be inferior to the Soviet Eastern theater forces as constituted in 1981.

Flaws, Weaknesses

Any system, no matter how powerful, has some weak points. As far as the Soviet forces per se are concerned, there are very few apparent weak points. Such is not the case, however, where concepts are concerned.

Tactical Level

A whole series of problems related to command, organization, and logistics surfaced in the late 1970's. As is their custom, the Soviets opened a debate which was largely echoed by the military press.* The aim of this discussion was to enhance awareness of these problems among the military as much as to find solutions. The issues raised do not seem to have been resolved in 1981 and apply to the Soviet Army as a whole.

The main problem is one common to most Western armies. The Americans call it C³, i.e. command, control, and communications in battle. The increasing complexity of command and control of troops, due to the sophistication of equipment as well as to the scope and fluid character of combat situations, is causing headquarters and staffs to lose

* Particularly in the periodical VOENNYI VESTNIK (Military Messenger) beginning in 1976 with an article by Colonel General Grinkevitch.

some control. Commanders not only feel that there are weaknesses in the equipment supposed to permit them to exercise command efficiently and effectively, but they also perceive a lack of human competence, an inability to adapt to equipment already in service, and even more to sudden and multiple situation changes.

There are also shortcomings in logistic support. Even though the Soviet Army is continuously striving to eliminate inordinate equipment sophistication, it has such wealth of equipment that it cannot do without a powerful "umbilical cord" to fuel that gigantic war machine on the move. Yet when faced with an unforeseen, unplanned situation, the "rear area troops" responsible for providing this logistic support prove incapable at times of coping with the problem. In Afghanistan, for example, a Soviet unit ran out of ammunition at the height of a combat operation because it had exceeded standard ammunition expenditure rates in a guerrilla situation marked by an endless succession of brief firefights entailing a heavy expenditure of ammunition. Moreover, planners had been unable to change the deployment of ammunition supply points in time.

Such weaknesses are not peculiar to the Soviet Army, however. It is far from certain that they can be overcome by Western troops, and also by armies of countries in the Near and Middle East. Yet the Soviet Army does have a specific flaw that stems intrinsically from its concept of war at all levels of command and even at the ordinary soldier's level.

The Soviets dogmatically contend that there is a military science governed by laws of warfare that must not be broken. This approach produces a rigid mode of thinking that finds expression more or less in formulas and stereotyped plans. The art of war then consists in recognizing the situation to which a predetermined and lengthily prestudied solution corresponds. Initiative inevitably becomes secondary to an obsession, namely not to be outside the law. The high command became well aware of the flaw in such rigidity of military thinking and sought to correct it. Its effort has met with very little success. In fact, it has been unable to reconcile two contrary absolutes: war is either a matter of circumstances to which man responds according to his own particular genius, or a dialectic complying with a scientific system based on laws, like any experimental science as Claude Bernard interpreted that term.

Thus the Soviet Army has a peculiar weakness in this regard. Yet there are two points that merit further consideration. First, it should be determined whether the advantages obtained from such a concept outweigh the impact of its rigidities. Actually, under this concept, the modalities of each combat action are known and thoroughly studied, thereby producing an indisputable community of thinking which rules out any unforeseen action by one's own friendly forces. Secondly, the flaw inherent in this rigidity could be exploited by the enemy only by implementing a war of maneuver concept giving privileged status to the seizure and maintenance of the operational initiative, in other words, by adopting a concept that is offensive by definition. But is this the case with the Western armies or the armies of Near and Middle East countries? I doubt it.

Strategic Level

In the event of a combined air and ground intervention in the Middle or Near East, geography would afford the USSR an advantage and at the same time a major disadvantage.

The advantage comes from the fact that Soviet forces can launch a surprise attack by land and be deployed in the area with indisputable superiority long before any Western forces, and American troops in particular, are dispatched. On the other hand, this same geography would compel the Soviets to extend the scope of their intervention immediately to such countries as Iraq, Turkey, and Syria which lie between them and the gulf, assuming the latter is their objective. The risks of escalation are obvious and outweigh the benefit it is reasonably possible to derive from this kind of operation. Nevertheless, a localized operation by large airborne forces is still within the realm of possibility.

The Soviet system's principal flaw lies in its actual strategic concept. Soviet strategy is based on a policy line that has been invariably followed ever since Stalin initiated it in 1952, namely the policy of peaceful coexistence. Yet peaceful coexistence contains two contradictory principles. The first is fundamental and holds that if the conflict between socialism and capitalism remains irreconcilable and can end only with the collapse of capitalism, war is no longer the sole solution to that conflict. War between the two sociopolitical systems is, therefore, no longer inevitable, and this permits socialism to be built within the socialist camp. The second principle makes it binding upon the USSR and its allies to support not only socialism, as in Afghanistan, but also national liberation movements even if they are not essentially Marxist. This second principle may lead Westerners to react in ways which, step by step, can start a conflict, i.e. a development that is the exact opposite of the goal sought by the fundamental principle of peaceful coexistence.

Up to 1981, the Soviets, acting with extreme prudence, have succeeded to such an extent that nowhere in the world has there been an armed clash between a Warsaw Pact soldier and an Atlantic Alliance soldier.

Its military build-up, coupled with the questioning of its ideological message, inevitably leads the USSR to be inclined to resort to armed intervention, thereby placing it dangerously at variance with its very own doctrine.

Conclusion

The USSR is deeply committed to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. It is officially inscribed in the Soviet Constitution and reiterated by the different party congresses, including the most recent, the 26th. Even a change of collective leadership cannot modify that policy line which is the policy of a party that transcends men. Under this policy, the USSR will not launch into interventionism or war unless it feels it has no alternative according to a peculiar logic which is not always that of Westerners, as was the case in Afghanistan.

Before taking any military action, the USSR has always sought to exhaust all other ways and means and has decided to take such action only as a last resort. The Polish situation is a cogent case in point. It remains for the West to correctly grasp this rationality and its basis.

Peaceful coexistence contains its own flaws in various contradictions which it was possible to smooth over as long as Soviet action did not extend beyond the European framework. A Western response, especially if directed at the USSR's allies in a region deemed nonvital to the socialist camp, is liable to bring these contradictions to light.

The main danger for Westerners in the Third World, however, does not lie to any great extent in the threat of Soviet intervention, but in the instability of nations that emerged from the decolonization process. In a region as vital to Europe as the Persian Gulf there is, of course, a threat of Soviet military intervention. All things considered, however, the main danger lies rather in those countries that have no social or national unity and may, therefore, become prey to internal conflicts. In conclusion, we should ask ourselves whether B.N. Ponomarev, one of the leading CPSU officials, was not right when he said that the USSR was neither exporting nor creating revolution, for such action was impossible. However, he added, the Soviet Union cannot refuse to support a revolutionary movement once it emerges.

Navy's Strength, Weaknesses

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 87-98

[Article by Jean Labayle-Couhat]

[Text] Since this article was written, the press (LE MONDE, 2-3 August) has reported a large concentration of surface vessels from the Soviet Northern, Mediterranean, and Black Sea Fleets, and perhaps the Pacific Fleet. This armada includes the aircraft carrier "Kiev" with its own escort (two "Krivak"-class guided missile destroyers), plus an amphibious force ("Ivan Rogov," "Alligator"-class LST, "Ropucha"-class ship) capable of landing approximately 7,500 men plus some tanks.

When the media refer to the Soviet Navy, they too frequently have a tendency to mention only its very large number of submarines and the powerful armament of its surface combatant warships, thereby inevitably alarming the general public. In so doing, the media overlook other aspects of that navy which are just as important and serve to moderate the opinion people may have of it. These aspects include, for example, its state of training, the proficiency of its personnel, the efficiency of its command structures, and above all, the geographical constraints to which it is subjected and which to a very large extent condition its operational capabilities.

The Soviet Union's continental land mass actually has four maritime frontages, two of which are on oceans and two on inland seas whose narrow outlets to open seas are controlled by noncommunist powers. Logic has led the USSR to organize its naval forces into four fleets, each being necessarily self-sufficient. It is possible to shift ships between these fleets by sea or via inland waterways, but such movements are long and subject to various limitations. The northern seaway is navigable only for a short period in the summer. The passage of warships through the Turkish Straits is tightly regulated by the Montreux Convention. The use of inland waterways is restricted to ships of less than 1,500 tons and limited to certain times of the year. Certain areas are icebound in winter, such as, for example, the White Sea and the Gulf of Finland. To gain access to the open seas, Soviet naval vessels must funnel through natural choke points: Iceland, Faeroe Island, Straits of Malacca, etc. where they are highly vulnerable. Lastly, the USSR has no overseas naval bases, a deficiency that cannot be remedied by the few support facilities it has been able to establish here and there. When in need of repair, Soviet ships are forced to return to the USSR.

I. Status of Forces

Submarines

With its 370 boats, the Soviet submarine fleet is numerically the world's largest. It is still saddled, however, with approximately 150 diesel-powered submarines of a type now obsolete or obsolescent.

The new construction effort initially centered on strategic submarines. Today, the Soviet Navy has 63 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). These supplement the deterrent capability of the Strategic Rocket Forces and constitute a second-strike force.

Following its emphasis on SSBN's, the Soviet Navy is currently stressing nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN's). Some of these are armed with torpedoes, others with cruise missiles. Though SSN's have an obvious priority, that has not halted construction of conventional diesel-powered, torpedo-launching submarines. Yet the construction rate of the "Tango"-class (NATO code name) (16 in service) diesel-powered attack submarines does not enable these to replace the 60 ageing "Foxtrot"-class submarines. An appreciable reduction in the number of diesel-powered submarines must, therefore, be expected, with some of their missions being transferred to SSN's. Concurrent construction of the following SSN's is continuing: the very fast (42 knots), very deep diving, and very costly 3,600-ton "Alfas;" 5,000-ton "Victors" (30 knots); and "Charlies" equipped with tactical anti-surface ship missiles capable of sub-surface launch. If we exclude the older submarines, we note that the Soviet Navy has, in the final analysis, only 80 modern SSN's, which is about as many as the U.S. Navy.

Thus, after a period of rather clumsily copying Western technology, Soviet naval authorities and engineers are exhibiting original thinking and dynamism centered mainly on speed, operating depth, and resistance. They have also made great industrial strides, inasmuch as the USSR is now capable of building 10 submarines per year. The Soviet submarine fleet is thus beginning to harvest the fruits of a sustained improvement and expansion policy.

It continues to have acoustics problems, particularly with regard to passive detection systems and quiet operation, especially in comparison with American achievements in this field. Soviet submariners still appear to be suffering from a lack of underwater seafaring traditions, a shortcoming that handicaps their operating procedures and techniques.

Surface Forces

These forces consist of 1,160 ships of all types. This figure may impress a superficial observer, but only 156 of these ships displace more than 2,000 tons and are capable of operating on the high seas. Of this total, 12 cruisers and 65 destroyers are more than 20 years old and cannot be considered first line ships. The 100 or so other ships have essentially defensive tasks and are designed to operate in confined waters or along coasts.

The Soviet Navy has no aircraft carriers or carrier-based aviation worthy of the name. It tried to correct this major weakness with the "Kiev"-class cruiser-aircraft carrier two of which--the "Kiev" and "Minsk"--are in service, with another two under construction.

But these hybrid ships cannot be considered true aircraft carriers.

There are 28 modern guided missile cruisers, including the "Moskva"-class helicopter carrier and the recently commissioned large nuclear-powered cruiser "Kirov."* These ships are very heavily equipped with missiles, guns, torpedoes, helicopters, and various other items of equipment.

The latest destroyers are also exceptionally well equipped with offensive and defensive weapons for ships of this category. Ton for ton, Soviet ships have armament which is always superior to that of their foreign counterparts. The resultant corresponding multiplicity of ammunition magazines may be a factor of vulnerability. Another source of weakness, in the opinion of Westerners, is the fact that none of these modern destroyers carries a helicopter, even though such aircraft have been in common use on escort ships in Western fleets for years and have become one of the most effective antisubmarine warfare systems. It was only this year that new types of helicopter-equipped destroyers of the "Sovremenny" and "Udaloy" classes, were first observed. But it will undoubtedly take a few more years before they are built in sufficient numbers.

The Soviets have made great strides in underwater detection. All surface ships are now fitted with intermediate-and low-frequency sonars. Americans claim that the Soviets are a good 10 years behind in this field, particularly in passive detection systems. In contrast, where radars are concerned, they are abreast of the most modern techniques. There are doubts, however, about the reliability of this radar equipment because of insufficient technology. Observers continue to believe that the problem of integrated fire control of antiship, antiaircraft, and antisubmarine weapon systems has not been solved thus far because of the lack of high-powered computers.

Amphibious Forces

The Soviet Navy has a naval infantry (marine) force of 20,000 men. To transport and land this force, the navy has an amphibious fleet of 81 vessels, generally of small tonnage. Only one of these ships, the "Ivan Rogov," has capabilities not unlike those of the American LSD's (Landing Ship Dock). It is now stationed in the Pacific.** These troops and ships are sufficient to help seize control of the Turkish and Baltic straits in the event of a war in Europe. They are also capable of conducting small-scale amphibious operations on the Chinese coasts in the event of war with the People's Republic of China. As we shall see later, some of these ships are engaged in special tasks.

Logistic Support Ships

With the sole exception of the 36,000-ton "Berezina," which is akin to the U.S. Navy's large and versatile replenishment fleet tankers, the Soviet Navy currently has but

* "Kiev," "Minsk," "Moskva," and "Kirov" are the real names of these ships and not their NATO code names.

** This ship has returned to the Baltic since this article was written.

some 10 modern tankers for underway replenishment of its combat forces. This is obviously a very modest support capability. However, to these military tankers must be added some dozen tankers chartered from the Soviet merchant fleet. It should also be noted that all Soviet merchant vessels are always prepared to assist the navy.

The Soviet Navy also has a large number of support vessels of different types, particularly repair ships capable of making minor repairs and performing routine maintenance. These repair ships frequently operate in open roadsteads or sheltered anchorages during overseas deployments.

Naval Air Arm

Naval air power is organic to the Soviet Navy. It comprises some 1,500 aircraft of all types, a very large majority of which are land based.

Carrier-based aviation is still in the embryonic state. It consists of helicopters based on carriers and large cruisers, as well as a few dozen V/STOL Yak-36 Forger aircraft deployed on the "Kiev." Current opinion is that this plane is not a success and has flown very little since becoming operational.

Shore-based naval aircraft include about 350 long-range aircraft plus 200 aircraft employed in aerial refueling, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare tasks. The primary mission of the bombers is to attack the potential enemy's large carrier task forces. The bombers are equipped with highly sophisticated antiship missiles having a 150-nautical mile range and armed with a nuclear or conventional warhead. This bomber force is now being modernized with Backfire aircraft. Three regiments have already been equipped with this bomber. The Backfire is a formidable fighting machine capable of transporting nine tons of bombs and missiles some 5,500 kilometers at Mach 2 speed. It represents a serious threat that will inevitably increase with the entry into service of 30 such aircraft each year.

The navy's maritime patrol and ASW aircraft include some old seaplanes, about 60 aircraft similar to our navy's Breguet Atlantic and the U.S. Navy's Orion, plus a few dozen long-range Bear bombers modified and equipped for this mission. The performance of all these aircraft and their equipment is inferior to those currently operational in major Western navies.

Personnel

An immense majority of all ship crews is composed of draftees who serve for 3 years (2 years in the army and air force). This term of service is probably insufficient to train crews capable of operating the increasingly complex and sophisticated equipment. Because of this, there are reportedly some problems in manning nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. As there are few enlistees and re-enlistees, the petty officer corps is numerically and qualitatively inadequate. The officer corps is said to be good on the whole, but reportedly shows little initiative. This latter characteristic was already very noticeable in the former Imperial Navy. It could not fail to become more pronounced with the dual political and military chain of command which hardly facilitates the exercise of command. Even though every effort is being made to rejuvenate the high command, it is older on the average than those of the major Western powers. The commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, the famous Admiral Gorshkov, is 71 years old.

Training

Training is of uneven quality. It is said to be good in the submarine forces, even though they still lack, as we mentioned earlier, a real underwater seafaring tradition. Naval surface exercises are not as numerous as in Western navies and are still too frequently stereotyped. For lack of modern facilities and equipment, antisubmarine warfare procedures are still very rigid.

The massive global exercise "Okean," simultaneously involving all four Soviet fleets and held in 1970 and 1975, was not conducted last year. The annual maneuvers in the Norwegian Sea were held, however, and simulated interception of a carrier task force.

When deployed overseas, Soviet ships lie at anchor more often than not for weeks on end in open roadsteads or sheltered anchorages just outside territorial waters. While this may have some crew-training value, it is not enough to acquire that seamanship so dear to Anglo-Saxon navies.

2. The Threat

After having thus reviewed the status of the naval forces and their equipment, and underscored certain weaknesses, we may well ask ourselves whether the Soviet Navy constitutes a threat to the West's sea lines of communication, whether it can inhibit the freedom of action of Western forces in crises situations, whether it has the means of supporting the USSR's foreign policy, and whether it is capable of striking decisive blows the moment a general war breaks out.

The Soviet Navy is indeed a threat to the West's sea lanes in the North Atlantic with its heavy bombers and nuclear attack submarines, provided the latter are able to foil the continuously improving surveillance and countermeasures. In the South Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean, nuclear attack submarines would be a continuous threat to oil tankers plying routes from the Persian Gulf to European ports.

In a crisis situation, the Soviet Navy can also inhibit the freedom of action of Western forces. That is certainly one of its primary missions, one it seeks to perform by maintaining a more or less permanent presence with large forces in certain trouble spots, and also by stationing a single ship in a carefully chosen location. For example, during the Mideast October 1973 War, a guided missile destroyed called at the port of Alexandria, thereby preventing the Israeli Air Force from attacking Egyptian naval forces based there.

Its current capacities preclude the Soviet Navy being everywhere at once. Consequently it has to change the focal point of its forces according to the political objectives of the moment or the priority given to threats: in the not too distant past, the African and Mediterranean coasts; a few months ago, the Indian Ocean; and more recently, the Mediterranean once again because of increased Israeli-Syrian tension. It is difficult for the Soviet Navy to support a lengthy sustained effort in a region so long way from its usual areas of operation. In the event of a protracted crisis, the absence of bases, indeed even of simple support facilities, and the inadequacy of underway replenishment capabilities, would oblige the Soviets to reduce their presence after a large initial effort. We saw a recent example of this in the Indian Ocean.

At the time of the events in Iran and Afghanistan, the USSR deployed into that theater a naval force comprising two to three guided missile cruisers, a half-dozen destroyers, and a similar number of submarines, some of them SSN's, with a small logistic support element. After a few weeks, this force was reduced, whereas the U.S. Navy kept its force there at full strength. Yet maintaining a force of this size as long as it did, does show what real progress the Soviet Navy has made of late.

In Soviet foreign policy, the armed forces are one means among others of pursuing the continuous worldwide struggle to have Soviet ideology triumph and to protect its interests. The navy makes a vital contribution to this policy, the main instrument of which is the surface fleet. This policy is actually based on the fear inspired among the general public and governments, relatively unfamiliar with maritime issues, by the formidable armament of its ships and their deployment in regions where the USSR wants to make its presence felt, promote its influence or prevent other countries from asserting theirs. This policy is a sort of deterrence on the local level. Another Soviet Navy mission consists in indirectly protecting governments supported by the USSR or whose interests approximate or coincide with Soviet interests. Its lack of resources, precludes giving them massive aid, as the U.S. Navy could with its marines, but its mere presence can constitute effective support. Accordingly, Soviet ships, generally amphibious vessels carrying a small military contingent, are frequently dispatched to waters off the coast of countries to be supported, unless they are already stationed there and ready to provide assistance.

Moreover, with its large fleet of freighters, the USSR is always prepared to unobtrusively transport troops and their equipment to facilitate, if necessary, the destabilization of a remote region.

Lastly, in a general war, the Soviet Navy can strike its enemies with a very severe initial blow by concentrating its resources and delivering surprise nuclear strikes upon Western fleets. In so doing, it could inflict heavy losses, but this action could not be decisive, and Soviet surface forces would be swept from the seas. Furthermore, this "one shock strategy" implies assumption of an all-out nuclear war which mutual deterrence seems to rule out.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Soviet Navy's impressive build-up is one of the major developments of the last two decades. There is no denying that the Soviet Navy has made great advances during this period. This progress has, however, been rather slow when compared with the financial and industrial effort such a build-up required. The Soviet Navy's strong points are its latest nuclear submarines and its bomber fleet currently undergoing modernization. Yet it also has its weaknesses and shortcomings: lags in certain technologies, absence of carrier-based aviation, very few large warships with half of them being old or very old, an inadequate logistic support fleet, a level of training inferior to that of Western navies, a very elderly high command, etc. A fact that is too often overlooked is that the Soviet Navy is plagued above all with massive geographical constraints that will prevent it from achieving a total "blue water" capability no matter what progress it may make. In its present state, it nevertheless represents a threat to the West. As the privileged instrument of the USSR's indirect strategy, it is making a vital contribution to Soviet global policy.

Table 1. Submarines

	<u>Arctic</u>	<u>Baltic</u>	<u>Black Sea</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Total</u>
Strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines:¹					
Typhoon ²	1				1
Delta I	9			9	18
Delta II	4				4
Delta III	8			3	11
Yankee	18			11	29
	<u>40</u>			<u>23</u>	<u>63</u>
Nuclear attack submarines (armed with torpedoes or missiles):					
Alfa	5				5
Victor I, II, III	22			7	29
Echo ³				5	5
Charlie I, II ⁴	13			6	19
Echo II ^{3,5}	14	1		14	29
Oscar ⁴	1				1
	<u>55</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>32</u>	<u>88</u>
Conventional submarines (armed with torpedoes):					
Tango	7	1	6		14
Foxtrot ³	36	5	6	19	60
	<u>43</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>74</u>

1. Submarines carrying ballistic missiles having a range of more than 3,000 kilometers.
2. Typhoon: submerged displacement of 25,000 tons (world's largest submarine); 20 SS-NX-20 MIRVed missiles with a range of 7,400 kilometers.
3. Aging submarines.
4. Carry sub-surface launch cruise missiles.
5. Carry cruise missiles that can only be surface launched.

Note: Old submarines are not shown in this table.

Table 2. Surface Ships

A. Ships in service

	<u>Arctic</u>	<u>Baltic</u>	<u>Black Sea</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Total</u>
Recent ships (more than 2,000 tons):					
Kiev-class aircraft carriers	1			1	2
Moskva-class helicopter carriers			2		2
Kirov-class GM cruisers	1				1
GM cruisers:					
Kara			5	2	7
Kresta II	6	1		3	10
Kresta I	1	1		2	4
Kynda			2	2	4
GM destroyers:					
Kashin mod.	2	2	2		6
Kashin		1	8	4	13
Krivak I, II	7	10	5	8	30
	18	16*	23*	22	79

*[as published]

Older ships (more than 2,000 tons), average age: 26 years:

Sverdlov-class cruisers	2	2	4	4	12
GM destroyers	7	2	5	6	20
Destroyers	8	8	11	18	45
	17	12	20	28	77

B. Ships under construction

1. Perhaps a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
2. Two "Kiev"-class aircraft carriers.
3. One "Kirov"-class nuclear-powered GM cruiser.
4. Four "Udaloy"-class helicopter-carrying destroyers designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare (one on sea trials).
5. Three "Sovremenny"-class helicopter-carrying destroyers designed primarily for the antiship role (one on sea trials).

Discussion Summary

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 99-112

[Narrative summary of discussions following each seminar speaker's prepared remarks]

[Text] Such a vast subject inevitably prompted a considerable number of questions and comments. These were, in fact, limited by the time available in the seminar agenda. Hence all comments, questions, and answers had to pertain to ideas advanced in the various prepared remarks, and were unable, of course, to exhaust such extremely comprehensive subject matter.

The discussions as a whole can be grouped into the following five major subject areas: nationalities and dissidents, satellites, economic problems, military problems, and the evolution of political power.

As usual, the opinions expressed in these discussions are the sole responsibility of the persons voicing them. Answers were not given to all questions and remarks, but we deemed it preferable to note these herein even though they did not produce an exchange of views.

I. Nationalities and Dissidents

A. Questions and comments

1. Zinoviev wrote: "It is naive to expect that population growth in the Soviet Moslem republics can appreciably change the situation within the country. Islam does not have much more chances of winning the hearts and minds of men in those regions than the Orthodox religion has in Russia." Elsewhere Zinoviev added: "Those who believe that conflicts between nationalities could mark the end of the USSR understand absolutely nothing about the actual situation in this regard within the Soviet Union."
2. Is the Islamic factor one of the factors of unrest noted in Yugoslavia? Of the eight Yugoslav communities, the Republic of Bosnia is Moslem.
3. Is Soviet acceptance of some measure of dissidence or of the emigration of a certain number of Jews the sign of a certain gradual change or is it "cash payment" for all the favors the USSR has been receiving from the West for some time?

B. Answers

1. Had the Islamic factor actually played a part in the disturbances within the Kosovo region, those disorders would undoubtedly not have occurred. As a matter of fact, Kosovo's Moslem population openly showed its partiality for Albania, a country where Islam is prohibited, all mosques have been closed, and the social situation is much worse than in Yugoslavia.
2. Zinoviev is depicted as the best spokesman of the dissidents, whereas he is but one among many others. He is right, however, on one point in his analysis, namely that there is a certain consensus in Soviet society, and that the latter does not function only if it is cudgeled. It functions because the political system gives it some elements of satisfaction, including laxity and mediocrity.

Zinoviev pooh-poohs the nationality problem because it is a very distressing problem and is linked to other cleavages in our world between industrialized peoples and

developing countries, between the feeling of domination and that of subordination. At the present time, Islam is fostering a cleavage, namely the idea of domination. Islam may probably be an ideology incapable of winning the hearts and minds of men. It is a remarkable instrument not in a war of ideas but as an instrument of power.

The nationality problem is a power problem. It's a matter of determining where power in the Soviet Union lies. There is a unifying system which is the party, along with all the structures which support the Soviet system. Within this multi-ethnic framework, the system does allow differences, even in the party, inasmuch as it has national cadres and national structures. This results in some odd situations wherein the military might be tempted to intervene because of crises stemming from this power problem. The party unifies all, but it is kept in check in the outlying regions by the cadres it has installed there. In a conflict of powers, these cadres do, in fact, exert some influence with the Kremlin by tightly controlling demonstrations for which they make themselves spokesmen in dealing with the central government.

3. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union's organizational structures are much more complicated than they appear to be. This brings us to the problem of the army. The army is the only structure free of this diversity. The Soviet Army makes absolutely no concessions to the differences in the country's organizational structures. It has but one language and does not accept the existence of many nationalities. It is the sole force capable of exerting a unifying influence. For that reason, authorities may be tempted to utilize it, but that would be a difficult recourse. In an atmosphere where national difficulties are liable to flare up, the temptation of a unifying force independent of national pressures can exist. This is a possibility that cannot be overlooked.

4. The Afghanistan situation may have weighed on the Soviet soldiers' morale, but it cannot have any impact on the nationalities problem. It is peripheral. The Soviet system remains basically the same, but its methods have changed and it is looking for more peaceful procedures, particularly by making use of emigration. Brezhnev certainly finds it more comfortable to send dissidents abroad, even if such action spoils the Soviet Union's image. Besides, the impact of statements by these dissidents is a great deal less than it was a few years ago. This procedure is less costly to the USSR, especially since it makes the Soviet leadership appear more reassuring. But these changes in procedure are no doubt responsible for the crises we see at the present time. The Polish crisis would undoubtedly not have occurred had the system's methods not changed.

2. Satellites

A. Questions and comments

1. In addition to the fact that the power struggle is waged in two theaters and that the present effort is aimed at achieving successes in the external theater, logic demands that for each period there must be a main direction of effort prescribed by each CPSU congress. The most recent congress brought about a change by having the main effort shifted to Asia, thus relegating Africa to a subordinate position. It was then that the Polish crisis suddenly erupted, catching the Soviet leadership from the rear as it were. Consequently this Polish crisis is much more important than has just been said.

. Are events in Poland symptomatic of a deterioration in the Warsaw Pact structures or are they possibly the source of such deterioration?

3. For the Soviet Union, the situation in Poland is an element of weakness because that country is inside the Soviet glacis instead of being on its periphery. Poland is of considerable strategic importance, to the Soviets in that it provides uninterrupted lines of communication with East Germany. The consequences of direct intervention in Poland would be those of a real war that would inevitably cause the GDR to intervene. In that eventuality, it may be asked whether the USSR is afraid lest there be an umpteenth partition of Poland, a partition accomplished with East Germany, something the Kremlin definitely does not want.

4. Another logical question is whether Kadarism is not nearing its end in Hungary, a country that has been more or less spared the turbulence occurring in the other satellites. The factors of instability in Yugoslavia and Romania are conceivably due to the Polish crisis.

In this connection, the USSR is probably directly vulnerable to contagion from Poland, particularly in the Ukraine and the Baltic countries. The consequences of the USSR's nonintervention in Poland are obvious to all the world. Yet in its letter to the Polish Communist Party, the USSR committed itself, and failing to keep that pledge now would be shocking. Historically, each time the Soviets have intervened, their empire's foundation, namely force, has been laid bare, but in the near term they have generally derived some success therefrom. Could the case of Poland possibly accelerate the Soviet empire's crisis?

5. What attitude would supporters of a liberal evolution of East European countries like to have the West take? Can it be defined at the present time?

6. In the event of no Soviet military intervention could Poland's contagion conceivably sweep through East Germany?

B. Answers

1. Intervention by the GDR in conjunction with the USSR is an extremely ticklish problem for the Soviets who are the first to know just how the Poles and East Germans feel about each other. An East German intervention in Poland would probably raise Polish indignation to the highest pitch. Moreover, the East Germans joke about what is happening in Poland. In fact, they have an expression for disorder, a "Polish bordello," and have supreme contempt for those Poles who do not know how to manage their economy. The GDR's Red Prussians have no sympathy for Poland. This is in sharp contrast with what happened with respect to Czechoslovakia in 1968 when East Germans wanted to join Czechs in signing the Czechoslovak people's petitions.

2. As for Kadarism in Hungary, it does indeed appear to be coming to an end, but it has not reached that point yet. It is true, however, that events in Poland did produce some highly objective reportages and interviews of Lech Walesa by the Hungarian press which did not limit its coverage to TASS dispatches. Thus the Hungarian Government does not fear the contagion from Poland. Romania, however, could be sensitive to that contagion. The same is true for Yugoslavia where the main source of destabilization is the nationality question.

3. The West's attitude toward Poland must be such that in the event of Soviet intervention there must be statesmen in the West who declare that such action is not a simple historical accident. The West must not remind the Poles, the Hungarians, or other peoples of the satellite countries that the fatality of their geographical situation is such that it would be wiser for them to keep quiet. Even though the West will not go to war over Gdansk, it still has the capability of making the USSR pay for its intervention without having to wage war. Above all, public opinion in the different Western countries will have to demonstrate its solidarity with Poland.

3. Economic Problems

A. Questions and comments

1. The capitalist economic system was compared to the Soviet or communist system. This can be considered a perversion of language. Admittedly the socialist economy is actually built as a system. Such is not the case, however, with the capitalist system. This distinction is a fundamental point in the ideological debate.

2. Apart from any probability of contagion, isn't there a sort of inevitability of social explosion that would be due to the poorly managed integration of the CEMA countries?

3. Can indebtedness be a factor of destabilization?

B. Answers

1. The minimal notion of a system's rationality and logic must be utilizable as a pattern of analysis. It is striking to note that no comment was made about the energy problem. Yet that question was recently the subject of very contradictory studies. There is no need to stress the importance of this factor, not only to the existence of the Soviet system but also to relations with other countries. One of the main points is, therefore, the energy problem.

Is the Soviet economy dependent on the world economy or independent of it? Has the Soviet economy's vulnerability increased or diminished? These questions are crucial, because all discussions on embargoes and retaliatory financial measures depend on them. Lastly, we may speculate about what independence the military sector enjoys compared with the economic sector.

2. The problem of social explosions is most complex. Poland has such a problem, East Germany and Bulgaria do not. For the past 25 years, successive Polish governments have proved particularly incapable of managing their economy, even within the limits prescribed for them. The reason for this incapacity raises questions that are hard to answer.

3. There are several sorts of indebtedness. For a dynamic and expanding economy, indebtedness is not dangerous. Such is not the case with a country like Poland.

4. In an interview given by Zinoviev, he said there were few countries in the world capable of producing the standard of living and average environment of the Soviet people for the extremely low workload assigned to them. He added that this was one of the principal means of maintaining the regime's stability.

4. Military Problems

A. Questions and comments

1. One of the weaknesses of the Soviet military system is the problem of time lags. It takes 3 weeks to activate and ready the headquarters and staffs that are lacking in peacetime. Another weakness is the absence of an effective corps of noncommissioned officers. Lastly, on the strategic level, we do have the impression, although we are not sure of it, that the Soviets have reverted to the Stalinist concept of the inevitable war for which the USSR has to prepare itself.
2. In the third generation of bilateral military agreements concluded between the USSR and East European countries since the mid-1970's there is no reference to the Warsaw Pact's geographical scope. This raises the question of whether such elimination of the geographical limits clause marks a new phase in Soviet thinking about the indirect strategy in the Third World.
3. It was shown that in the East the Soviets have superiority in rapid intervention forces. We know that in Europe the Soviets have also had undeniable superiority in conventional forces for a long time. In addition, this superiority was recently bolstered by the deployment of mobile, highly accurate, MIRVed missiles. This appears to have produced a twofold threat to the Western system, and particularly to Europe, by giving the Soviets the capability of advancing simultaneously in Europe and the East. Furthermore, we are prisoners of a decision made by NATO in 1979 which precludes correcting the nuclear imbalance in the European theater until actual negotiations have proved that it was impossible to reach agreement. Can such negotiations achieve the desired objective?
4. From what all speakers have said, it follows that the communist camp is obviously no longer an all-powerful "ideocracy" forming a monolithic bloc within which the ideology has absolute preponderance. We have shown the extent and importance of certain dissociative forces, mainly the nationality factors. Our military experts have thoroughly highlighted the means the USSR has of exploiting crises arising far from its borders. Considering those means, we should examine the specific places where we are liable to fail and those where we can succeed. For example, we saw the Soviet Union forced to abandon its objectives in Egypt and Somalia. The means employed in both places were about the same, thereby indicating not implementation of a systematic plan but simply the exploitation of crises cropping up locally. If the Soviet Union's chances lie in the flaws that emerge within the Western system, or at least the crises the West has been unable to prevent, then the West's chances definitely lie in the Soviet system's flaws that have just been pointed out.
5. It does seem that we always reach a sort of dilemma about the Soviet Army. On the one hand, we see a very powerful army, on the other, a military system that could readily break up because it is "tuned" to the general state of the Soviet Union. We probably have to accept both aspects together. Actually the two are not conflicting. That was the great lesson of 1941. This brings us back to the question outlined by one of the speakers. Is the army the CPSU's present method of existence, or is it an independent body that is possibly opposable to the party to some extent?

B. Answers

1. It is obvious that the Warsaw Pact is less constraining than the North Atlantic Treaty instituting the Atlantic Alliance. The Warsaw Pact delimits that treaty's geographical area and designates the adversary by name, i.e. NATO. In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty, though also geographically defined, covers a much more extensive area and does not name the adversary. In the strictest sense, the Warsaw Pact was supposed to permit the Soviet Union's allies to feel more comfortable, but it was preceded by a whole series of bilateral treaties between the USSR's allies and between them and the USSR. These were followed by another series of bilateral treaties which, *inter alia*, made the military commitment automatic, something which does not exist in the Western case.

The USSR has always encountered difficulties with the implementation of these treaties, and notably with the Warsaw Pact. The impression one has of a monolithic bloc is not altogether accurate, although the USSR has always wanted to form a coalition. There are divergent interests, very strong nationalisms, and even in Eastern Europe there is not solely one form of communism. The USSR has always sought to exceed the provisions of the Warsaw Pact. It has practically succeeded in doing so with regard to the GDR, but Romania is the most reluctant country, whereas for the GDR there is not only an automatic military commitment but also elimination of the geographical area concept. Accordingly there is a whole series of gradations that vary with the different countries. Nevertheless, the Soviets are definitely still intent on getting all of the Warsaw Pact countries involved.

The Soviets have two concepts of war. One is that of a general war between the two blocs. But they also have the concept of a limited war, because they believe that a war limited to Europe is possible with the use of nuclear weapons. This latter concept has never been questioned. Theater nuclear forces are the problem in this type of limited war. For the Soviets, this concept assumes that there is "decoupling," because if the Americans agree to deploy Pershing 2 missiles in Europe, the Soviets view this as meaning the Americans do not intend to use their central systems. If there is "decoupling," the Soviets believe war becomes possible. This offers the advantage of making the conquest of Europe possible, whereas conquest of the United States has never been considered.

Another current of Soviet thinking rejects the limited war concept and deems it impossible, because it is necessary to consider the nationality of weapons and not the location of their deployment. If these weapons are American, there would inevitably be escalation. This question is currently being debated in the Soviet Union.

2. Is negotiation on this subject advantageous at this time? The Soviet objective is to prevent deployment of the Pershing 2's which, at all events, constitute an increase in the other side's capabilities. In the West, we may question whether there is any good reason to open such negotiation. The answer is "yes" if we expect thereby to obtain removal of the equivalent--equivalent and not equal--Soviet weapons, so as to open a window of vulnerability in their system. This is subject to a complete technical evaluation.

3. It is unlikely that the Soviet Army is an army in the process of breaking up. The party has the Soviet Union firmly under control regardless of its shortcomings.

These weaknesses are, in fact, noted by KROKOVIL. That same party has a firm grasp on the army, and neither the Soviet state nor Soviet society are ready to break up. The year 1941 was crucial in that it marked the defeat of the Soviet Army. Yet, even before the United States entered the war, that same army took the offensive upon Stalin's orders and made the Reich's forces suffer their first defeat. The party derived its legitimacy from this victory, in front of Moscow, over the Nazi adversary, the vanguard of the capitalist enemy. The party saved socialism's fatherland, the Russian motherland, and made it possible to build socialism, expand it, and bring it to the powerful status it now enjoys.

It is inconceivable that the USSR is eager for war. What good would war do it? It has no need to conquer territory, and the Afghan territories are of absolutely no use to it. It had to go into Afghanistan because it was driven by its own peculiar logic, namely to defend socialism wherever it is under attack. The Afghan case must be entered on the "debit side" of Western political thinking, because the USSR was practically compelled to intervene, the West having never stirred when faced with the events that occurred after Prince Daoud's assassination, even when Moscow announced it was going to sign a treaty of friendship with Kabul, an event that marked a point of no return. The pattern of the USSR's conquest of Afghanistan remains the pattern of the setting up of a party. When the party is in place, it will settle the question with its militia, its cells, and its whole "scaling-down" system.

5. Evolution of Political Power

A. Questions and comments

1. What was said about the Soviet Union's evolution into a military regime is extremely interesting. It is hardly possible, however, to imagine a development of this kind without very sharp upheavals and very intense internal crises. It is to be feared, therefore, that these remarks may lead the audience to think that power could pass straight into the hands of the military and then result in a regime like that of Juan Carlos in Spain. The problem would probably be infinitely more complicated.

In any case, the period 1980-1985 entails very grave risks if we take into account all that has been said about strengths and weaknesses which, unfortunately, only serve to multiply these risks.

2. Are we not minimizing the KGB's role? The KGB is a veritable state within a state, one that has gained influence inside the system, in the diplomatic corps, in the army, in counterintelligence, everywhere.

3. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, no major nation possessing these weapons has found itself confronted with a revolutionary problem. We can, therefore, only speculate about the role this extraordinarily powerful instrument might play, considering the fact that it could remain effective in the hands of just a few persons at a time when the rest of the population would have rallied to the revolutionaries. Has this contingency been examined as thoroughly as deterrence between nations?

B. Answers

1. The KGB is very important indeed. It even played a considerable role against the armed forces in Stalin's day, and this by the express desire of Stalin who could have build-up the armed forces instead of the KGB.

It is certain that nothing can be done against the KGB, but it is difficult to see how the KGB could seize power against the armed forces. If the fate of the regime is ever at stake, the KGB will form an alliance with the armed forces to take matters in hand. The armed forces will feel they are vested with the power to intervene only when such action is necessary to avoid great upheavals, and there will probably be some resistance from orthodox communists. It must be clearly realized, however, that Brezhnev and his associates are able to hold their own solely because they have established a very close alliance with the military. Hence it is impossible to govern without the military. And to succeed, it is almost necessary to become identified with the military. This leaves open the possibility that the military could act alone someday, provided the party becomes more and more a parasite. The party could then become a "messenger boy" for the military. This is obviously an optimistic hypothesis. It is quite conceivable that there will be upheavals of a more serious nature, but the more serious they are, the more the army will be called upon to intervene.

As long as the Politburo is firmly united, nothing can happen. But if this situation changes, anything can happen. The party is more than a bureaucracy, but its role has never been so eminent. In the Stalin era, it was merely an instrument that Stalin used, but the KGB was a more important instrument. At the present time, the party is rather a highly parasitic association, and it could be replaced by another sort of authority. We also overestimate the role of the ideology which is only the relic of a system that claimed to have the answers to all questions. Now it is a "wooden language" that can easily be put aside under the pressure of sociological burdens.

2. We must stress the fundamental importance of the party structures. The mechanism of the vertical structures is such that, even if the masses are outside of it, the apparatus is always well in hand. It was able to act in Poland because opposite it there was another equally strong apparatus, the Polish Church. It was able to act in Yugoslavia because it was the head that acted.

If the armed forces were to attempt to seize power, they would run into this united apparatus. The armed forces can succeed only by having the approval of the apparatus in an evolution into a Chinese-style mechanism in which the armed forces would effectively control the party.

3. A distinction must be made between the change in Soviet realities and the enduring nature of the regime. Any devolution of the Soviet regime is inconceivable. The build-up of the communist world's technical "agencies"--armed forces, diplomatic corps, police--was the result of a CPSU decision. It is an integral part of a party line approved in 1973, and thus national bolshevism is a line approved by the party. If the military do triumph and then remove the ideology, we shall see a considerable upswing in Soviet society which will then give more power to the armed forces. Yet society's growing independence will immediately give rise to opposition movements which the new government will no longer be able to restrict because it will have lost that essential weapon, the dirigiste ideology. It is important, therefore, that there be a solution other than volatilization of the communist regime.

4. In acting against the Soviet Union, the basic problem is the ideology. There are three distinct levels to that ideology, however. First, there is the external ideological apparatus in Western nations and consisting mainly of communist parties.

that apparatus has to be debunked. Then there is the imperialistic apparatus, and the term imperialistic, as we employ it in the West, covers the intense ideological campaign conducted by the Soviet Union as well as its historical aims predating Leninism, with the result that the Third World is no longer the Third World insofar as it is directed by Cuba which is a sort of Soviet soldier. Lastly, there is the internal ideological apparatus. It must be clear to all of us that we will not be able to act effectively against the latter unless there is a model acceptable to and for the Soviets. It is practically impossible to reestablish the capitalist system in the Soviet Union.

5. At the time of the Chinese cultural revolution, we studied the revolutionary problem in a country possessing nuclear weapons. China was then on the verge of splitting in half and having a civil war. It already had a nuclear capability at the time. If we were to study a situation wherein the military seizure of power in the Soviet Union led to civil war, the nuclear aspect thereof would pose a real problem. A civil war always produces a split in the armed forces, but we actually do not know how this split will occur, nor who will have control of the nuclear arsenal. The problem is aggravated in the Soviet Union because tactical nuclear weapons are standard equipment in the combat arms and commanders normally have them at their disposal. Hence this is a very different problem from the one we know with that degree of centralization which is the rule in Western countries.

6. Admittedly there is still further study to be made of possible civil war or putsch situations in countries having nuclear weapons, even though this kind of event has not yet occurred. Yet we cannot rule out the possibility of a military coup d'etat. On the contrary, whoever could secure control of the famous button would have a prime advantage. This is an additional motive for acting very quickly.

USSR Vulnerabilities

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 113-125

[Article by Roger Seydoux]

[Text] The USSR has numerous vulnerabilities. Yet it cannot be said that these really impair its power. The Polish crisis is a different story, because if it continues to spread, it will create extremely large-scale problems for the Soviet Union.

That crisis already marks a watershed in the very perception of Soviet strength.

I. Geographical, Political Vulnerabilities

These vulnerabilities are well-known to all of the audience. In fact, they were mentioned during the seminar. I shall merely recall them for the record. Distances are enormous in the USSR, lines of communications extremely extensive, railroads overloaded,* and highways mediocre or poor.

* Soviet railroads carry more than one-half of the world's ton kilometers. Traffic on east-west lines is very heavy.

The USSR borders on countries the Kremlin considers untrustworthy or hostile: China, Iran, Turkey, NATO Europe, not to mention Afghanistan. The Russian climate is very harsh, glacial in the north and east, rigorous over the entire center of the continent. The USSR only opens onto two enclosed seas, the Baltic and Black Seas. The population is heterogeneous and very unevenly distributed. Border areas are sparsely populated and, therefore, more difficult to protect.

2. Vulnerabilities Due to Demographic Situation

The USSR as a whole is plagued by a low rate of population growth. Between now and 1995, the working population will increase at a rate of below 15 percent.

Furthermore, populations of the USSR's various ethnic groups are not all increasing at the same pace. The population of the Slavic and Baltic peoples is increasing at a very low rate: birth rate of 15 percent.

Central Asia's Moslem population is growing twice as rapidly (30 percent). The internal migration patterns of these populations differ. While the rural areas of European Russia and the Western Ukraine are becoming depopulated, those of the Caucasus region and Central Asia are becoming more populated. This produces a paradoxical situation in which the rich natural resources--new deposits of raw materials--are in the North and East, the potential manpower supply is in the South, and the industrial plants and highly skilled labor are in the West. Highly populated areas do not correspond to economic requirements. The population balance between Slavs and non-Slavs is gradually shifting in favor of Central Asia.

3. Economic Vulnerabilities

Agriculture remains one of the Soviet economy's* serious vulnerabilities. The government has to import several million tons of grain almost every year, especially from the United States. The reasons for this are well-known: insufficient mechanization, low use of fertilizer, deficient production of livestock feed, transportation bottlenecks, outmoded methods of storage and preservation of farm products, widespread negligence at production, processing and distribution levels. The party, the Soviet government and press are the first to decry these shortcomings. Brezhnev periodically mentions them in his speeches. The two major daily newspapers and the specialized press criticize, often severely, the management of Soviet agriculture. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes, i.e. the basic organizational units of production, are to blame for this ridiculous productivity in spite of massive investments (27 percent of the 10th [Five Year] Plan's total capital investment).

And yet a subsidy of 25 billion rubles was allocated to farm price supports in 1980. To grasp the underlying cause of the deplorable inefficiency of Soviet agriculture, one need only compare the output of the collective farms with that of the small private plots: that account for 30 percent of the value added of farm products and use only 3 percent of total sown land.

Having said this, agriculture, as noted by Mr Sokoloff, is not expected to cause the system to explode. From 1953 to 1975, Soviet agriculture progressed by successive

* The 1981 harvest will again fall short of the production target. The USSR will have to import a massive amount of wheat.

stages reaching--exceptionally--peaks of 220 to 230 million. Consequently there is no threat of famine, according to Sokoloff. The problem is more one of stock raising (fodder) than of food for the people, a problem which the authorities meet by changing the feed for livestock and by maneuvering as best they can to calm the malcontents.

The economic weapon has proved unwieldy. President Carter suspended wheat exports. Under pressure from American farmers, President Reagan was obliged to end the embargo. The Soviets, however, did not wait for the sanctions to be lifted. They proceeded to circumvent them by purchasing, among other things, wheat from Argentina. Hence economic sanctions are a partially blunted weapon. If the Red Army were to intervene in Poland, Washington and its allies would no doubt resort to sanctions on a massive scale. But we wonder about the firmness of the governments of the large grain-producing countries, and also about how long the sanctions would last. In addition, we cannot underestimate the reaction of farm circles in democratic countries and the effectiveness of their pressure groups. The Canadians recently signed an agreement with the Soviets calling for the delivery of 25 million tons of wheat over a 5-year period. The Americans had earlier concluded an agreement covering the sale of 6 million tons of wheat to the Russians.

At all events, it does appear that for the past 20 years, Soviet citizens have seen their bread and meat consumption levels improve slowly but steadily.

In summary, agriculture remains a serious vulnerability in the USSR. It should become alarming only in case of general war.

In advanced research and technology, the USSR sometimes lags considerably behind the West, except in such fields given priority as standard nuclear power plants, basic research in thermonuclear fusion and accelerators, and space flights.

On the other hand, the USSR appears to lag far behind Western countries, and the United States in particular, in three fields vital to the economy: data processing and computer science, microelectronics, and robots.

The Soviet Union is making an enormous effort to close the gap--semiconductors, lasers, etc.--but that gap remains. And nothing indicates, at the present time, that the USSR can easily catch up with Europe and America in the 1980's.

At first glance, there is no Soviet energy-related vulnerability. The USSR is clearly the world leader in production of energy from the principal current and potential sources. Yet the latest plan's forecasts indicate oil production is liable to remain nearly stagnant during the period of the new 5-year plan. In fact, geological exploration for new oil fields is centered increasingly on the North and East, and authorities are having great difficulty recruiting qualified labor for those regions. Transportation of oil, natural gas, and coal from the East is becoming increasingly slower and increasingly costlier. To make old deposits competitive, operate new fields, and transport fuel, the Soviets have to call upon Westerners both for equipment as well as know-how.

A vast reconversion effort is, therefore, required, particularly to increase production of gas, coal, and nuclear power. Action must also be taken to reduce energy waste which is enormous in a country like the USSR.

There is need also to continue selling energy raw materials--70 MTP [million tons of petroleum (?)]--to Western countries so as to obtain foreign currency (50 percent in 1980).

Lastly, to maintain the cohesion and dependence of CEMA countries, it is necessary to sell them 80 MTP at a price 20 percent below world prices. These 80 MTP are about 65 percent of their 1980 requirements.

In summary, there will be no shortage of energy raw materials in the USSR over the next 10 to 20 years. Yet the USSR will have to successfully complete its effort to reconvert to gas, coal, and nuclear power, and increase the production thereof. The natural gas phase of this effort appears to be moving along smoothly with the FRG, in that the latter has agreed to supply the USSR with pipes and special pipeline equipment.

4. Military Flaws

It would be superfluous for me to dwell upon the size and importance of the Soviet arsenal. The armed forces are, by and large, the USSR's major success. No country is planning to attack Soviet military power. There are only indirect confrontations between the USSR and the United States in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, by their strategic and conventional power, Soviet military forces deter any potential aggressor.

The Soviet threat is so deeply felt, particularly in Europe, that it is contributing to the growth of neutralism--Northern Europe, Germany--or Finlandization.

This military power, buttressed with a large population, an immense territory, a hostile climate, a considerable reserve of strategic raw materials, and a highly centralized government, still has flaws, however.

Some of these flaws are due to the sheer size of the country. The navy has four fleets positioned far from each other, including two in enclosed seas. For the ground forces, lines of communications are long and vulnerable.

Other flaws are due to the international political situation. The USSR has at least two potential enemies, the West and China.

From a personnel standpoint, the armed forces are a conscript organization. Its enlisted men and almost all of its noncommissioned officers are draftees. It does appear that the training of enlisted men, junior commissioned officers and NCO's--except in elite units--has generally remained very conventional. The training of certain categories of personnel, notably aircraft pilots and ship's crews, is considered inadequate by some Western experts. Without underestimating the power of Soviet conventional forces--armored units, air forces, air defense units, submarine forces--it must be noted that their long-range intervention capabilities do have a few deficiencies (amphibious forces, carrier-based support aircraft, naval logistic support).

Two seminar speakers, Colonel Henri Paris and Jean Labayle-Couhat, skillfully and accurately analyzed the other military flaws of Soviet power. I can do no better than refer the reader to their articles.

Offhand, the arms and advanced technology industries do not constitute a flaw in Soviet military power. The USSR not only appears to have a lead in antiaircraft missiles, antiship missiles, ballistic missiles, and marine propulsion systems, but it is also closing its gap with the West in aerodynamics, MIRVed warheads, tactical nuclear weapon systems, and perhaps even lasers.

But the arms industry most likely achieves such results only because:

- a. It has absolute priority in the allocation of resources and personnel.
- b. It is ordered to produce highly sophisticated equipment regardless of cost.

We can infer from this that the Soviet arms industry produces efficiently but very expensively and that any acceleration of the arms race--such is the case at the present time--weighs heavily on its costs. The transfer of funds that this obviously requires, is being done to the detriment of funds earmarked for improving the Soviet people's standard of living, in other words at the consumer's expense.

6. Poland

The vulnerabilities I have just outlined--and there are others--have not prevented the USSR from building a military machine that equals, if not surpasses, that of the United States. Nor, have they prevented it from becoming the world's second ranking industrial power, and from enabling the Soviet people to have a standard of living that has appreciably improved in the past 20 years, even though it is still relatively low in comparison with Western democracies.

The Polish crisis, in its current state, is not a vulnerability like the others.

In the recent history of the USSR, this crisis is an altogether new and much more dangerous phenomenon, because if it were to spread, it might well strike a severe blow at the power and security of the Soviet Union. It is appropriate, therefore, for us to examine, first of all, how the situation in Poland looks today, knowing full well that it is constantly evolving.

For a French observer who visited Poland this spring, the most spectacular change was the collapse of the Polish economy. Many factories were shut-down for technical reasons. There were frequent water and electric power outages. Transportation was disorganized. There is little hope that the situation will improve. "In addition, everywhere there is sabotage by absenteeism, by negligence, and equally by incompetence. Polish society is not on strike; it has simply stopped working. The main explanation for this attitude of the Polish people lies in the incredible material difficulties of everyday life. For instance, people have to spend 2 to 3 hours waiting in line everyday. Yet the Poles put up with these material difficulties with extraordinary patience. According to the same observer, this social discipline of the Poles is attributed to two principal factors:

- a. The influence of the Church whose role is generally a moderating one;
- b. The sense of liberation everyone has felt ever since the birth of Solidarity.

"There are undoubtedly internal divisions within Solidarity, but its leaders remain prudent and have a sense of compromise. Though they detest the communist regime, they do not question the Soviet alliance, for the moment. Solidarity's divisions remain limited, however, and above all, Walesa is still extremely popular. He has the somewhat showy backing of the Catholic hierarchy. Lech Walesa embodies a Polish movement which is outwardly a trade union effort, but actually it is also a religious and, above all, national movement. The ultimate goal is to withdraw Poland from Soviet domination, but Solidarity leaders are prudent and give themselves several years to attain this goal."

Their moderation is prompted by pressure from the Church which does not want to jeopardize the important status it has achieved in Poland, and also by the dangers they would face if the USSR were to intervene militarily.

The party's situation does not appear to be much more homogeneous than Solidarity's. While the new trade union movement has been able to competently embody the hopes of the Polish nation without, however, clashing directly with moderate elements in the government and the PZPR (Polish United Workers Party), the same is not true of the communist government which had split into two wings before the 14 July party congress. One was a hard-line pro-Soviet wing that sought to take advantage of the slightest incident in an effort to regain its influence. The other was a liberal wing that was attracted by Solidarity and was much more cautious than Lech Walesa's movement.

Soviets and Poland

The CPSU Central Committee's 5 June 1981 letter to the Polish central committee does not mean that the Soviets have decided to occupy Poland militarily. It does clearly show, however, that the escalating tension between Moscow and Warsaw had passed a very important stage.

The letter treats the PZPR leadership with harshness. It calls upon the party "to find in itself the forces to reverse the course of events and put them back on the right track before the congress."

The USSR's misgivings are understandable. The Polish crisis is without doubt the most serious challenge to its authority since World War II. It involves, in fact, one of the most sensitive areas in its western glacis, a country vital to its communications with the West, notably with the GDR, and beyond to the FRG. It involves a nation of 36 million which, without being the Warsaw Pact's most reliable ally, has thus far lived up to its commitments.

If the Polish experiment were to succeed, in other words, if the Solidarity movement, supported by a liberal communist party, were to achieve its goals, not only would this affect the Soviet Union's prestige, but the contagion could spread into East European countries, thereby shaking the Soviet Union's power. The trend would then be toward a different balance of power in Europe.

If up to now, despite a very critical and at times threatening Soviet press, the USSR has not intervened militarily, the reason is that it is weighing the risks of such a venture, the risks not only in Poland but in Europe and the world as well.

First of all, Poland is not Czechoslovakia. Officials in Moscow realize that armed occupation would not be a simple military parade. It is probable, indeed almost certain, that the Poles, supported by part of the national armed forces, would resist, particularly in the cities. Bloodshed would be inevitable.

International repercussions would be no less serious. The Americans and their allies have warned the Kremlin on several occasions that a military invasion of Poland would mean the end of detente, the definite breaking off of arms negotiations, a halt to economic exchanges, and the application of sanctions. In short, it would mean starting the machinery that would isolate the USSR from the rest of the world.

In addition, the neutralist movements that have been demonstrating in Northern Europe and Germany for some time would lose strength. Furthermore, deployment of Pershing missiles, so dreaded by the Kremlin, would become difficult to avoid.

Lastly, Brezhnev's much desired summit meeting with Reagan would be put off indefinitely.

Hence the ultimate cost of the operation would be very high. We can understand, therefore, why the USSR is reluctant to undertake it.

Since our seminar, the situation in Poland has naturally changed, even though the opposing forces are still the same. The PZPR supported by the Soviet government is opposed by the Solidarity movement supported by the Catholic Church. The indirect pressure exerted by the West through its economic and financial aid must also be taken into consideration.

Stanislaw Kania has had his ups-and-downs. In early June, the Kremlin demanded his ouster. It clearly appeared to want him replaced by a man who would be able to restore, in the name of the party, economic order, or even simply order. Should this solution, which would, of course, be the work of "honest communists," prove impossible, the Soviets appeared ready to consider dramatic measures.

Kania did not yield. He tried and succeeded in showing that, for lack of someone better, he was the man the Soviets needed to reestablish the party's authority. So the Kremlin accepted him. There were signs that the situation had eased. Gromyko visited Kania. V.V. Grishin's* speech at the ninth congress was moderate and Brezhnev sent a brief message to the PZPR's general secretary. The latter finally had the benefit of the Polish consensus and Moscow's renewed confidence.

During his recent visit to the Crimea, Kania obtained substantial assistance for his country. This aid included: extension of repayments on the Polish debt during the next 5-year period, additional supplies of raw materials and staple consumer goods, and assistance in developing and utilizing Poland's industrial capacity.

Although uncertainty and confusion currently dominate the Polish scene, Kania is not slackening his efforts to reaffirm the party's leadership role. Thus he is in no mood to let Solidarity control Poland's economic life under the pretext of "self-management," no more than to lose control of the media that are not allowed to be apolitical.

* V.V. Grishin, Moscow city first secretary, headed the Soviet delegation to the PZPR congress.

The Solidarity congress met in early September in an oppressive atmosphere. Even though they had no direct connection with the Polish crisis, the largest naval maneuvers in 10 years were conducted in the Baltic Sea from 4 to 12 September, under the personal command of Marshal Ustinov.

In this disturbing situation wherein events follow one another with no apparent logic, three facts must be noted:

- a. Stores are empty and people are encountering more and more difficulty in providing for their daily subsistence.
- b. Polish public opinion is divided between irritation and fear.
- c. Contrary to what one might believe, "Polish contagion" has not infected East European countries, even though dissidents, indeed even segments of the population, are pleased with Solidarity's action. In the satellites as a whole, the Polish situation worries people more than it cheers them.

The fact remains, however, that the future is still unpredictable. Solidarity is now much more than a free trade union. Can the Soviets allow it to exist? That is the whole question. It does seem that Moscow may tolerate a certain evolution in Polish society, on condition that it does not overstep precise limits: the PZPR must control the economic and social situation and Poland must remain faithful to the Warsaw Pact's military alliance. Thus Solidarity and its many supporters have very limited room for maneuver. Yet the movement has already obtained a great deal, and each time it has seemed to be on the brink of a confrontation, a Polish-style solution has settled the problem.

Solidarity, which still represents an immense hope but has difficulty controlling its rank and file, is opposed by a party which has regained its self-confidence and has the Kremlin's renewed support.

The Church does not want to jeopardize the status it has so laboriously attained. It has time, experience, and the support of almost the entire Polish population on its side. Through the Primate of Poland, it recently issued an appeal "for 30 days of tension-free peace and work." If a serious risk of confrontation were to arise once more, it is logical to believe that the Church would again be a possible recourse.

The Polish crisis is the most serious one the USSR has experienced since 1945. It is not only Poland's future that is at stake, but possibly the European balance of power born of World War II.

Soviet Third World Policies

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 81 pp 127-134

[Article by Paul-Marie de La Gorce]

[Text] As we explained earlier, this article by Paul-Marie de La Gorce completes the dossier we have compiled by reconstituting discussions on an important subject, "Is the USSR's Power Flawless?"

The failures and successes of Soviet policy in the Third World could basically find their roots in the theoretical bases of contemporary communism: in Marx and in Lenin. Marx, while condemning the violences of the colonial era, considered that era to be a decisive historical stage. In his view, it heralded the end of the medieval economies or oriental type economies which still prevailed in a large part of the world, and cleared the way for the 'single market' which, from one end of the world to the other, would be under the joint rule of industrial capitalism and European civilization. Thus, according to Marx, the economic, social, and historical bases of socialism, that is to say the development of capitalism itself, would expand to global dimensions. It must be noted that this firm belief shared by Engels was also the conviction of all the theorists of the other socialist schools. All held the same view that European civilization would prevail over all others, overthrowing the archaic, retrograde, or immobile structures of other societies and carrying with it the values of the modern world and its future.

Lenin, the strategist of the Revolution, dreamt above all of having that Revolution triumph, in other words, of enabling revolutionary parties to seize power. To accomplish this, he defined a strategy for combating the large capitalist states. As we know, that strategy was summed up in a saying that is as famous and full of imagery as it is paradoxical: a rebel Afghan prince is better than an English Laborite worker. He was convinced that capitalism had the capability of "corrupting" the working elite in advanced industrial countries--such was the case with the English Laborite workers--and that this capability came from the overexploitation of the rest of the world, for example, the British Empire's colonies. He naturally concluded from this that the revolt of colonized peoples would undermine the foundations of the imperialist system and facilitate the task of revolutionaries whose historical role was to overthrow the system. Such was the strategy which was ratified at the famous 1920 Baku Congress, organized largely by Stalin, and which announced resumption of international communism's support of nationalist movements struggling against imperialism and colonialism.

By recalling these two theoretical sources of contemporary communism, we rediscover the origins of Soviet policy in the Third World, the often insurmountable difficulties it has encountered, and its successful breakthroughs. On the one hand, communist policy consists, as Marx had said, in following up the radical modernization of Third World economies and societies. It invokes the values of modernity and cannot be implemented without challenging the old civilizations, thereby clashing with them to the point of appearing to be a foreign element in the national and social reality. At the same time, it uses nationalisms, wants to become identified with them, encourages or exploits them so as to threaten the internationalist capitalist order and replace it with a socialist authority.

Implementation of Soviet strategy allows us to see what has become of the action facilitated by Lenin and continued by Stalin. That action became identified first with the history of the communist parties hurriedly founded in colonial or semicolonial countries after formation of the Third International. That history was a long tragedy. Yet it also revealed, in extraordinary fashion, the contradictions the communist movement had and generally did not manage to overcome. The movement established itself, practically everywhere, in intellectual circles that were obviously only very small minorities. It expanded with great difficulty among factory workers who, in the colonized Third World's extremely underdeveloped economy, were naturally a

class very much apart, easily controllable by local authorities and the perfect victim of all kinds of repression. It became deeply rooted preferably in minority ethnic communities because it was synonymous with the protest against racial segregation, the revolt against religious prejudice, or demands for equality. Accordingly it recruited supporters primarily among the Jewish communities of the Near East rather than within the Moslem masses, among the Christian minorities of Asia Minor or the Far East rather than within the followers of the majority religions, and among the racial minorities, for example, the Kurds or Armenians, rather than within the Arab majority in the Middle East. This confirmed the analysis made by Marx, namely that the socialist movement could take root only where capitalism had caused traditional societies and preindustrial economies to collapse or at least to be challenged.

But the Third World's young communist parties proceeded, nevertheless, to attack the imperialist and colonialist order. As was inevitable, they failed almost everywhere. Without any real deep-rooted popular support, suspected of transmitting a foreign and atheistic ideology, and closely identified with intellectual and working--i.e. privileged--or racial minorities, they were doomed to impotence, isolation, or defeat. The Algerian Communist Party's goal was the country's independence. But because its membership was drawn almost exclusively from the Christian and Jewish communities, it came to grief. The Indonesian Communist Party started a rebellion that received no popular support and was crushed. As a way out of its isolation, the Chinese Communist Party had allied itself with the nationalist movement. It was temporarily crushed by that movement.

Stalin, and then his first few successors, had the task of revising communist strategy for the Third World in the light of past failures and according to the new balance of forces. Wherever communist parties could exist and assume leadership of national movements, they would do so. Wherever they could only support major nationalist organizations, they would likewise do so. And when they could not exist by themselves, Soviet policy--and possibly its local supporters--would directly support nationalist movements.

Such was the strategy followed immediately after World War II and until the conclusion--still incomplete, however--of the anticolonial wars. It is possible to take stock of the latter and show therefrom either that Soviet policy may have been successful in that the results obtained were consistent with its aims, or on the contrary, show how results turned against those aims.

In a certain sense, the main objective was achieved because the English, French, Belgian, and Dutch colonial empires have almost entirely disappeared. This may have given the Soviet Union some temporary advantages: the prestige it derived from its support of liberation movements, or the troubles caused the former colonial powers as a result of their wars against these movements, for example, during the Indochina War or the Algerian War. But there was still one permanent advantage: the Soviet Union now had as contacts dozens of new nations in Asia, Africa, and the Near East, and as major powers have done since time immemorial, it could now play upon their national interests, their conflicts or internal difficulties, their needs or their rivalries. This opened a vast field of activity to classical diplomacy, to the eternal interplay of rivalries and influences. The Russian diplomatic service, one of the world's oldest, could turn this to good account as well as any other service, once it succeeded in living down the mistakes or blunders that would inevitably accompany its action in parts of the world it had neither known well nor operated in.

the nationalities had triumphed everywhere. It took the Indochina War's disastrous mesh of circumstance, to enable a communist party in Vietnam, and there only, to become identified with nationalism to the point of taking it over for its own benefit, assuming leadership thereof, and attaining governmental power once the country had gained its independence. Everywhere else, communism was "marginalized," even where it was important, as in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, or just simply absorbed by the preponderant nationalist as in Algeria, or even the instant as in English speaking Africa. In Indonesia, where it had retained power and continued its activity after independence, the 1965 massacres stamped it out. In the former French colonies, the African Democratic Rally, initially allied with French communists, soon preferred to work with the parties in power under the Fourth Republic while waiting for General de Gaulle to sanction their independence. In short, nowhere, or almost nowhere, had liquidation of the colonial empires been identified with success of the communist movement. The one exception was Vietnam, and that exception confirmed the fact that the Soviet Union had been able to exert direct influence only where the struggle for independence had taken the form of a long and bitter war. Wherever independence was negotiated fairly peacefully, Soviet policy had had no role and had secured no hold.

But the Soviets were smart enough not to let it go at that. During the latest period, the Soviet leaders--actually Khruschev's successors--very creditably perceived that beyond accession to independence, the history of relations between former colonized countries and major capitalist countries--more particularly the United States, the sole Western power currently considered "imperialist"--would continue in other forms and give rise to other conflicts. The USSR would have to be able to take advantage of these conflicts.

That is exactly what happened. Cuba rebelled against the political, economic, and social order identified with North American hegemony. The United States considered Cuba an enemy. The Cuban revolution, which had been conducted successfully without any contact with the Soviet Union and despite the discreet disapproval of Cuban communists, became the USSR's first ally in that region of the world. In South Vietnam, the regime left in place by the 1954 armistice was unable to find sufficient support and--after an interminable war in which the United States went all-out--joined the socialist camp which was able also to extend into Laos and Cambodia. In Angola, South African intervention and the American administration's decision to back certain national movements created conditions conducive to establishment of a government allied with the Soviet Union and supported by a Cuban expeditionary force. In Ethiopia and South Yemen, nationalist revolutions slowly drifted toward affiliation with the socialist camp. As extraordinary as it may seem when we think of Colonel Qaddafi's personality, ideology, and cultural background, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Reagan administration may make the same mistake in dealing with Libya that Eisenhower and Kennedy made about Cuba and end up with the same result.

Elsewhere, Soviet policy undertakings have ended in failure. In some cases, this was due to the failure of in-country economic and social experiments. Guinea, for example, opted for socialism and was long considered a partner of Soviet policy. Yet when inextricable difficulties endangered the regime, it chose to diversify its international contacts and reestablish special relations with France. Mali underwent the same change to some extent. Many excessively hasty observers were sure that Somalia had become a Soviet advanced base. Yet after revolution erupted in Ethiopia, with whom it had a territorial dispute, Somalia changed camp. But the most significant example

by far is Egypt. There the Soviet Union was dealing with a dynamic and vigorous socialist-oriented nationalism supported by a strong government and Nasser's prestigious personal status. The USSR was unable to make Egypt a privileged partner until Nasser, assured first of American support, clashed with the desire of Western countries to retain their exclusive influence in the region. Moscow accepted all of the disadvantages and risks this partnership entailed. It went all-out in conducting this experiment of systematic rapprochement with revolutionary nationalism. Symbolically, Nasser was designated "hero of the Soviet Union." But his experiment remained purely nationalistic. He continued to keep a tight rein on Egyptian communists and had no revolutionary party as his power base. He was fundamentally a classical statesman engaging in classical power politics, developing a relatively modern economy and a new national middle class based on a vast state-controlled industrial and business sector rather than on the mechanisms of the market as others had done elsewhere. His death soon put an end to this experiment. A simple decision by President Sadat was all it took to eliminate Soviet influence in one fell swoop. Egypt, with Israel, then became the United States' principal ally in the Middle East.

This Egyptian experience, as well as the contrastive successes scored elsewhere, reveal the nature, limits, fortunes and misfortunes of Soviet Third World policy. That policy does not emanate from any systematic plan as the geographical distribution of positions won or lost suggests. It may be based on the formation and development of national liberation movements which first ally themselves with it and then eventually join the socialist camp, as in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. Nevertheless, established successes remain precarious, wherever they have been achieved. The different examples of Egypt and Somalia are proof of this. Even when the Soviet Union was practically alone in supporting national liberation movements, as was the case in Zimbabwe, the governments formed immediately after independence immediately retrieved their freedom of choice and action, as the policy initiated by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe definitely shows.

We find two obvious constants existing at all times and in all places. The first is that the crises which arise between Third World countries and major Western nations, primarily the United States, are what create conditions favorable to Soviet action and enable the USSR to influence the course of events. The second constant is that the Soviet Union always uses national self-interests: yesterday against colonial rule, today against the aftereffects of that rule or against the West's monopolistic economic hold. These self-interests can work tomorrow against Russia itself just as they have thus far worked in its favor. This is what happened in Afghanistan and, somewhat differently, in Egypt. Even the Soviet Union's most faithful allies now make up their own minds, and will continue to do so in the future, on the basis of their national interests, as demonstrated by Somalia. The Vietnamese exception to this rule is probably not an exception in that the strongest cement of the close alliance between Russia and Vietnam is no doubt their common hostility toward China.

At the same time, we also find obvious constants in Soviet policy toward the Third World. That policy will always seek to exploit crises between the Third World and Western nations. It will always run into the irresistible power of nationalisms with their own peculiar Third World character, in other words, with their cultural and even religious specificity. But it will always try to limit the risks of a turnaround or a weakening of its partners by strengthening the established political power. It will do this not by simple agreement with a ruling individual--as was the

... with Basseterre by the formation of a party or by direct military presence. This is a difficult undertaking that has involved and will continue to involve equally temporary successes and failures. National interests have the last word in such an undertaking.

This means that, for the powers that are Basseterre's rivals, or just simply for a policy wanting to prevent excessive expansion of the major powers with their spheres of influence and hegemonic temptations, everything depends on the new type of relations that nations are capable of establishing with a Third World which is still in search of its development and real independence.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

VIEWS PRESENTED ON BATTLE FOR MOSCOW

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Oct 81 pp 2-3

[Article by Col A. Yakushevskiy, candidate of historical sciences: "On the Ideological Warfare Fronts: The Truth and Falsehood about the Battle of Moscow"]

[Text] Forty years separate us from those anxious days of 1941, when the hordes of Hitler's Wehrmacht were moving against Moscow. This was a difficult time not only for the capital, but for our entire country as well.

The main body of Hitler's Army was drawn up on the Moscow Axis. Elite SS divisions and the most experienced generals had been sent there, but the Hitlerites' plans were not borne out. The fascist Wehrmacht not only was halted at Moscow, but was thrown back to the west 100-350 km. A blow was struck against it here which marked the beginning of a fundamental turn in the Great Patriotic War and in World War II as a whole. After the triumphal march through Europe, the fascist German Army experienced for the first time the burden of a major defeat and lost the strategic initiative. The "defeat at Moscow dispelled the legend of the fascist Army's invincibility," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "The historic Battle of Moscow inspired Soviet citizens to new exploits and reinforced their confidence that the enemy inevitably would be defeated."

The victory by the Soviet Armed Forces at Moscow was of great international importance. It helped strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition and weaken the bloc of fascist states, activated the liberation movement in territories occupied by the Wehrmacht and forced the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey to refrain from coming out on the side of Germany against the USSR.

Scientific studies and memoirs of participants have been written in our country about the Battle of Moscow and its scope, and works of literature and art have been devoted to it. Here and in the works of progressive scholars around the world, the historic importance of the great battle was assessed on its merits and tribute was paid to the patriotism, steadfastness and courage of the defenders of the USSR's capital and to outstanding Soviet military art.

Bourgeois authors also write much about the Battle of Moscow, but existing bourgeois literature about the battle is distinguished by its contradictory nature and class prejudice. It is characterized, first of all, by its one-sidedness in covering this greatest battle of World War II; secondly, by its attempt to degrade the world historic importance of the defeat of fascist German forces at Moscow; and thirdly, by its attempt to belittle the role of the USSR Armed Forces and the entire Soviet people in the victory won.

In evaluating the Battle of Moscow, bourgeois historians usually focus all attention only on actions by the fascist side. They describe in detail plans of Hitler's command, proposals by individual fascist generals to higher-ups, and measures of the staffs and troops during the attack on Moscow, while actions by the Soviet side intentionally are kept in the background.

The tendentious nature of the interpretation of combat actions on the Soviet-German front in 1941 and early 1942 is especially obvious in memoirs of former Hitlerite servicemen and in "historical essays" about individual fascist German units, combined units and formations published in abundance in the FRG in recent years. They extol the Hitlerites' military art and the Wehrmacht's combat equipment and weapons. Even certain serious bourgeois researchers point out the one-sidedness of the approach by authors of such works to depicting events at the Soviet-German front. "That which they wrote," notes T. Taylor, former U.S. Deputy Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trial, "cannot of course be objective. . . . They are seeking to justify their own mistakes."

In covering the Wehrmacht's offensive actions on the Moscow Axis, bourgeois historians strive to downplay the extent of the Soviet forces' resistance and to inflate their losses. But after the Soviet Army's assumption of a counteroffensive, they focus all attention on the "capable organization" of defense by the Hitlerites under "unfavorable conditions." That is done, for example, by American Colonel A. Turney in the book entitled "Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock's Campaigns, 1941-1942," by British historian A. Seaton in the work entitled "The Battle for Moscow in 1941-1942," and by other bourgeois authors.

But what kind of "capable organization" of defense and what "military art" of Hitlerite generals can be the subject when the Wehrmacht lost over 500,000 men, 1,300 tanks, 2,500 guns, over 15,000 vehicles and much other equipment at Moscow? What kind of "military art" is it when Hitler removed 35 of the highest ranking personnel from their posts, including field marshals Brauchitsch and Bock, generals Guderian, Strauss and others?

Certain differences are seen among bourgeois historians in their evaluation of the historic role of the Battle of Moscow. Some of them recognize its great importance for the course of World War II as a whole. Above all, many West German authors engaged in studying events at the Soviet-German front arrived at that conclusion. R. Hoffmann, an author from the FRG, writes: "The enormous political and military importance of the Battle of Moscow for World War II should be seen in the fact that a grandiose plan for defeating the Soviet Union in 3-5 months failed and it marked the end of the German 'Blitzkrieg.'" Hoffmann assumes that the Hitlerites' defeat at Moscow led to a change in the situation on other fronts in favor of the allies and greatly strengthened the British position in the Mediterranean. Former Hitlerite Admiral K. Assmann in the article "The Battle of Moscow" as well as West German historian K. Reinhardt in the book "The Turning Point at Moscow" adhere to a similar opinion.

But while recognizing the seriousness of defeat of fascist German forces in the winter of 1941-1942 to one extent or another, a majority of bourgeois historians attempt to present the Battle of Moscow as a local phenomenon and restrict its importance only to the framework of the Soviet-German front and the purely military sphere. This is done by the aforementioned A. Seaton as well as many American authors. According to their assertion, a turning point was achieved as a result of

the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow only at the Soviet-German front. P. Schmidt, a former employee of the fascist German Foreign Office, who now writes under the pseudonym of P. Karell, perceives the importance of the Battle of Moscow only in the fact that a blow was struck against the German divisions of Army Group Center in its course. Authors of the multivolume official American work entitled "The U.S. Army in World War II" completely ignore the effect of this great battle on the plans and actions of the western allies.

A belittling of the importance of the Battle of Moscow also was manifested at an international symposium held in Stuttgart in September 1981, which discussed the topic "The Turning Point in the War in December 1941." The rout of fascist German forces at Moscow was presented there as equivalent in importance for the course of World War II to actions by the allied fleet in the Atlantic, fighting by British troops in North Africa and the beginning of the war between the United States and Japan in the Pacific.

But is it really possible to view actions in the Atlantic or fighting in North Africa, or U.S. entry into the war against Japan as the beginning of a fundamental turning point in the course of the entire World War II? Of course not. The beginning of the fundamental turning point in the war was laid down by Soviet citizens and the Soviet military personnel who won a victory in the Battle of Moscow.

The Wehrmacht's defeat at Moscow is a historic fact of great international importance. In covering the course of war at the Soviet-German front, bourgeois historians naturally cannot ignore it. To some extent they are forced to recognize the importance of the Soviet victory in the winter of 1941-1942, but with all this they try with all their might to belittle in their works the efforts of the USSR Armed Forces and the entire Soviet people in this victory. And to this end they attempt to reduce the reasons for the Hitler Wehrmacht's defeat at Moscow to random factors disconnected with the social and state system of the Soviet Union.

Soviet historians have written repeatedly about the groundlessness of attempts by bourgeois historiography to explain the rout of the fascist German hordes at Moscow by such "random" causes as "Hitler's mistakes" or "unfavorable" climatic factors. An analysis of the latest western works indicates that they continue to repeat old assertions, and in the majority of instances this is done in the very same form in which the beaten Hitlerite generals presented it in attempting to remove from themselves blame for the defeat after the war and to appear before their new masters as unsullied representatives of the "most advanced" military art "in the world." For example, West German authors of the popular three-volume work "World War II," published in the FRG in 1979; British historian J. Lucas in a recently published book entitled "War at the Eastern Front, 1941-1945"; American historians S. Patrick, T. Dupuy and E. MacCarthy, in the work "The Russian Front"; and Frenchmen F. Reider and A. Landemer continue to take great pains about Hitler's "fatal mistakes," the "bad roads," "impassable mud" and "unprecedented freezing weather" at Moscow in 1941.

In the words of E. MacCarthy, the "mud made everything impassable" and "saved Moscow" in the fall of 1941. T. DuPuy lays the entire blame for the Wehrmacht's defeat at Moscow on Hitler, who allegedly "interfered in affairs" of the generals and thus hindered them in winning victory. F. Reider writes that allegedly at Moscow the "freezing Russian winter suddenly fell on the German forces . . . and set them to flight." According to N. Bethell, "roads, climate and expanses . . . joined together to slow down the German offensive" on the Moscow Axis.

In making such state edits aimed at degrading the Soviet Army's role in defeating the fascist invaders at Moscow, bourgeois historians consciously are silent about the fact that armed warfare is a two-sided process in which the belligerents are under identical conditions from the standpoint of climate.

The victory at Moscow was not the result of some chance confluence of weather and climatic factors, as the majority of bourgeois authors assert, but the natural result of the higher expertise of Soviet troops, their life-giving patriotism, selflessness, steadfastness and mass heroism in the struggle against the hated enemy. For exploits, valor and courage in the Battle of Moscow and for exemplary performance of combat assignments 14 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry corps, 2 naval infantry brigades, 5 tank brigades, 9 artillery regiments and 6 aviation regiments were awarded guards titles.

It is typical that some bourgeois historians lately have been forced to give up the version that weather and climatic conditions were the reason for the Wehrmacht's defeat at Moscow. They admit that in the final account this version does not favor the fascist German generals and so they attempt to find what are in their view other more "convincing" arguments. For example, West German historian K. Reinhardt admits that the "German Army was stopped on the Eastern Front not by the freezing weather, but even before that, as a result of the catastrophic position in which it found itself because of an interruption in supplies and, most important, because of the unremitting resistance by the Russian troops."

Having shown obeisance toward objectivity, Reinhardt at the same time tries to create the impression in readers that the Soviet Army allegedly had "numerical superiority" over the enemy during the counteroffensive at Moscow and this permitted it to win victory. It is true that he does this cautiously without citing concrete figures and not as crudely as, for example, K. Tippelskirch, who in his "History of World War II" asserted there was a superiority of twenty times which allegedly permitted the Soviet forces to throw the Hitlerites back from Moscow. As a matter of fact, despite Soviet troop replacements in the form of reserves, the fascist side surpassed them in early December 1941 by 1.5 times in personnel, 1.4 times in artillery and 1.6 times in tanks. By remaining silent about this, Reinhardt tries to belittle the success of Soviet troops and their military art and to conceal the fact that the strength of Soviet troops lies not only in weapons and equipment, but also in their high morale caused by the social and state system which they are defending.

One can also find bourgeois authors who write correctly about the relative strengths during the Battle of Moscow and about the role of the weather and climatic factors, but none of them gets by without some version aimed at belittling the efforts of the Soviet people and their Army. Each of them distorts history to one extent or another to please the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Without this they cannot hope to have their work published by bourgeois publishing houses.

For example, the well-known American journalist and historian H. Salisbury, who spent much time in the Soviet Union in the war years, admits in his latest book "The Unknown War" (that is what he calls the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union) that the fascist German forces were stopped in front of Moscow not by the winter, but by the Soviet Army, "which actually did not have numerical superiority over the Germans." "For the first time since Hitler began his march through Europe in 1933," writes Salisbury, "the Nazi armies were not only halted, but thrown back

and defeated in open battle by an enemy which Hitler dozens of times had declared 'defeated once and for all'."

But after making this admission, the author immediately hastens to belittle the importance of the Soviet Union's efforts, stating that allegedly "a new and possibly deciding factor" in the war against fascism "appeared on the scene" with the entry of the United States into the war on 7 December 1941.

Of course the inclusion of the United States in armed struggle against states of the fascist bloc increased the potential capabilities of the anti-Hitler coalition, but there are no grounds for stating that it was a "deciding factor" in the war and that the Battle of Moscow was an "ordinary" event. The fact is that the United States became a combatant after the Soviet Union, actually battling the main body of the fascist bloc one on one, disrupted Hitler's plan for "blitzkrieg" once and for all, blocked the path for a spread of fascist aggression to other countries and continents, and inspired confidence in the inevitability of victory over fascism in world nations.

By the way, this was admitted in the war years by many state, political and military figures in the West. W. Churchill, traveling from London to Washington for discussing the situation with President F. Roosevelt in connection with the initiation of war in the Pacific, informed I. V. Stalin on 16 December 1941: "It is impossible to describe the feeling of relief with which I learn about your remarkable victories on the Russian Front each day. I never before have felt so confident in the outcome of the war." That same day he remarked that "at the present moment the failure of Hitler's plans and his losses in Russia are a fact of primary importance." The Soviet Army's victory at Moscow, according to a statement by U.S. Army Chief of Staff General G. Marshall, was a "strategic defeat of the German Armed Forces and the turning point in the war."

The first phase of the struggle on the path to complete and final victory over fascist Germany, and the most difficult one for the Soviet people, ended with the Hitlerites' defeat at Moscow. And no matter what arguments the falsifiers of history advance for belittling the world-historic importance of the Battle of Moscow, all their efforts are in vain. The truth of history is irrefutable. The heroic exploit performed by the Soviet Army and all our people under the party's leadership on the fields of Podmoskov'ye 40 years ago will inspire more and more generations of people in their struggle for mankind's bright future.

At the same time, this exploit serves as a formidable warning for the aggressive circles of imperialism planning a new war.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

VIEWS OF U.S. ARMS 'POLICY'

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 42, 16-22 Oct 81 p 8

[Article: "A Step Toward Confrontation"]

[Text] Now, when legislators, the public and the press in the United States are actively discussing R. Reagan's new program aimed at a sharp strengthening of the U.S. nuclear missile potential, some participants of the discussion are rightly noting that the proposed plan has a political side as well as the purely military side. This is not simply one more decision by the administration to purchase combat equipment from military monopolies and deploy it (in this instance 100 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, 100 B-1 bombers, Trident submarines, 3,000 cruise missiles and so on), it also consists of political plans reflecting a certain position in the approach to the Soviet Union and to American-Soviet relations.

Just what kind of political signal (as American journalists love to say) is the U.S. government sending?

President Reagan categorically refused to approve the SALT-2 Treaty, but this treaty envisaged concrete restrictions in strategic arms both in the number of platforms and in warheads, and the assumed later transition to the next phase, SALT-3, envisaged a considerable reduction in their numbers as well. Putting a good face on the matter, Reagan repeatedly declared demagogically that he would seek a realistic reduction in strategic arms. The abbreviation SAR, i.e., strategic arms reduction, even was placed in circulation in Washington in place of SAL. But discussions remain discussions, and concrete actions of the U.S. government indicate that it is not reduction, but a build-up in arsenals of weapons for mass destruction of people that is first and foremost. President Reagan does not conceal his goals. First of all, as he declared, it is to achieve a "safety margin"--the "expression by which he means an advantage over the Soviet Union," states the WASHINGTON POST without beating around the bush. Secondly, and also according to the President's words, it is to obtain "trump cards" which later can be laid on the conference table. In other words, an attempt to hold talks with the USSR from a position of strength.

Without dwelling on counterarguments to the effect that neither of the goals is attainable inasmuch as there exist absolutely unambiguous warnings by our country's leaders to this effect, we will recapitulate: From the political standpoint Reagan's plan signifies a conscious step-up in international tensions and an increase in the threat to the security of peoples around the world, inasmuch as it

leads to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is a dangerous course, and the blame for aggravation of the political climate rests fully on the Reagan government.

From the military standpoint this step by the American administration cannot fail to be described as openly provocative inasmuch as it leads to a new spiral in the arms race without increasing guarantees of assuring genuine U.S. security at all, and to a further build-up of nuclear missile arsenals, which even now are so sizeable that they can destroy every person on earth several times over.

Acting throughout the entire postwar period as the pioneer in the arms race and initiator in creating increasingly sophisticated models of weapons (we will recall that this was the case with the atomic and hydrogen bombs, with nuclear-powered combatants, with multiple independently targeted nuclear warheads and, finally, when the United States became the only country to begin production of nuclear weapons), U.S. ruling circles tried to justify almost every qualitative and quantitative leap in this area by shouting about their "lag" (the "lag" in bombers and missiles later was declared a lie officially) and the "Soviet threat." A propaganda "justification" also has been prepared for the present instance. This is now the thesis about the "window of vulnerability," in addition to general discourse about the "Soviet military might," which allegedly greatly exceeds missions of defense and surpasses American might.

The essence of the fraudulent trick with the "window of vulnerability" lies in the fact that higher-ups in the American administration headed by Reagan are passing off the purely theoretical vulnerability of ground-based missiles (as of any fixed installation, by the way), which exists for both sides, as an actually existing vulnerability in case the Soviet Union delivers a nuclear missile strike against the United States. This statement is repeated in every way, although it is known that the USSR not only does not intend to attack anyone, but proposed to conclude a treaty, rejected by the United States and NATO, on not being the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons; and during the present session of the UN General Assembly it came out with the initiative of adopting a declaration which would brand as criminal the government which was first to employ nuclear weapons.

Thus, in pushing off from a false premise, Washington is engaging in conscious deception to conceal its attempt to achieve military superiority using pseudoinnocent discourse about a desire merely to "close" the "window of vulnerability."

But no diversionary maneuvers will help conceal the main element: Having decided to build up nuclear missile might, President Reagan is acting at the beck and call of the military-industrial complex, which according to preliminary and thus clearly understated estimates will receive \$180 billion in the next five years for this program alone. And it is not concern for genuine national security, but a gravitation toward world domination that serves as the motivation, the more so as the path toward ensuring it lies not through an increase of arsenals, but through their reduction. National security can be guaranteed not by playing trump-cards, but through honest, constructive, equal talks with consideration of the lawful interests of both sides. And it is not for nothing that an ever-growing number of sensible people are emphasizing in the discussions being carried on in the United States at the present time that real security can be achieved only by continuing the SALT process.

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